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Abstract
Human Migrations can be defined as the movement or displacement of peoples from one
place to another, in particular from one country (emigration) to another (immigration) for
political, social, economic, or personal reasons. They have been the fact of life for populations
integrating into a wider world. Historically, Senegalese migrations to Europe started under
colonialism with the massive recruitments by the French colonial administration within the
Senegalese territory. This practice of European colonial administration caused the first wave of
Senegalese migrations towards Europe to conform to French colonial needs and expectations.
Senegalese migrations to Europe continued in the post-colonial period as part of France’s postwar reconstruction and its need for labor to revitalize its economy. In the 2000s, Senegalese
migrations to Europe increased tremendously with the “Barca or Barsaakh” phenomenon,
involving a whole generation of Senegalese youth. Throughout this research, I provide three
broad theoretical frameworks (colonialism and dependency, post-colonialism, globalization and
its neoliberal ideology) that may explain this phenomenon. However, I rely on colonialism and
dependency and post-colonialism to propose the two leading hypotheses of the study:
H1: If a dependency relationship develops between a colonial power and its former colony, then
the former colony’s economy is likely to be weak and unproductive. France’s relationship with
Senegal is a dependent relationship in which Senegal’s monoculture economy and general
development depend on France’s economic, financial and technical assistance. By weakening
the Senegalese economy, the colonial dependent situation has created conditions of generalized
poverty and lack of economic opportunities for young people. This situation causes migrations to
Europe and elsewhere.

H2: The more post-colonial holders of state power resort to authoritarian rule and the
privatization of the state, the more likely they will loot national resources for their private
interests. In Senegal, post-colonial rulers have used authoritarian means of governance and
appropriated the state resources as personal property. This has created a situation of generalized
poverty and lack of economic opportunities for young people. The outcome has been massive
migrations to Europe and elsewhere.
I attempt to test these two hypotheses using recent statistical databases and empirical and
historical evidence that I collected from the intensive field research I conducted in Senegal
during the 2019 summer externship. Based on the evidence, I discuss migrations from Senegal
by linking them to the issues of poverty and economic deprivation. Although my hypotheses are
largely supported by the evidence, the persistence of poverty in Senegal and its similarities in
some aspects with other poor countries suggest that my two causal factors may not completely
explain poverty in Senegal. Poverty in Senegal may be partly caused by factors (such as drought
and globalization-induced structural adjustment programs of IMF) not accounted for in my
hypotheses. This means that migrations in Senegal are partly explained by these other factors.
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CHAPTER ONE

1

Background Information on Senegal

Senegal Political Map with capital Dakar, national borders, important cities, rivers and lakes. English labeling and
scaling. Illustration. — Graphic by Furian (October 21, 2014). Retrieved from:
https://fr.depositphotos.com/56051475/stock-illustration-senegal-political-map.html
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Senegal is a rather small West African Country bordered by Mauritania in the North, Mali to
the East, Guinea to the southeast, and Guinea-Bissau to the Southwest. It has an estimated
population of around 16 million people and a national territory of 196722km2. The most
populous city is its capital, Dakar, the only city whose population surpasses the 1-million mark.
But, its population is essentially rural with 60% that still live in these areas (Aina, Chachage, and
Yao, 2014, p. 109) while the other 40% is concentrated around the urban cities and surrounding
zones. Throughout history, Senegal was perceived as one of the stable nations in Africa, getting
its independence on April 4, 1960, from France, and transitioning respectively from each of the
following political head of state: Senghor, Abdou Diouf, Abdoulaye Wade, and Macky Sall.
Today, Senegal is a presidential republic structured into 14 administrative regions. The official
language is French, but many native languages and dialects, such as Wolof or Pulaar, are widely
spoken. Most of the Senegalese population is young with an estimated 60% of its population
under the age of 24. 7,509,273 young people under 15 years old (3,772,424 males / 3,736,848
females), and 9,348,629 persons between 15 and 64 years old (4,392,138 males / 4,956,491
females). 1
In religious terms, almost 95% of the population is Muslim though they are subdivided into
various Sufi orders or brotherhoods to which a growing number of Senegalese Muslims belong.
The three major Sufi brotherhoods are the khadriya the Tijaniya, and the Muridiyya. The
khadriya, which is the oldest Muslim Sufi order, was founded in the twelfth century by Cheikh
Abdou Khadre Djeylani. It was originally from the Maghreb, expanding across the Sahara

1
“Senegal Population: Age Structure” (2020). Retrieved from Countrymeters:
https://countrymeters.info/en/Senegal#population_2020
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(Adrar and Walata), Tombouctou and then down into West Africa to Senegal. 2 Even though a
minority of Senegalese belong to this Sufi order, it historically has influenced other Senegalese
brotherhood.
Tijaniya was founded in the eighteen century by Cheikh Ahmad al-Tijani in Morocco. It is
the Sufi order that has the largest followers in Senegal. It is divided into various branches with
different religious leaders in each region in Senegal. Among them, we can cite Ibrahima Niass
of Kaolack (in the North), Maodo Malick Sy of Tivaoune (in the West), Omar Futiwou Tall of
Fouta-Toro (in the North), and Mouhamadou Saidou Ba of Medina Gounass (in the South). It is
the Sufi order that nearly all Pulaar-Speakers belong to.
Finally, the Muridiyya is the only Sufi order that was founded in Senegal by Cheikh
Ahmadou Bamba in the late nineteenth century in Touba (located in the North of Senegal). In its
expansion in Senegal, it has reached the heart of many Wolof (the largest ethnic group) and other
ethnic groups such as the Serere and Halpoular.
All these three major Sufi brotherhoods in Senegal became intertwined with the colonial and
post-colonial administrations and have been playing a significant leadership and influential role
in the country’s politics.
Statement of the Problem
Migrations have been the subject of numerous scholarly works reflecting various conceptual
formulations. They have attempted to provide a better understanding of Migrations as a process,
their causes and effects on the global scale.
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“Khadriya in Africa”. (August 22, 2012). Retrieved from Setal.net:
https://www.setal.net/Cheikh-Saad-Bouh-grand-propagateur-de-la-Khadriya-en-Afrique_a5222.html
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Historically, Senegalese migrations to Europe started during colonialism. In fact, during
colonial times, French colonizers settled in the Senegalese’s land. Once installed, the European
colonial administration created the four townships of Dakar, Rufisque, Goree and Saint Louis.
The creation of these four European townships served as a way to integrate the Senegalese
community, to spread their hegemony and to have total control over the Senegalese territory for
their own sake. In order to operate its plan and business, the European colonial administration
started collaborating with the Senegalese local chiefs who had at that time the power over the
Senegalese people. The collaboration was based on bribery: The European colonial
administration procured them with diamonds, guns, coppers, and ivories, and the chiefs served
them as indispensable channels through which to get access to the Senegalese people. Once the
collaboration was effective, the European colonial administration started their recruiting process.
They took many Senegalese individuals from their own land, embarking them on boats and sent
them to Europe. Many of those Senegalese sent to Europe were transformed into soldiers and
defenders of French colonies. They were given the name of “Tirailleurs” in order to reflect the
policing needs generated by the European colonization phase and to fight for France during the
Two World Wars. This practice of European colonial administration within the Senegalese
territory led to many Senegalese migrations to Europe during that time to conform to Europe’s
needs and expectations.
Senegalese migrations to Europe continued in the post-colonial period. In fact, during the
post-colonial period, there was an international mobility that was partly the result of France
facing a demographic challenge: a declining birth rate, an aging population, and the loss of many
French young soldiers during the two successive world wars. Setting its sight on industrial
recovery, which would require significant labor power, France turned to its former colonies. As
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part of post-war reconstruction, migrants from across francophone Africa, particularly Senegal,
were courted to work in French industries and on infrastructure projects. Known as the “Thirty
Glories”, the three decades after the war saw the dirigiste revitalization of France’s economy,
which was made possible in part by the importation of cheap labor from North and West Africa.
France established official recruitment centers in eight foreign countries, one of which was
Senegal. The economic logic of immigration legislation between 1945 and 1973 enabled France
to remedy its domestic labor shortage by extracting labor from its former colonies (Maher, 2017,
pp. 77-91). This led to a massive migration of Senegalese people to Europe for the latter’s labor
needs.
Since the 2000s, migrations towards Europe have increased tremendously. According to
the Country Profile report published in 2007, approximately 32,000 migrants reached the Canary
Islands, compared to only 4,800 the year before. 3 Recently, in the specific case of Senegal, there
have been new types of migrations. A new phenomenon called “Barca or Barsaakh” (“Barca”
being a reference to Barcelona in Spain, and “Barsaakh” a reference to the Arabic word for
death), meaning “Europe or Death” has preoccupied the Senegalese. It consists of the deaths of
many young Senegalese people who try to reach Europe by any means necessary, including
using boats on the oceans or crossing the Sahara desert. Dakar, Rufisque, Thies, Mbour,
Diourbel, Saint-Louis, Louga, Matam, Ziguinchor, all these areas and cities of Senegal are
affected by the phenomenon of “Barca or Barsaakh”. A high number of young people have lost
their lives. Despite the deaths and sufferings, young people keep on migrating. Consequently,
many Senegalese families have lost their sons, who represented their only hope. This has created

3

Retrieved from Country Profile:
http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/uploads/tx_wilpubdb/CP_10_Senegal.pdf
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a trauma in many families in Senegal and has affected Senegalese society. Whether it is on
television news, newspapers, or local meeting places, all debates revolve around the
phenomenon of “Barca or Barsaakh”. Senegal is in a total shock. This is a shock that the
country cannot endure for a long time. My research is an investigation of the problem, that is, of
the phenomenon of “Barca or Barsaakh”.
Therefore, there is a need to deal with this problem: What is going on? What is the
phenomenon of “Barca or Barsaakh”, and how does it affect the youth and families in Senegal?
This is what I want to investigate.

Research Questions
To understand Senegalese migrations and particularly the phenomenon of "Barca or
Barsaakh", different questions can be raised. For example:
a) How do Migrants get to Europe?
b) What will migrants bring back to Senegal?
c) Do they travel with other family members?
All of these questions are important. However, these are not the types of questions I am
interested in. My main research question is rather:
Why does a whole generation of young Senegalese resort to such desperate and
dangerous Migrations to Europe, known as the “Barca or Barsaakh” phenomenon? What
causes the phenomenon?

7

Short Review
Throughout this research, I will deal with the phenomenon of Senegalese youth’s migrations
called ‘‘Barca or Barsaakh’’. “Barca” is an abbreviation for Barcelona, the administrative and
economic capital of Catalonia in Spain and its surrounding and metropolitan area. In my study,
it refers to Europe. “Barsaakh” is an Arabic word that means “death”. “Barca or Barsaakh” is a
formulation of plucky and valiant young Senegalese migrants seeking opportunities abroad by
braving the Atlantic Ocean and the Sahara desert at their peril.
The works of many scholars and writers related to the issue of migrations are one of the
greatest sources for a general understanding of the issue. Many of the works reflect insights
from three broad theoretical frameworks.
Globalization and Neoliberalism can help answer the research question because they connote a
rise of market reforms as a global creed, a phenomenon partly engendered by the global
economic crisis, which prompted a search for alternative economic and policy paradigms. It puts
emphasis on market rules and their “infallibility”. Economic mobility becomes the fundamental
aspect of many countries because of the fluidity of free trade in goods and services, and free
capital circulation. This creates massive mobility because of economic opportunities in some
countries in the North and the economic failure in other parts of the world such as the African
continent, where the economy is a reproduction of colonial extraverted economy that relied only
on raw materials. Globalization relies on multinational corporations, which exploit the country’s
resources and leave only crumbs for governments already tempted by unlawful practices.
Therein lies the birth of certain de-structuring practices that affect both the state and society.
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They lead to migrations in many African countries, such as Senegal’s new phenomenon of
“Barca or Barsaakh” (Note taken from AAS 612, Dr. Carty).
Neoliberalism is the ideology of globalization. It helps answer the research question because
with it comes calamities that ravage the African countries. Because neoliberalism is part of
globalization, fluid movements of people also characterize it. Take the case of Senegal, where
rural areas provide most of the food for the nation. The new government’s agricultural program
of diversification should help farmers not only to feed themselves and their families year-round
but also to retain seeds for the next season and commercialize a significant part for liquidity.
However, neoliberalism has brought drastic changes. More and more, rural people such as
leather, iron, clay smiths and workers are forced to move to the cities for additional cash flow.
These relocations of rural populations to the city for their survival cause an anarchical growth of
the urban population and slums that lack basic services. This accentuates insecurity in the large
slums of the major cities. The miserable city-living causes slum dwellers to attempt an escape to
Europe. Another neoliberal policy is Structural Adjustment Policies by the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. It gives indebted states access to further credit with which to
service their debts but in return for a radical neoliberal restructuring that includes the
deregulation of finance and trade as well as the privatization of public assets. Structural
adjustment policy also imposes cuts in State subsidies, public employment, wages, which affect
severely families. These two combined calamities set the stage for the movement Fakh
(Extraction: leaving by any way possible), and its slogan “Barca or Barsaakh” by young
Senegalese.
Colonialism and post-colonialism are the two other broad frameworks that help explain
migrations. Several authors have addressed the issue in general and in relation to Senegal. With
9

the new economic configuration of the world in the new industrial era, dependency has become a
colonial tie mechanism allowing former colonial powers to establish not merely outposts from
which they could still execute their system of dominance, but also to get access to their former
colonized countries’ raw materials in order to expand their industrial economies. Such a
mechanism renders pliant their former colonized countries for their own specific interests. In
Africa, many European powers mostly used this colonial dependency as their post-independent
method in most of their former colonies. In Senegal, for instance, its former colonizer, France,
even after relinquishing direct rule over Senegalese territory after its independence, has created
colonial dependency ties with the latter and ensured a steady supply of Senegal’s raw natural
resources to further advance its own development. This can be seen in the Senegalese
monoculture economy, which is driven by agriculture. Furthermore, the Senegalese economy is
still a colonial extraverted economy based on the massive export of its agricultural and fishing
products to France and other parts of Europe but with low-income revenue for Senegal. This has
created a stagnation in the Senegalese economy. In addition, the colonial dependency makes it
possible for France to be the main trade partner of Senegal. It leads Senegal to operate in the
global economy of France and Europe rather than in favor of its national economy. This
condition deregulates its financial market and allows Senegal’s integration in the global market.
Such conditions have led to shortfalls in foreign exchange for Senegal and its need to borrow
money from I.M.F to recover (Note taken from Professor Mbow’s discussion). The end result is
generalized poverty and lack of opportunities in Senegal.
In post-colonial Africa, many believed that with the independence of many African
countries, prosperity would follow automatically. In the 1960s, many newly independent
African states’ hopes lied with the new African rulers, who were expected to serve their citizens
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and to relieve their long-suffering by practicing better governance and by committing themselves
to the development of the African continent. A continent returning to African control where the
interests of their citizens would be put first. Many believed that after independence, the
continent would make more progress after a long time of colonial oppression. However, these
hopes were dashed. Authoritarian rule better characterized the new African regimes. They
plundered national treasuries and appropriated the natural resources at the expense of the masses.
Such a way of governing has betrayed the aspirations and hopes of their citizens and has violated
the rights of their people with impunity. It is one reason why African development is stalling
comparing to other regions. In Senegal for instance, post-colonial rulers have used authoritarian
means of governance and appropriated the state resources as their personal property. This has
created a situation of generalized economic poverty and lack of opportunity for young people.
Colonialism’s dependency and post-colonialism are, thus, two other theoretical frameworks
that help explain migrations. The literature on migrations raises issues that are connected to
these broad theoretical frameworks.
Migrations from Senegal to Europe are often viewed as outcomes of “irregularities”, which
make Senegalese migrants desperate travelers who fall victim to human trafficking. Their
illegality makes migrants worthless in the eyes of the traffickers whose only goal is to make
profits and to take advantage of the situation, as was the case under Slavery. Such conditions
compel them to seek humanitarian protection. Maher (2017) evokes this aspect of migrations,
stating that, “Today what we see is an increasing victimization of the migrant subject. As such,
the blame is often leveled against migration facilitators, who allegedly use and abuse their
human ‘cargo’ for quick profits. It has become common in media and policy reports to suggest
that irregular migrants the world over are manipulated into departure by greedy and
11

unscrupulous human smugglers who do not fully disclose the dangers of passage, and who take
advantage of passive or gullible migrants. Consequently, Europe’s mission to police its borders
becomes a humanitarian project to ‘protect’ the vulnerable migrants”. Playing on the ‘care and
control duality of humanitarianism’, police interventions ‘control’ the national borders while
‘caring’ for the vulnerable migrant who is presumably exploited by criminal thugs.
It is true that Senegalese do face increasing exploitation along their journey to Europe, such
as being kidnapped, being held for ransom, or literally being sold by depraved people. This
development is due to the fact that border securitization has made entry an impossibility for
most. Migrants are forced to rely on traffickers. However, I agree with Maher. Traffickers do
not cause migrations. They only take advantage of the situation because many of these migrants
feel vulnerable, desperate and naive and are always opened to rely on traffickers whom they
consider as their conveyor who can help them navigate through their way to Europe. But what or
who created this situation that compels many of these migrants to live their countries?
Mondain, Diagne, and Randall (2013) explore also the dynamics of migrations among
Senegalese men. The latter are motivated by the social reality and religious culture of Senegal,
which places men as caretakers of the family. The moral and religious values that characterize
Senegalese Wolof society, the obligations and duty toward family and parents compel many men
to migrate. Failure to respect these values could lead to the marginalization and social exclusion
of the individual. According to the three authors, “Migrations to Europe have become a major
source of financial and social resources for an increasing number of Senegalese men who are the
main providers for their natal households”. For the three authors, through migrations they hope
to support their families, especially parents left behind, contributing to both their well-being and
social standing in old age”.
12

I completely agree with Mondain, Diagne, and Randall. Senegal’s social reality and
religious culture place men at the center of attention. A man’s financial situation characterizes
and determines him in the Wolof society, where duties and obligations toward the family are
supposed to be sorted out by the man. It is impossible for the man to stay home without being
able to meet all these expectations. Therefore, the need to provide for their families economically
is what forces Senegalese men to migrate to Europe or elsewhere. But this still does not explain
why they cannot stay in Senegal to meet these obligations. Why are resources lacking in
Senegal?
Many Senegalese people choose to migrate illegally to Europe. Mbaye (2014) explores this
aspect of migrations by explaining the factors behind the choice to migrate illegally, knowing
that death might occur during the trip. According to him, “the intentions to Migrate are
determined by the economic conditions in the country of origin such as the level of income
inequality” (Mbaye, 2014, p. 6). Dalen, Groenwwold and Schoorl (Mbaye, 2014, p.6) assert that
“the probability to migrate can be motivated by great expectations concerning the living
standards at the destination”.
I agree with Mbaye because the economic system must be analyzed as a fundamental
element of any country’s development. The link between Migrations and income inequality is
well evidenced by the fact that much of the global economy is controlled by the G20 countries
and the remaining is divided among the other countries of the world, many of which remain
below the poverty line. Low economic growth and income inequality are among the main
reasons that cause many people to migrate to other countries in order to flee hardship and to
seize opportunities that these countries can offer them to improve their living conditions and to
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succeed in their lives. However, Mbaye does not explain who creates income inequality in a
country like Senegal.
According to Baizian and Gonzales (2016), “Senegalese migrations to Europe have their
roots in colonialism, and the first migrations resulted from recruitment efforts by the French
army and administration during colonial times”. It means that migrations have their roots during
the time when the European system of dominance took individuals from their own land and
transformed them into defenders of French colonies. Furthermore, they highlight the role of the
labor market and social capital in the migrations. In agreement with Baizian and Gonzales, I
stated earlier that Migrations in Senegal have their roots in the colonial period. I take for proof
the statue of “Demba and Dupont” in Senegal, representing an African and a French soldier,
which is a symbol of colonial paternalism. This view is consistent with exploring colonialism as
a theoretical framework.
Migrations and the indefectible will of the young Senegalese who try at all costs to go to
Europe are a major theme for Senegalese rappers known as “Y'en a marre” (“We are fed up”),
considered since the 2000s as a success in Senegal with their ability to mobilize young people in
order to be heard in the local public sphere to question and feel concerned about the issue of
migrations. They convey messages of awareness in their texts. Kouka (2014) in his
anthropological study of Senegalese migrations chooses to focus on the discourse of these
rappers as actors of social life, in relation to the phenomenon of migrations or life in exile. As
Kouka, states “Now taking part in mobility, a number of them, among the most emblematic of
the current period, produce texts and express themselves in the media on the subject of
migrations”. According to Kouka (2014, p. 418) “This imagined geography is not comparable to
the pure "fantasy" or phantasmagoria for the work of the imagination to have an effect; it
14

imposes itself on it to be connected with the real”. The rappers tie themselves to their lived
experiences and those of their peers to produce a speech as anchored as possible in the daily
reality of Senegal. They mention and evoke in their texts the difficulties of the Senegalese life
by blaming the Senegalese leaders perceived as being there only for their own interest and who
are responsible for the Senegalese migrations to Europe.
I consider Kouka’s argument because rap represents Senegalese culture, and rappers have
played an important role in raising the awareness of Senegalese youth who constitute the future
and hope of the Senegalese Nation. Taking into consideration the embezzlements and corruption
of the Senegalese leaders, Senegalese rappers’ blame of the Senegalese leaders, perceived as the
main causes of the Senegalese migrations to Europe, is apt.
In light of what these different authors have argued, I concur that the effects of globalization,
neoliberalism, colonialism, and post-colonialism have destroyed hopes of Africans and
particularly of Senegalese. Not having great opportunities and better living conditions for
themselves and their families are the socioeconomic consequences in Africa. It is an effect of
the negative economic growth and the development of the African Continent. In Senegal, the
generalized poverty and the attendant lack of economic opportunities for young people is a
possible reason for migrations.
Nevertheless, I do not focus on globalization and neoliberalism here because of time constraint
imposed by my field research. They require a collection of a different set of data. For this
research, I will use Colonialism and Post-Colonialism as theoretical frameworks to guide my
hypotheses. I propose two hypotheses.
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Hypotheses
H1: If a dependency relationship develops between a colonial power and its former colony, then
the former colony’s economy is likely to be weak and unproductive. France’s relationship with
Senegal is a dependent relationship in which Senegal’s monoculture economy and general
development depend on France’s economic, financial and technical assistance. By weakening
the Senegalese economy, the colonial dependent situation has created conditions of generalized
poverty and lack of economic opportunities for young people. This situation causes migrations to
Europe and elsewhere.
H2: The more post-colonial holders of state power resort to authoritarian rule and the
privatization of the state, the more likely they will loot national resources for their private
interests. In Senegal, post-colonial rulers have used authoritarian means of governance and
appropriated the state resources as personal property. This has created a situation of generalized
poverty and lack of economic opportunities for young people. The outcome has been massive
migrations to Europe and elsewhere.

Methods
In order to test these two hypotheses, in light of research topic, which depicts the social
context of a particular population, I use a qualitative research approach. The latter helps
illuminate and understand complex psychosocial issues and better answers the humanistic
question of why and how. It brings flexibility and provides an effective way of collecting the
type of information sought by my research question. To collect the data, I resorted to sampling,
snowballing sampling, Gender approach, and interviews, in addition to documents and archives.
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Sampling
Sampling is as a systematic selecting process that helps identify the subjects or informants
of the study. In other words, it defines and selects a subset of population for any given or
particular study. It was an appropriate method for me to use as it targeted and selected
individuals sharing the same culture and representing the society about which I was collecting
data. Each individual selected for the collection of data represented the sample frame.
Therefore, I used the group of those Senegalese who left for Europe or who attempted to leave
for Europe, their families and friends who still live in Senegal.

Snowballing sampling
Snowball or chain sampling usually involves utilizing well-informed people to identify
critical cases or informants who have a great deal of information about a phenomenon. As a
researcher, I followed this chain of contacts in order to identify informants I did not know and to
accumulate more information. Often a few key informants or cases were mentioned multiple
times and took on additional importance. It was represented as a chain referral sampling. One
research participant referred to another, that person referred to another and the latter referred me
to another unsuspected informant. Thus, a chain of potential participants was identified. For me,
it was also a useful strategy to use when my group of interest was likely to be difficult to find,
not only because of some stigma associated with the group but also because the group appeared
relatively rare. By contacting some members of Senegalese communities living in Senegal, they
referred me to other people who also were able to provide in-depth and detailed information
about the migration patterns from Senegal.
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Gender approach
I used both male and female participants to convey different articulations and experiences
germane to my research. I had in mind those who constituted the first wave of migrations and
their family members in Senegal and those who experienced the impact of migrations with the
loss of their sons. This gender approach created triangulation and added more value to the data
collected.

Interviews
Much of qualitative research entails oral interviews. The latter constitute a fundamental way
for a complete answer to a research question. Oral Interviews may be designated as structured or
rigid when data are collected by the same flow, same questions, and the same order. The
questions asked are generally limited, thus allowing short answers and only enough useful data
in a particular research study. In this study, semi-structured interviews, which allow more openended answers without any formalized or strictly-followed list of questions, were used in order to
add creativity and to help develop further avenues for data collection.

Documents and Archives
I collected data through documents and archives. For the documents, I consulted those
provided by the Senegalese government, particularly those of the Senegalese ministries of youth
and national education, of labor, of foreign affairs and international cooperation. Newspapers
such as “L’Observateur”, “Le Soleil” and “Le Quotidien” were also consulted via Senegal’s
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national archive, where I purchased all documents related to Senegalese migrations. I went to
IFAN (Fundamental Institute of Black Africa) which is an academic and research institution that
is located at Cheikh Anta Diop University of Dakar. Its aim is to help students and researchers
by facilitating access to necessary resources in their field of research. I also went to CODESRIA
(Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa). The latter’s main aims are
to develop scientific capabilities and tools that promote the cohesion, well-being, and progress of
African societies. Unfortunately, I did not get access to their archives because by the time I was
there, they were closed until further notice.

Interest of this Study
I am interested in this study for several reasons. First, because it reflects the lives of many
Senegalese young people and is part of my own experience as part of this generation. In fact, in
Senegal, we young people of my generation (18-29) used to find ourselves in a corner called the
“corner of the lost” that was behind Cheikh Anta Diop University of Dakar, next to the beach, to
meditate and to exchange ideas concerning our future. Always present at this corner, I can
testify about the feeling of disappointment and despair of these young people who were very
worried about the future. These feelings and concerns caused many of them to make bad
decisions to migrate and face the “Barca or Barsaakh” phenomenon as the only possible way to
leave the chaotic situation in Senegal for a better tomorrow. Thus, it is of major interest for me
to contribute through this study to an understanding of the aches and pains of the young
Senegalese people in the hope of seeing some change in the Senegalese society.
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Second, the study sheds light on the incapacity of the African State, and particularly the
Senegalese State, to unleash the potential of its youth as manifested through the inadequacy of
the education system. As a result, to leave the country or to stay is now a matter of life and death
both literally and metaphorically. Thus, this study will help inform the state by hopefully
awakening the awareness of these Senegalese leaders to consider and to open the door to these
Senegalese young people who constitute the hope of the nation of tomorrow.
Third, as a student in the African American department, the study’s interests also lie in its
Pan African implications because many of Senegal’s problems are shared by other African
countries. Senegalese, African American and Afro South Americans share the racial component
of Migration. Thus, this study will help to raise the debate of leadership and management in the
Pan-African world.
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CHAPTER TWO:

LITERATURE REVIEW
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Introduction
Imperialism is originated from the Latin word imperium, which means supreme power and
has become a policy or ideology of extending a country's rule over foreign nations, often by
military force or by gaining political and economic control of other areas. 4 The theory of
imperialism is dominated by Lenin’s contribution and Marxist scholars of imperialism.
According to Lenin and Marxist scholars of imperialism, “Imperialism was not simply a policy,
but an indispensable stage of capitalist growth and development, the higher stage of capitalism
because of its power to extract a surplus-value, to expand production, and to increase privileged
investment under competition. Imperialist expansion displays five characteristics: (1) the
concentration of a production and capital so that it creates monopolies; (2) the fusion between
banking capital and industrial capital occurs as the result of concentration of production in
monopolies. This merger gives rise to the finance capital dominated by financial oligarchies and
financial traders; (3) the exportation of capital, which is more important than the export of
commodities into other countries, thanks to foreign investments; (4) the formation of
international capitalist monopolies that share the world among themselves; (5) the territorial
division of the whole world by great powers” (Yansane, 1980, p.10). For Hobson who preceded
Lenin’s contribution, “Imperialism was a policy adopted in capitalist societies because of
inequalities in the distribution of wealth. When consumption failed to keep pace with the growth
of production power in developed capitalist economies which were haunted by
underemployment and convinced that more goods can be produced than can be sold at a profit
and that more capital exists than can be found a remunerative investment, the resulting state of

4

Definition retrieved from Dictionnary.com:
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/imperialism
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over saving made imperialism a necessity” (Yansané, 1980, p. 9). Campbell (2015, pp. 99-100)
defines it as “a worldwide expression of the search for profits and the ever-increasing
accumulation of surplus value by monopoly-financial capital centered in two parts of the world;
first in Europe, and then in North America. Placing its fact within the general trajectory of the
evolution of the transcendental factor, which has changed the face of the world, namely capital
and the process of its accumulation, imperialism refers to piracy transplanted from the seas to dry
land. It is piracy reorganized, consolidated, and adapted to the aim of exploiting the natural and
human resources of our peoples”. “It was the highest stage of capitalism”, said Lenin (Nkrumah,
1965, p. 37).
The singularity of imperialism in Africa was marked by the period when Europeans and
foreign powers invaded the continent, exercised supreme authority, and forced the African
society to relinquish power entirely to Europeans. As a system of domination and subordination
organized with an imperial center and a periphery, it gained tremendous momentum in the
history of Africa. It became the product of specific historical conditions that marked the starting
point, which made possible the emergence of byproducts such as colonialism and dependency,
post-colonialism, globalization and its neoliberal ideology that occurred in the next decades of
world history with particular consequences in the African continent. The combination of these
three episodes: colonialism, post-colonialism, and globalization and its neoliberal ideology as the
byproducts of imperialism continue to contribute to the legacy of western hegemony and the
notion of weak state attributed to Africa. Hereafter I discuss these three episodes, although I rely
on colonialism and dependency and post-colonialism as my conceptual and theoretical
frameworks to help shed light on the causes of migrations of young Senegalese to Europe.
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Colonialism and Dependency Relations
Colonialism was the policy of a nation seeking to extend or retain its authority over other
people or territories (Webster, 1989, p. 291). From Rodney’s perspective (1972), its general aim
was for economic dominance. The colonizing country sought to benefit from the colonized
country or landmass. In the process, colonizers imposed their religion, economics, and
medicinal practices on the natives. According to Yansané (1980, p. 9), “colonialism had a few
characteristic features. First, colonial domination made the colonists secure economic
advantages by acquiring more land, properties, and material resources. Second, the colonists
ravaged and destroyed many independent and indigenous ways of life and cultures. Third, the
rise of racism as an ideology justified and rationalized the dehumanizing and depersonalizing
aspect of colonialism. Fourth, political economy and social institutions were established to
continue European domination, to incorporate and subordinate the African people by
colonialism, and to strengthen their attachment to the expanding European capitalist economic
and trading activities from the fifteenth century to the present”.
Driven by imperialism, colonialism, as the practice of the idea of a system of dominance
over the periphery, designed institution that would primarily benefit Europe. With the Berlin
conference (1884-1885), countries like Great Britain, Portugal, German, France, Italy,
Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck and King Leopold II of Belgium, among others, partitioned and
carved up the African continent into spheres of influence. The European colonial powers were
seeking to establish not merely outposts from which they could launch campaigns against each
other to preserve their geopolitical dominance, but also new resources for the raw materials they
needed to expand their industrial economies. The territories established after the Berlin
conference served the interests of the colonial powers well. The administrations they set up were
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not interested in the genuine development of an empowered local populace; they were there
either to ensure the flow of raw materials to the mother countries or to provide representation and
organizational capacity for the white settlers who were encouraged to colonize the new
territories, in the name of developing them and to “civilize” and Christianize third-world
countries the native peoples (Maathai, 2009, p. 26).
The first five of the 25 articles issued from the “Charter” was developed and traded discretely
at the “Berlin conference in 1885”. They were secretly renegotiated two years after World War
II at “Yalta” in February 1947, and had partitioned the world in two blocks: the colonial
metropole and Africa. According to CoupsFrancs Journal (2018), the Charter stated
approximately the following: (Article 1): From the motto of Imperialism: rule the world and
control the riches of the planet; our policy is to divide to better rule, dominate, exploit and raid to
fill our banks and make them the most powerful in the world. (Article 2): No third-world
country is a sovereign and independent state. (Article 3): All power in the countries of the third
world comes from us, who exercise it by pressure on the leaders who are just our puppets.
Nobody in the third world can give itself the exercise. (Article 4): All Third-world countries are
divisible and their borders are accessible to our will. Respect for territorial integrity does not
exist for the third world. (Article 5): All dictators must put their fortune in our banks for the
security of our interests. This fortune will serve as donations and credits granted by us as
assistance and development assistance. 5
Although these are a rough interpretation of the charter, because of the partition of and
scramble for Africa at the Berlin Conference, currently Africa is subject to the same strategy by a

5

“Charter Invented by the Western Powers to share and dominate Africa”. (August 15, 2018). Retrieved from CoupsFrancs:
https://www.coupsfrancs.com/voici-la-charte-inventee-par-les-puissances-occidentales-pour-se-partager-et-dominer-lafrique/
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different costs of players. There are no more underground and secretive movements or activities
of the partition of Africa as it was at the Berlin conference. 6 Nevertheless, looking at how those
scrambling for Africa are partitioning, if not repartitioning it, Africa is facing a modern-time
scramble or new scramble (Dzingirai, 2003; Lee, 2006; Frynas and Paulo, 2006; and
Habiyaremye, 2011). The current scramble is about the leverage and extraction of resources
whereby those former colonial powers scrambling for Africa do not necessarily need to occupy it
directly. Instead, they want to use Africans themselves to do the show. While Africa was not
aware of the first scramble for itself during the precolonial, colonial and post-colonial time, it
still is the subject of a scramble in the modern time, as the continent is still dependent on its
former colonizers. The latter continue to play their cards smartly based on their acquired
experience from the history of colonialism and imperialism in Africa.
During the heyday of the world economic expansion era 7, there was an economic
reconfiguration incorporated into the world system. As Wallerstein (Wallerstein, 2004)
characterizes it, “the world system is as a set of mechanisms, which redistributes surplus value
from the periphery to the core”. In his terminology, the core is the developed, industrialized part
of the world, and the periphery is the “underdeveloped”, typically raw materials-exporting from
the poor part of the world. In the new world marked by a global economic configuration, the
market is the means by which the core exploits the periphery. It has established imbalance and
privilege upon nations such as the industrialized and the underdeveloped countries particularly

6

The Scramble for Africa was a late nineteenth century rush by major Western European powers to stake territorial claims in
Africa. Partition of Africa formalized these claims, and imperial occupation was eventually accomplished through military
conquest from the late 1880s to the early twentieth century. For a summary of these historical processes, see Robert O. Collins
and James Burns, A History of Sub-Saharan Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007: 265-279.
7 “Economic expansion era” is an economic growth period, a period where there is an increase in the level of economic activity,
and of the goods and services available.
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Africa. According to the economist Goldstein (Mhango, 2017, p. 117): “Africa is endowed with
attractive extractive resources such as oil, mining, and timber that are very capital-incentive”.
Because of such wealth in terms of natural resources, many Europeans countries, due to their
hegemony and the colonial relation they built, have participated in massive exploitation of
African countries by raw materials exporting, international division of labor, free market, and
free trade in order to accumulate wealth.
Therefore, the concept of colonialism and dependency automatically came into existence
when parts of Africa were caught in the web of international commerce. On the one hand, there
were the European countries who decided on the role to be played by the African economy
because they made their African colonies’ monoculture economies entirely dependent on the
metropolitan buyers of their produce; and on the other hand, Africa formed an extension to the
European capitalist market. The latter double Western countries’ wealth by exploiting Africa’s
cash-crops and buying raw materials from Africa at low prices and then processing and selling
them back to Africa at hiked prices because “as far as foreign trade was concerned, Africa was
dependent on what Europeans were prepared to buy and sell” (Rodney, 1972, p. 76). In my
understanding, the colonized (Africa) is like a person who is fallen into a hole. Its former
colonizers represent the person holding a rope and telling her, “I will throw you a rope so you
can get out”. While the rope provided is never quite long enough for her to grab on to it, it is
long enough so she has the hope of reaching it. At the same time, the person holding the rope
throws spades and is encouraging the person in the hole to dig herself in deeper. In other words,
from the outset in the game, Africa’s former colonizers are not motivated by the love of Africa or
the intention to help it out but to exploit it. In the hope of seeing its economic development to
proceed after the trade became truly international, Africa was integrated into the global market
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by its former colonial powers, who at the same time undermined its stated objectives. Africa
achieved a completely opposite outcome, leaving the majority of the African states dependent
rather than empowered because, as Rodney (1972, p. 75) asserted, “The relationship between
Africa and Western Europe was just to ensure the transfer of wealth from Africa to Europe and
the contention here is that Africa helped to develop Western Europe in the same proportion as
Western Europe helped to underdevelop Africa”.
With the colonization of Africa, Europeans in their respective colonies applied two
contrasting ideals. They were the philosophy of indirect and direct rule. The philosophy of
indirect rule, which is associated closely with the name of Lord Lugard (a British officer,
colonial administrator, explorer of Africa, governor of Hong Kong and then of Nigeria, and
practitioner that came to be known as one of the best theorists of indirect rule matters), became
dominant in British imperial thinking between the two World Wars. It held that the most
appropriate way to administer the newly acquired territories was to operate through the existing
political authorities rather than to act directly upon the people. In this way, the impact of
imperial rule was less obvious to ordinary Africans and much of the day-to-day political activity
of the rural areas was left apparently undisturbed. This philosophy had a threefold origin: the
parsimony of the British Treasury, which necessitated a cheap method of administration; a
genuine belief in the sanctity of local institutions and a fear of the social and political ills which
follow their decay; and, finally Lord Lugard’s own experience in Northern Nigeria where easily
discernible political rulers had been the obvious tools for his administration (Hodder-Williams,
1984, p. 33).
The philosophy of direct rule, by contrast, minimized the importance of existing political
organizations. The paradigm for this essential French conception was a bureaucratic state in
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which officials were appointed at every level, each level being ultimately responsible to the
imperial government itself. There were domestic reasons for such a preference. The French
state was a centralized, bureaucratic state in which the preféts in départments were powerful
agents of the central government. The French motives for imperial expansion were more
positive than the British and thus more easily attracted government funds. There was not in
France tradition, and approval, of local government autonomy. Thus, the governors-general of
French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa, for instance, who were themselves subject to
control from Paris, were the heads of centralized hierarchies; their control extended over the
governors of the individual territories, the appointed commendant de cercle and chef de
subdivision (roughly the equivalent to the district commissioner and district officer in the British
Empire), and the appointed chef de canton and chef de village, whose authority depended not
upon his standing in the local political system but upon his efficiency as a tax collector. Orders
thus went down the line of command and there was little feedback, or room for the initiative,
through political channels to which villagers had access (Hodder-Williams, 1984, p. 33-34).
The difference in this dichotomy between the French and British philosophies of imperial
rule can be summed up by saying that the French policy was designed to create black
Frenchmen, while British policy was designed to create Africans with British characteristics. In
the French colonies, there was the assimilationist policy that was incorporated into the colonies’
educational system, which from primary to university level was made free, secular, and carried
out exclusively in the French language. This assimilationist policy also allowed France to
entrust their interests to the élites, professors, and their recruits to black officers (Symonds, 1966,
p. 213). The centralized political structures and those assimilated people moved the centre of
political competition to the national level, where the political parties were responsive not to local
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barons but to the need for influence in the French National Assembly (Hodder-Williams, 1984,
p. 44). But on the British side, there was never any thought of assimilation. Although the ideas
behind the policies may have been different, the practices of imperial rule on both sides had the
same purposes that were to have the control of Africa and make the continent available to their
disposal.
By 1900, a significant part of Africa had been colonized by European powers. For instance,
British dominated Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, The Anglo-Egyptian Susan, Uganda,
Northern and Southern Rhodesia, and the Union of South Africa. French dominated West Africa
and Equatorial Africa. The colonial state was the machinery of administrative domination
established to facilitate effective control and exploitation of the colonized societies. 8

Map retrieved from Exploring African: http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/colonial-exploration-and-conquest-in-africaexplore/
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The Scramble for Africa: late 19th century. (March 20, 2015). Retrieved from SAHO:
https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/grade-8-term-3-scramble-africa-late-19th-century
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According to Mhango (2017, p. 124), “Africa has immense resources that many rich
countries need. But Africa has never benefited from its humungous resources. Thanks to
colonial and the archaic and exploitative nature of international trade, Africa’s resources have
become a curse of its own”. “This resources curse has turned Africa into a witness of its
robbery” (Robinson and Verdier, 2006; Mideksa, 2013; and Haber, and Menaldo, 2011).
Mhango (2016) addresses colonial legacies as the major causes of Africa’s
underdevelopment. He argues that the division of Africa did not only weaken African countries
but also created artificial identities, dependency, perpetual exploitation through neo-colonialism
and enmity among African countries, and suggests that the only way to turn the resource curse
into blessings is only through reunifying Africa so as to have a say in international affairs just
like the US or Canada have whereby the money and resources that fund war and the war of
economies will be channeled and invested in economically and socially beneficial uses.
According to Mhango (2017, p. 179), “ Many hyper iconized and eulogized European racist
scholars such as G.W. F Hegel, Darwin, Ibn Khaldrun, Francois-Marie Arouet (Voltaire), Ibn
Sina or Avicenna. David Hume, Emanuel Kant, Ibn Qutaybah and others, viewed Africa as an
android that will never do anything meaningful for itself while at the same time it has for many
years contributed immensely for the prosperity of the world”. From this point of view, most
Western countries tip the balance in international affairs and world economy with the means of
dependency by continuing to perpetuate their routines and habits with Africa, their daily
homework of exploiting Africa’s natural resources by practicing plundering, deceit, and
manipulations as the same rules of the game that make them prosperous and respectable.
Conversely, in the case of Africa, it credulously lives with the infamy of excruciating
31

dependency that leads to the suffering, desperate situation of its citizens, poverty, and beggary in
the country because Africa has allowed itself to become the backyard of the world. Essentially,
Africa expects its development by depending on Western countries to export development to it
instead of adopting some strategies to top up to what it naturally is endowed with (Note taken
from AAS 612, Dr. Carty). Furthermore, Africa’s development results from an external spur that
does not emanate from and rest in the hearts, minds, and the shoulders of Africa itself, but it
relies on whatever external forces can offer. Countries keep on allowing foreigners to define
them and decide for them, thus making Africa dig itself deeper in backwardness and remain in
slumber.
According to Clapham (1996, p. 98), “Post-colonialism was the most exclusive manifestation
of colonial dependency relation, between a single former metropole on the one hand, and its
former colonized country on the other. Even multilateral organizations such as the Francophone
Community and the Commonwealth were in essence clusters of bilateral relationships, in which
the connections of each of the individual members with France or Britain were on a different
plane from those, which they had with one another. The incorporation of all Africa’s former
colonizers into the European Community, 9 and their creation of a multilateral relationship among
themselves, none the less brought with it a multilateralization of their relations with Africa, and
in turn, broadened the linkages which African states could seek in Europe”. “Postcoloniality was
the condition of what we might ungenerously call a comprador intelligentsia: of a relatively
small, Western-Style, Western-trained, group of writers and thinkers, who mediated the trade in
cultural commodities of world capitalism at the periphery. In the West they were known through

9

The Term “European Community” (or EC) is used throughout this section, for an institution that has successively been known
as the European Common Market, the European Community, and Economic Community, and most recently the European Union.
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the Africa they offered; their compatriots knew them both through the West they presented to
Africa and through Africa, they had invented for the world, for each other and Africa” said
Appiah (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, 1995, p. 119). Put it differently, post-colonialism was
the period when Africa’s continent transitioning through colonialism, was influenced by many
Western thinkers to borrow and adapt the Western’s cultural forms of capitalism where
everything was based on accumulation and commodification. This period represented not only a
period to create a normative type of society in Africa but also a dependency relation in the
formerly colonized continent Africa.
For Clapham (1996, pp. 98-99), “Academic analysis of this relationship has almost
exclusively been concerned with Lomé Conventions, which from 1975 linked the two groups of
States within a common trading structure, and within that with the impact of the Conventions on
African economic development. This discussion will take a different emphasis. The effects of
the Lomé Conventions on African development were in any event negligible, and their
provisions are of interest largely as indicating the balance of relative advantage, which existed at
the time when each of them was negotiated. The aid provisions of the Conventions, however,
provided African states with a significant source of income, while at the same time subjecting
them to the peculiar pressures and tensions, which any relationship creates. More generally, this
relationship provided European Community states with a mechanism through which to pursue
their individual or collective interests in Africa, while giving false alternative points at the same
time to African states of accessing to Western Europe financial support”.
In its origin, the initiative for establishing special links between the European Community
and its former African colonies came very largely from France, which established sphere of
influence and especial relation over its former colonies in Africa known under the expression of
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“Françafrique”. 10 The latter allowed France to continue to maintain dependency relations and to
practice its foreign policy over its former colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa. One of the salient
examples that can be given to corroborate this idea of special relation within dependency is the
“CFA Franc”. Established during the Bretton wood agreement in December 1945, it became the
current and common money of 14 African States members of the “Franc Zone” as a way of
maintenance of a special relationship between France and the Francophone states of Africa. 11 At
its most cynical, indeed, it could be regarded as a mechanism through which other states in the
Community (and especially Germany) could be induced to contribute to the French aid budget,
and through which the special trading relationship between France and the Former colonies
could be extended to the rest of the Community while remaining essentially under French
control. The founding members of the Community, France had overwhelmingly the most
important interests in Africa, and though the arrangements made for former French colonies had
to be extended to those of greatest gainers. This largely French connection led first to the
provision for the ‘association’ of the African colonies of Community members under the Treaty
of Rome, and subsequently to the negotiation of the Yaoundé Conventions between the
Community and 18 of their former African colonies (Clapham, 1996, p. 99). According to
Zartman (1971) “The first Yaoundé Convention came into effect in 1963, and the second 1969;
but though they put the relationship between the 6 states of the EC and their African former
colonies formally on the basis of an agreement between independent states, and maintained the
European Development Fund for EC aid, they were too restricted in scope, and too uneven in the

10

“Françafrique”, derived from the expression of France-Africa, it is generally used in a pejorative way to designate the special
relationship between France and its former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa during the post-colonial period.

11 “History of CfA Franc”. Retrieved from BCEAO:
https://www.bceao.int/fr/content/histoire-du-franc-cfa
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bargaining power of the two sides, to constitute more than a partial multilateralism of previously
bilateral post-colonial economic relationships”.
Once again, Africa was at the Centre of the world, and promises were many. However, the
game has remained the same. Britain joined to the EC membership. By doing so, the United
Kingdom adopted a strategy to make it necessary to extend the EC-African relationship to
Commonwealth African states, and in the event led to the inclusion of all independent subSaharan states, which wished to take part, except for South Africa, while France used
Francophone linkages to rekindle their colonial ties. In addition to that, there are now emerging
blocs such as China, India, Japan, and Turkey, among others, as a counterweight to the West, but
which are espousing the same Western strategies. All these new countries promise heavens
while blaming the former colonial powers. Zhang Ming (Mhango, 2017, p. 119), China’s ViceMinister for Foreign Affairs recently said that, “There is never a shortage of conferences and
promises for Africa, and yet action and implementation have not always followed”. I believe
that even when the actions were followed, Africa would not have any gains. Zhang’s statement
is still a strategy to jockey for a position to meet some African leaders of the countries that hold
resources these courters need. “Those who summon Africa prepare themselves based on their
interests, strategies, and timing while Africa just fits in without any pre-prep arrangement”
(Mhango, 2017, p. 122). Those hegemonic powers seek to take advantage of Africa’s natural
resources and cash crop producing in order to reinforce their economic and financial muscles not
to mention their technological advancement while Africa is weakened, and relies on promises,
hoping that there is goodwill or love in business.
Thus, these are the consequences of colonization and dependency ties through which former
colonial powers imposed their power and reinforced a sense of superiority vis-à-vis their former
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colonized countries in Africa. The latter accepted an inferiority complex and weakness vis-à-vis
their former colonial rulers. As a matter of fact, even after independence, this ideology is still
persistent in most African countries and makes Western rule effective. Africa is still
manipulated and persuaded to accept that it not only is inherently inferior but also should
gratefully receive the wisdom of the so-called “superior” (former metropole) that renders
Africa’s continent’s economy pliant, weak and unproductive. Africa, naively and blindly
believes that the only choice it has is to be reliant on outside guidance and direction. This
experience exposes Africa to a deep dependency relation. Because of this dependency, relations
that connected Africa with its former colonizers during the colonial era still prevail and make
Africa play the subordinate role to the former colonial metropole. Not able to alter the
fundamental inequality that was built into that colonial relation which persists through the
economic means, Africa’s economy is weakened and affects African countries’ development.
Consequently, it leads to a condition of generalized poverty and lack of economic opportunities
for many young African people. This situation causes migrations to Europe and elsewhere.

Post-Colonialism
“Post-colonialism begins from the very first moment of colonial contact. It is the discourse
of oppositionality which colonialism brings into being. In this sense, post-colonialism writing
has a very long history” (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, 1995, p. 117). Nevertheless it true that
the intensification of theoretical interest in the post-colonial era has coincided with the rise of
African rulers to the leadership in the 1960s. The rise of the new African rulers in the newly
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independent countries has come with a new behavior in their way of governing that tends to be
generally “authoritarian”. 12
In this perspective, the notion of “post-colony” identifies itself specifically as a given
historical trajectory, that of societies recently emerging from the experience of colonization and
the new type of behavior that comes up within the newly independent states because of their
leaders. To be sure, as Achille Mbembe puts it, the post-colony is chaotically pluralistic in the
sense that politics and decision-making are primarily within the framework of the new rulers. It
is a specific system, a particular way of fabricating simulacra or re-forming stereotypes. In other
words, a designed state apparatus appears neither to refer to any underlying reality nor to claim
to be worthwhile for that reality itself. But it appears just as an economic junction of signs in
which power is possessively mirrored and imagined self-reflectively, and at the expense of the
masses. It is characterized by a style of political improvisation and modus operandi that
accounts for their own sake rather than one of their citizens, by an excess tendency and desire to
privatize the state power as their legitimate property, as well as by a new practice against the
civil society’s will, interest, and expectation. It is made of a series of corporate institutions
whose aims are to accumulate wealth and a political machinery that, once in place, constitutes a
distinctive regime of violence. This set of behaviors the Cameroonian philosopher and postcolonialism theorist, identifies it with “Power, violence and accumulation”. Because of these
three, in Black Africa the question of a reflection on the economy is marked by a renewed
decadence. Although multifaceted, this decadence is reduced to its economic aspect. And the
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Authoritarian is used through this section to refer to the way in which new African rulers’ behavior in the newly independent
continent Africa that basically is associated with a principle of blind submission of authority as opposed to individual freedom of
thought and action.
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solutions envisaged by both the external actors and by the natives themselves hardly escape this
reductionism, this fixation on the economic side of a multi-faceted impasse. 13
Under these conditions, the linkage to the world economy could not be favorable to the local
societies because the main source of the colonial mode of production was the manipulation by
the post-colonial holders of state power. Their new regulatory and coercive apparatus entangle
with those formerly initiated by the colonial metropole. The latter induces the new African
rulers to perpetuate the same system in a sense to continue to promote and consolidate the steady
supply of natural resources. 14
This said, I am more concerned with the post-colonial holders of state power in Africa, and
the way they privatize and monopolize the state resources as their personal property.
Since their accession to independence, many African rulers had operated under the shadow of
the colonial system. They dovetail with the former colonial metropole and have created a way of
governing based on oppression on their newly independent States. They promoted the same
system of oppression initiated by the former colonial powers and shaped public and foreign
policy designed principally for their own interests and for the benefit of the former colonial
powers. Post-colonial African leaders were supposed to make possible the creation of utilities, to
produce value and wealth by putting an end to scarcity and poverty, to ensure the satisfaction of
the needs of their citizens by protecting them and their natural resources from outside predators,
and to create a continent, where the ideas of democracy and autonomy representation could come
into being and “common” or “general” interest would prevail. Instead of being motivated by the
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sense of service to their people by putting an end to the power of customs, traditions, and
authorities perceived as unjust and tyrannical, and by practicing a better governance that could
create opportunities for their people to prosper, post-colonial African leaders and holders of state
power tend to be coercive and authoritarian. Postcolonial regimes of African rulers betrayed the
aspirations and violated the rights of their people with impunity. They plundered the national
treasuries and resources often plunging their citizens into fruitless wars, both civil and regional.
Though they were members of the community, such chiefs and their assistances were de facto
agents and information gatherers for their former imperial powers. These local autocrats did
everything they could to promote the oppressive, exploitative and undemocratic authority of the
colonial government and ruled their own people with even greater cruelty than the departing
colonizers by privatizing the state, and by engaging blatantly themselves in a mass looting; they
stall Africa’s development and impeded the sustainable growth and stability of the continent, and
the welfare’s promotion of the continent’s citizens (Note taken from AAS 525, Prof. Diallo).
As such, the new African holders of state power deeply disappointed their citizens’
expectations to be served and to be relieved of their long suffering by a better governance and a
commitment to the development of the new emerging African continent. A continent under the
African control and where the interest of the citizens should be put forward first. But the African
rulers had adopted an authoritarian propensity, resembling the colonial systems of governance
that was designed principally to facilitate the continued exploitation of human and natural
resources of the colonies for the benefit of the colonial powers. The latter, although they were
relinquishing direct rule over their former colonies, they were eager to maintain economic ties
with the so-called new independent states, by making sure that the new leaders or rulers, who
eventually held power in the former colonies were as cooperative politically as they were pliant
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economically to ensure a steady supply of the raw natural resources that had provided their
countries with such wealth during the colonial period. At the same time, those African leaders
who conformed, were rewarded with political protection from would-be plotters of coups d’états.
They were given economic assistance they did not have to account for, such as opportunities to
open secret bank accounts or purchase expensive villas in foreign capitals. Their armies were
well supplied with weapons and equipment, which were used mostly to silence their own citizens
(Maathai, 2009, pp. 29-30).
With regard to governing, two factors spring to mind. The first is that dealing with human
behavior and how it is regulated in a state with state instruments means not simply to look at
what constitutes the strength and reason of the state, but also to ask questions about the actual
forms of power, its manifestations and the various techniques that it uses to enhance its value,
distribute the labor product, and either ensure abundance or manage poverty and scarcity. And
since Africa both before and after colonization state power enhanced its value by establishing
specific relations of subjection, something must be said about the relationships between
subjection, the distribution of wealth and tribute and the moral general problem of the
constitution of the postcolonial subject. The second factor is that postcolonial African regimes
have not invented what they know of government from scratch. Their knowledge is the product
of several cultural heritages and traditions of which the features have become entangled over
time, to the point where something has emerged that has the look of “custom” without being
reducible to it, and partakes of “modernity” without being wholly included in it. One part of this
knowledge or rationality is colonial rationality (Mbembe, 2001, pp. 24-25).
State sovereignty in the newly independent Africa had, in principle, two main features. On
the hand, it combined weakness of, and inflation of, the notion of right: weakness of right in that,
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in the relations of power and authority, the model was, in both theory and practice, the exact
opposite of the liberal model of debate and discussion; inflation of right of conquest, the very
concept of right often stood revealed as void. On the other hand, it rested on the form of
violence that was designed to ensure the authority’s maintenance, spread, and permanence.
Falling well short of what is properly called “dictatorship”, it recurred again and again in the
most banal and ordinary situations crystallized through a gradual accumulation of numerous acts
and rituals that in short, played so importantly a role in everyday life that it ended up constituting
the central cultural imaginary that the state itself shared with society, and thus had an
authenticating and reiterating function (Mbembe, 2001, p. 25).
The lack of justice of the means, and the lack of legitimacy of the ends, conspired to allow an
arbitrariness and intrinsic unconditionality that may be said to have been the distinctive feature
of the former colonial sovereignty and its credo of power in the colony, was the one postcolonial holders of state power adopted. They promoted this unconditionality and the regime of
impunity and resorted to authoritarianism within Africa and its corollary in the African continent.
These new African regimes which espoused the model of the colonial governance through
authoritarian’s propensity made it possible for the former colonial metropoles to make equipment
and goods available to them and was justified by the fact that they were to be enrolled into the
structures of production that were administrated by their decentralized state apparatus, to be
precise by their new agents called African rulers or elites through specialized institutions
reshaped for this purpose. They could at any moment, usurp the law and, in the same name as
the state, and exercise the law purely for private ends. Nobody in the African continent could lay
claim to his or her right. They conformed themselves with the prevailing rules because of the
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type of oppression they underwent in their daily life in the African continent (Mbembe, 2001, pp.
26-31).
In addition, there is a social policy of postcolonial African regimes that have been conceived
based on an imaginary, which the state makes the organizer of public happiness. As Such, the
state arrogated the possibility of exercising an unlimited hold over every individual although in
practice, whether in colonial times or since the outsize place of the state was never total. Neither
colonial commandment nor the postcolonial state was able to bring about the total dismantling,
still less the disappearance, of every corporation and all lower-order legitimacies bringing people
and communities together at the local level. In a number of cases, state domination or the
“etatisation” of society was achieved through the old hierarchies and old patronage networks,
which led to two movements: The privatization of public prerogatives and socialization of
arbitrariness, becoming in this process as the cement of postcolonial African authoritarian
regimes. Moreover, throughout the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, governing
in the African continent means primarily having commandment over the African citizens.
Exercising it thus meant to compel people to perform “obligations” like an army with orders and
demands. Power was reduced to the right to demand, to force, to ban, to compel, to authorize, to
punish, to reward, to be obeyed in short, to join and to direct. The key characteristic of the postcolonial rule of these African leaders who had no loyalty to Africa was thus to issue orders and
have them carried out and also involving in mass lootings or embezzlements of the state
resources at the expense of the masses, to set out how to create foreign bank account in the
western former colonial motherland where they could be able to ship this money embezzled and
looted from Africa (Mbembe, 2001, pp. 31-33). In this perspective, Campbell’s article (2018),
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asserted that, “Thus, even at the moment when the Continental Free Trade Area Treaty 15 was
signed in to create the world’s largest single market, the African leaders continue to ship their
money to foreign bank accounts and hinder the creation of a common currency in Africa.
Leaders beg for aid while stealing billions and lodging the loot in foreign bank accounts”. 16
However, it is important to highlight that these transfers of money’s lootings of African
leaders into foreign bank accounts were in perfect concomitance with setting out how to dispose
of Africa’s continent humongous natural resources and raw material to the benefit of their former
colonial motherland. These African ruling elites were integrated into international networks, and
the revenues extracted from these transactions helped them structure local systems of inequality
and domination, facilitate the formation of coalitions or inflame factional struggles, and
determine the types of external support that these African elites enjoyed. In short, the structuring
of the relations among state, market, and society also depended on the modalities of this
integration into Western world trade thus, creating a total economic imbalance and stagnation in
the African continent.
These political and economic arrangements also made it possible to sustain a complex system
of revenue transfers from the formal official circuits to the parallel informal ones, from urban
households to rural households, from rich to poor (Russel, 1984, p. 595). More importantly,
patterns of both social stratification and internal power relation between groups and ethnicities
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were also part of the bases upon which the manner of these political and economic arrangements
worked in practice and the state was the mechanical part that both regulated and created
inequalities. Put it differently, the political and economic arrangement followed up the range of
structured social order within the society and the state was the main apparatus conditioning them.
The post-colonial potentates were thus themselves a form of domination that, while using
universal techniques (a state and its apparatus), had its own internal coherence and rationality
both in the political-economic realm and in the imaginary (Caswell, 1996-1980, p. 39). With the
foundation of the post-colonial states grounded in authoritarian regimes, there was a purely state
type of allocation by transforming the native employees’ salary into a claim, and the state
granted means of livelihood to all it had put under obligation. This meant that any salaried
worker was necessarily dependent. The means of livelihood he or she received were not
designed to reward a process of converting energy into wealth but were helping shape a
particular figure of submission and domination. For Médard (Mbembe, 2001, p. 46), “Other
modalities of state allocation had developed as by-products of a form of regulating political
affairs based largely on private appropriation of public resources to create allegiances”. Two
conditions had made possible the crystallization of such a political order and the viability of its
functioning. First, there was an economy of predation based on indebtedness, expenditure, and
deficit. Second, a general regime of privileges and impunity made possible this economy
relatively extended reproduction. The appropriation of public resources and the privatization of
the state took various forms. There were, first, the advantages and privileges that holders of
positions of authority granted themselves, with a cumulative value sometimes far greater than the
salary, housing, furniture, water, electricity, cars, domestic help, entertainment and travel
expenses, and bonuses reserve funds. Then there was a system of double accounting
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(misappropriation): double payment of rent, false administrative leases, secret commission,
“backhanders” and under-invoicing in the granting of public contracts, allocation of property
rights or bank loans, misappropriation under cover of performing customs and tax procedures.
Then, finally, there were the parallel cuts on documents and visas that were required and issued;
this was also the case with road checks or the granting of licenses and other permits (Morice,
1987, p. 108). In this optic, economic orders were converted into social and political ones thanks
to these two forms of allocation. It was through their mediation that many persons acquired an
idea of the “good life”, managed to overcome material scarcity, or simply were released from the
terror imposed by lack of security, by poverty and need. To exercise authority is, above all, tire
out the bodies of those under it, to disempower them not so much to increase their productivity
as to ensure the maximum docility. To exercise authority is, furthermore, for the African
potentates, to appropriate the natural resources for their private interest. Moreover, the
experience of the post-colony makes it clear that illegal activities are not conformed to ordinary
people. Enforcing regulations, manipulating the system of bribery, collecting taxes and levies
forcibly confiscating hoarded goods and then selling them, all are characteristics of a situation
where there is the privation of national resources, looting, extortion whether for cash or product,
violence, instability, and corruption. For the latter, Maathai (2009, p. 154) asserted that “Most of
the African communities end up dealing with governments that are mainly interested in taking
advantage of this vacuum created by a culture of corruption to extract as many resources as
possible. By exposing their own greed and selfishness, the people are easily bought, exploited,
and victimized, thereby working against their own interests”.
Thus, the period of the 1960s marked the transition from colonial despotism to independence
in many African states. In newly independent Africa, this epoch coincided with the rise of
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Africans as rulers of the African states. By virtue of their control of the “state” which serves as
“An autonomous bureaucratic apparatus of domination endowed with its own material interests
and political agenda” (Fatton, 1992, p. 19), African leaders put forward a new style of political
modus operandi for their own interests rather than in the interest of their citizens. They
constitute the ruling classes or elites and holders of state power in Africa. “These high circles
exercise a virtue of monopoly over state offices and institutions through which they appropriate a
disproportionate amount of a nation’s wealth and yearly income and dominate the policyforming and decision-making process that structure relations’ power and property” (Domhoff,
1971, p. 109). By dissociating themselves from the subordinate classes and by resorting to
coercion, patronage, and communication through the monopoly of the state apparatus, African
postcolonial rulers repress, co-opt, and manipulate citizens, rig elections, emasculate the courts,
and cow the press. They pack the civil service with their own supporters and employ the secret
police to hunt down potential opponents, using imprisonment, torture, or murder if necessary
(Meredith, 2013, p. 378).
In many ways, postcolonial Africa has been dominated by authoritarianism even when it
proclaimed itself “democratic”. Often African leaders monopolized power by putting forward a
one-party rule to cling to power even in their old age. As a result, postcolonial Africa has been
marked by relentless attacks and destructive confrontations between leaders vying for power
domination that lead to many coup-d’états, bloody conflicts, high level of political instability,
and brutal repression. The tendency toward authoritarianism even in the democratic regimes,
such as Senegal, is what Sangmpam has called overpoliticization (Sangmpam, 2007).
This behavior of the African potentates toward authoritarianism involves impulses of failed
integration. As Mbembe (2001, p. 54), writes: “Post-colonial African regimes had attempted to
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integrate and discipline the bulk of the urban population through the mechanism of the salary, a
gift when examined closely, allocated for the purposes of institutionalizing a form of domination
having its own rationality. These economic and political arrangements are today being shaken,
in two ways. On the one hand, there are the constraints that the financing and structure of the
external exchange impose on African economies. On the other, there are the prospects opened
by three processes: the appearance of previously unknown forms of political mobilization, forms
it would be wrong to confuse with a transition towards democracy; the disintegration of state
power and then the recomposition of political power in a context of resurgence of the predatory
economy characterizing Africa and the apparent instability”.
Thus, this situation has led to a condition of generalized economic poverty and lack of
opportunity for many young African people. Under such post-colonial conditions, it is
impossible for most of the young African people to stay in Africa because their aspirations are
diametrically opposed to the postcolonial state’s behaviors. The postcolonial state in Africa
should serve rather than repress, practice a better governance and treat all citizens fairly, and
carefully watch over the state’s resources, which constitute the collective wealth rather than
appropriating them for the benefit of the rulers and of the former colonial powers.

Globalization and its neoliberal ideology
Globalization, as a concept, has become a worldwide phenomenon with different
articulations. It can be perceived as a new basic form of capitalism based on capital
accumulation, privatization, and marketing, which creates extensive deregulation of industries
and labor division enabling financial capital to play a much more dominant role within the global
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economy based on labor mobility and production. It is new model of global organization, a
series of structural changes that entail not only an intensification of previous patterns from crossnational lending to the hypermobility of finance capital but also a quantum transformation of a
system lacking the staying power of effective means of regulation in the global political
economy (Mittelman, 1997, p. 231). Cox (1993) sees two main aspects of globalization: global
organization of product and global finance. The first entails the rise of complex transnational
networks of production, which secure profitability through the most advantageous labor
procurement, combining dimensions of political security and predictability. Global finance is a
very largely unregulated system of transactions in money, credit, and equities (Cox, 1993, p.
260). It encompasses contradictory trends. On the one hand, the unaccountable forces of
globalization such as cross-border flows of undocumented workers and modern communications
with instantaneous speed are partially beyond the control of effective state regulation. To adjust,
the state responds to the globalization process by more fully integrating the domestic economy
into world markets. On the other hand, the state pulls in the opposite direction by using a variety
of government interventions to create a competitive edge. All countries industrializing late rely
on large-scale interventions, most importantly, direct involvement in the production process,
establishing social and economic infrastructure, generous terms of credit, and material support
for shifting from imitative to indigenous technology capacity (Mittelman, 1997, p. 16).
Globalization also may be regarded as a phase in the history of capital, whose lineage has
brought together many different societies into one system. Long-distance trade and the
emergence of nation-states are important conditions for the development of this single
configuration. It is a new set of movements of capital that involves a deepening of commodified
forms of political and social integration. With this new set of movements of capital, there is a
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concentration of capital benefiting the wealthiest minority and making the masses poorer. In this
perspective, it is merely an expansion of social inequality, a particular constellation of economic
concentrations, and the denationalization of economic activities at the expense of the masses. “It
is the spread of capitalism, its ideology, and culture; a worldwide integration and linkage of
capitalists and social classes; a profusion of information technology; investments, new credits,
financial institution, and privatization” (Note taken from AAS 365, Dr. Sangmpam).
Few are as widely discussed in historical, political topics as that ideology. Yet, it is not
always well defined. Globalization is generally perceived as an “ideology”, that is a normative
expression or set of ideas that rely on basic assumptions about reality that may or may not have
any factual basis. In other words, Globalization based on this interpretation is the duplication
and manifestation, which appears to reflect a set of different perception assimilated to an
“ideology”. In this perception of globalization as an ideology, two parts can be highlighted. On
the one hand, the dialectical relationship between the international economy and world
economy; on the other hand, multinational corporations and banks as principal agents of
globalization in terms of economic development.
In the first part, it is essential to make the distinction between international economy and
world economy first before stating the dialectical relationship between them. As Madeuf and
Michalet (1978, p. 253) argued, “The international economy was what classical economic theory
had concerned itself with: movements in trade, investments, and payments crossing national
frontiers that were regulated by states and by international organizations created by states. The
world economy, in contrast, was the sphere in which production and finance were being
organized in cross-border networks that could very largely escape national and international
regulatory power”. This can be understandable because the late 1970s coincided with the global
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recession crisis that affected both the developed countries and the developing countries and
which prompted a search for alternative economic and policy paradigms based on the global
credo of market reform. This accentuated both the separation between those small, privileged
groups integrated with the world economy and the larger part of the population that remained
outside in the developing countries, while the developed capitalist society was feeling the
financial and market discipline.
Despite this distinction, the relationship between international economy and world economy
is dialectical. “A Perspective on Globalization” of Robert W. Cox provides us with salient
perspectives to corroborate this idea of the dialectical relationship. Cox (Mittelman, 1997, pp.
21-23) argued that, “The world economy grew by taking advantage of the territorial
fragmentation of the international economy. This allowed capital to choose the most propitious
sites in which to locate diverse phases of a geographically disseminated production process,
taking account of differences in labor costs, environmental regulations, fiscal incentives, political
stability, and so on. It also allowed capital to manage its accounts so that profits would accrue
when the lowest taxes prevailed”.
In the second part, “the multinational corporations and banks, principal agents of
globalization, henceforth represented themselves (and after a time were perceived by many
governments and academic theorists) as primary agents of economic development. They were
also a growing force for national and international trade and finance. Globalization began to be
represented as a finality, as the logical and inevitable culmination of the powerful tendencies of
the market at work. The dominance of economic forces was regarded as both necessary and
beneficial. States and the interstate system would mainly to ensure the working of market logic,”
said Cox (Mittelman, 1997, p. 23).
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Thus, these two parts show how globalization becomes an ideology. Therefore, it is
important to understand that economic globalization denotes the widening and intensification of
international linkages and interactions in trade, investments and economic policy orientations in
the world. In this perspective, two major theoretical issues have arisen in the discourse on
economic globalization. The first centers on the role of the state in the economy and policymaking. The second focus on the effect or impact of economic globalization on economic
progress and social welfare, especially in its spatial dimension. In both contexts, two divergent
positions are discernible. The first concerns the impact of the growing transnationality and
‘borderlessness’ of economic transactions and activities on the authority and economic powers of
the nation-sate, especially as market reforms and economic liberalization policies foisted by the
World Bank and the I.M.F on developing countries vitiate the capacity of domestic economic
policy-making. At one level, some argue that economic globalization erodes the national market.
One of the foundations of the nation-state, and the nascent global economic space is replacing
the national space as the most relevant and strategic space. On the other hand, some scholars
insist that despite the challenges posed by globalization, the state will remain the site of political
authority, economic regulations and decisions, although there will be alternative in the nature of
state power in this regard that will remain a major political actor in its configurations and
activities (Aina, Chachage, and Yao, 2004, p. 26).
In addition, globalization’s ideology is to promote neoliberalism. In this neoliberal ideology
of globalization, there is a return to a basic form of capitalism. Economic forces are represented
as having potentially planetary reach and are akin to forces of nature; they are represented as
beyond or above politics and form of basic structures of an interdependent world. In this
perception of globalization as a neoliberal discourse suggests a set of ideas that justify and
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legitimate forms of class domination (of capital); it is abstract insofar as it reifies complex social
processes and institutions such as the market. With the latter, there is a new restructure based on
capital accumulation and the massive mobility of people. In this perspective, a variety of factors
are central to this restructuring: a much greater engagement of corporations in the delivery of
social services through policies of privatization and marketization; the extensive deregulation of
industries, the most far-reaching of which was financial deregulation in all its forms, which
enabled financial capital to play a much more dominant role within the global economy and
indeed, people’s everyday lives” (Cahill and Konings, 2017, p. 19).
These different articulations of globalization and its neoliberal ideology provided above
should inform an understanding of some of the negative global impact on the developing or
peripheral countries, especially Africa, thus creating calamities in the whole African society
particularly in Senegal. Massive migrations are such calamities.
During the heyday of the world economic expansion era, there was an economic
reconfiguration where Africa was incorporated into the world market in which a premium was
put on the extraction and a steady supply of Africa’s raw material exporting and its monoculture
economies. It was the purpose of the world system, which was a set of mechanisms that allowed
the redistribution of surplus value from the periphery (developing countries) to the core
(developed countries). As mention earlier, during the late 1970s, a global economic crisis
affected both the developed and the developing countries. This compounded with the effects of
globalization and its neoliberal ideology, inflicted great pain on Africa as occurred elsewhere in
the other developing or peripheral countries. They had had to reduce domestic levels of
economic activity and consumption, to reduce imports and to allow more resources to be
channeled into production for exports. In this perspective, Mittelman (1997, p. 22), argues that,
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“Developing countries abandoned import substitution in favor of export promotion, which also
meant sacrificing production for domestic consumption and satisfaction of basic needs in favor
of earning foreign exchange”. The adjustment also involved restructuring and reorientation of
the industry into high technology sectors, diversifying services activities, mastering new skills,
winning new markets, gaining access to new financial flows, and internationalization production.
The general configuration of the market, the industrial base, the structure of relations
between the bureaucracy and local business circles, and the nature of respective alliances with
multinational firms in Africa ruled out any possibility either of gaining access to new
technologies and new distribution networks or of accumulating any substantial manufacturing
know-how or developing an entrepreneurial dynamic that could have helped to respond
creatively to the constraints of the world marker, as occurred elsewhere in the other developing
countries. These countries’ economies suffered even more from the fact that local incentive
structures were not very effective and that it was hardly possible to find in them the productive
combinations sought by international capital. Thus, these economies could not profit from delocalization whether by providing outlets for intermediate good industries, by allowing
investment in high technology products for export or by specializing in international finance
activities (Mbembe, 2001, p. 52).
In addition, the era of globalization and its neoliberal ideology was accompanied by a
process of responsibility’s appropriation for economic and social development management by
the International Financial Institutions (I.F.I), principally the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank, which imposed solutions to the world economic order by means of
economic packages and Structural Adjustment program. These institutions have always forced
poor countries to swallow, hook, and sinker their programs while some researches showed how
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their policies are negative to economic growth in countries that enter into an agreement with
them (Mhango, 2017, pp. 204-205). These policies, that are supposed to give indebted states
access to further credit with which to service their debts, entail in return a radical neoliberal
restructuring, including the deregulation of finance and trade as well as the privatization of
public assets, which are detrimental for Africa. They exacerbate social inequality and gaps
between the super-rich and poor at the national level; increase inequalities between nations;
decrease state autonomy and sovereignty; create corruption, bribery, violence, and prostitution;
cause migrations (Note taken from AAS 365, Dr. Sangmpam). These policies open up the
African market, reduce its public sector, and devaluate its currency (AAS 612, Dr. Carty). Going
into that logic, Maathai (2009, p. 89) argued that, “Africa received over half a trillion dollars in
loans from the World Bank, the I.M.F, and individual wealthy nations, and paid back roughly the
same amount. However, because of the interest on that debt, by 2002 $300 billion was still
outstanding. Throughout this period, the international community continued to provide more
loans to African states so they could pay back the old ones. More recently, some of these loans
came with economic “conditionalities” requirements to curtail government spending, to open
markets to foreign goods, and to restrict money supply. These restrictions forced governments to
slash budgets for health, education, and other essential services for their citizens”. Most African
states were, in addition, able to borrow on favorable terms from Western governments and
international institutions. The easiest short-term expedient, for African (and other) states, was
therefore to borrow money which they were no longer able to earn, which explains the rapid
increase in levels of African indebtedness (Clapham, 1996, p. 166). These policies have sent
many countries like Senegal to more poverty by pumping to them much money that ends up
being misused thereby expanding national debts. This explains why African economic
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development is rendered impossible by the domination of the global economy and industrialized
capitalist power. These have created calamities in the African societies where migrations are
seen as the only viable solution to escape from these calamities.
Thus, Globalization and its neoliberal ideology can help answer the research question
because it connotes a rise of market reforms as a global creed, a phenomenon partly engendered
by the global economic crisis in the late 1970s, which prompted a search for alternative
economic and policy paradigms. It puts emphasis on market rules and their infallibility.
Economic mobility becomes the fundamental aspect of many countries because of the fluidity of
free trade in goods and services, and free capital circulation. This creates a massive mobility
because of economic opportunities in some countries in the North and the economic failure in
other parts of the world such the African continent where the economy is a reproduction of
colonial extraverted economy with a premium put on the extraction, and a steady supply of
Africa’s raw material exporting and its monoculture economies. Globalization relies on
multinational corporations, which exploit the country’s resources and leave only crumbs for
governments already tempted by unlawful practices. Therein lies the birth of certain destructuring practices that affect both the state and society. They lead to migrations in many
African countries, such as Senegal’s new phenomenon of “Barca or Barsaakh” (Note taken from
AAS 612, Dr. Carty).
In the case of Senegal, there are other negative consequences of globalization. Rural areas
provide most of the food for the nation. The new government agricultural program of
diversification should help farmers not only to feed themselves and their families year-round but
also to retain seeds for the next season and commercialize a significant part for liquidity.
However, neoliberalism has brought drastic changes. More and more, rural people such as
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leather, iron, clay smiths and workers are forced to move to the cities for additional cash flow.
These relocations of rural populations to the city for their survival cause an anarchical growth of
the urban population and slums that lack basic services. This accentuates insecurity in the large
slums of the major cities. The miserable city-living causes slum dwellers to attempt an escape to
Europe. Another neoliberal calamity is Structural Adjustment Policies (S.A.P) by the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund as described above. These two combined calamities
set the stage for the movement Fakh (Extraction: leaving by any way possible), and its slogan
“Barca or Barsaakh” by young Senegalese.
As was stated in chapter 1, although globalization and its neoliberal ideology admittedly can
help explain the research question, it is not used here because the externship time constraint did
not allow me to collect the type of data that it requires. Nevertheless, the discussion in chapters
3, 4 and especially 5 refer to the policy impact of globalization and neoliberalism. The
discussion in those chapters help link migrations to the unbreakable relationship between
globalization, colonialism, and post colonialism in Senegal.
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CHAPTER THREE:

FRANCE-SENEGAL COLONIAL RELATIONS AND DEPENDENCY
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Introduction
As a byproduct of imperialism colonialism is the policy of a nation that seeks to extend or
retain its authority over other people or territories generally with the aim of economic dominance
(Webster, 1989, p. 291; Rodney, 1972). It has given birth in the post-colonial era to a new type
of indirect dominance exercised through dependency ties. As part of the transitional stage of
modernizing societies, dependency has become the new way through which former colonial
powers reinforce their economic power and notion of superiority vis-a-vis the former colonized
countries. Therefore, this dependency tie helps to understand the outcome it has brought
economically, politically, culturally, educationally, and socially in many former colonized
countries that became independent. Dependency has emerged in the post-colonial epoch as an
important paradigm in the comprehension of the issue of underdevelopment in most independent
countries, where the legacy of colonialism and its deep-seated history have made them remain
completely in a dependent posture toward their former colonial powers. I am arguing that this
dependent posture vis-à-vis their former colonial powers has created a situation of harsh
economic and developmental constraints in many of these countries. This chapter aims at
demonstrating France-Senegal colonial relations and the consequent dependency that represent
serious roadblocks to Senegalese development since its independence.

French colonialism and the roots of dependency
France’s relations with Senegal started in the 1600s with France’s conquest of Senegal and
its settlement along the Senegalese coasts of Saint-Louis and Goree Island. Due to the
Restoration period in the 1700s, which came up with the freedom of trade, local commercial
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capitalism developed in Senegal parallel to the settlement of the Bordelais (people from the
French city of Bordeaux) coming from France to settle in the coastal enclaves of Saint-Louis and
Goree in Senegal. Between 1815 and 1860, the French of Saint-Louis and of Gorée increased in
number due to the miscegenation that was created with the interactions of the Bordelais with
Saint-Louis and Goree’s inhabitants whose ancestors were often military or commercial agents
of the old companies. “This period of 1800s was the mercantilist period dominated by the slave
trade and later the gum trade in Senegal” (Vidrovitch, 1977). This great era of the gum trade’s
development was mostly dominated by the Bordeaux trading companies, which at that time had
strong influences in the Senegalese economy and political influence. This period was marked by
the first French-Senegalese mulatto or metis generation of Saint-Louis traders, who settled in the
stopovers of Dagana, Podor, Matam, Bakel, and Medina rivers where they operated on pirogues
and worked as trading agents. Travelers of that time, including René Caillé, a French explorer,
gave a striking description of this trade which established a barter economy with European
countries particularly France. In addition to gum, Saint-Louis exported gold, which the
Signares 17 of the town during the Restoration and the July Monarchy brought from Bambouk 18
goldfields. They regularly sent their servants to buy the precious metal, which they paid in cloth
and junk (Amin, 1969, pp. 11-19). With the trading post at Saint-Louis operated by the French
West India Company, later known in French as “Compagnie du Senegal” (Senegalese
Company), established in 1659, France in this period of gum’s trade also continued its export of
cloth, iron, and muskets to Senegal and its import of textiles, ivory, spices and, slaves through its
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“Signares” were the name given to those influential Mulatto French-Senegalese women of the city of Saint-Louis and Goree in
the French part in Senegal during the 18th and 19th centuries.
18 “Bambouk” was a traditional name for the territory in eastern Senegal and western Mali encompassing the Bambouk
Mountains that borders Senegal and Mali.
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four townships: Saint-Louis, Goree, Dakar, and Rufisque that served with the establishment of
the French railway from Dakar to Saint-Louis as ways to perform exports and imports within
Senegal.
During the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815), Great Britain captured French possessions in
Senegal and in 1807 Britain proclaimed the abolition of the slave trade known as the “Slave
Trade Act 1807”. In 1816, Britain returned to France its possessions in Senegal. “1850s and
1890s was the first phase of colonialism, marked by the introduction of cash crops for export and
dominated by merchant capital, which extended trade from the coastal to rural areas”
(Vidrovitch, 1977). This meant that parallel to the establishment of French domination, there
was an increasing commercial penetration of which the French houses controlled the prices and
monopolized exports and imports. They advance goods on credit to African traders, who
circulated in the interior and, in turn, often advanced goods and either seeds or food to peasants,
creating a debit-credit cycle that became a basic part of Senegalese peasant life (O’Brien, 1979,
p. 70). During the “Scramble for Africa”, 19 France began to insert control of Senegal’s river and
its hinterland. By 1895, Senegal became part of the French West Africa colony with its capital
in Saint-Louis before being relocated to Dakar in 1902. The first major industries in Senegal
established between the wars were French companies set up locally to process groundnut oil.
These refineries represented the first monopoly export sector, which was to be reserved for the
foreign industry and was followed by import substitution industries later (O’Brien, 1979, p. 27).
Because of the colonial affiliations, there were immense migrations of Senegalese to France for
labor’s need. Furthermore, Senegalese soldiers fought for France during the Two World Wars.
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“The scramble for Africa”, more accurately called the “Partition of Africa” or the “Conquest of Africa”. It refers to a period
between the years 1881 and 1914. During this time, European countries occupied Africa and attempted to colonize it. By the
year 1914, around 90% of Africa was under European rule.
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They were given the name of Tirailleurs in order to reflect the policing needs generated by the
European colonization phase. A piece of evidence for this period is the statue of “Demba and
Dupont” in Senegal, representing an African and a French soldier as a symbol of colonial
paternalism. These colonial relations also made Senegal part of the France Union 20 in 1946.
For almost a century and half of European penetration in Africa and particularly France’s
penetration in Senegal, substantial colonial relations were built with Senegal through which
France exercised direct colonial rule within the Senegalese territories. This penetration of France
in Senegal and the colonial relations it built with Senegal led to the establishment of a strong
reliance on France by Senegal in the aftermath of the colonization era. In the heyday of the
1960s, many African countries achieved their independence from France. It was during this
period that Senegal got its independence from France. However, France’s legacy of colonialism
and its deep-seated history still made Senegal remain completely in a dependent posture toward
France. Though direct rule ended with independence, through dependency France continued to
indirectly maintain its sphere of influence over Senegal and kept political, economic, military,
educational, developmental assistance, cultural, scientific and technical cooperation ties. It
continues to impose its hegemony over Senegal to serve its interests and to maintain “imperial”
prestige associated with its colonial past.
When Charles de Gaulle returned to power as French President in 1958, France had already
been severely weakened by World War II and by the conflicts in Indochina and Algeria. He
proceeded to grant independence to France’s remaining colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa in the
1960s period to maintain close cultural and economic ties with them to avoid more close costly
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“The French Union”, commonly known in French as “Union Française” (1946–1958) was a political entity created by the
French Fourth Republic to replace the old French colonial system, colloquially known as the "French Empire". It was the formal
end of the "indigenous" status of French subjects in colonial areas.
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colonial wars (Chafer, 2005, pp. 7-23). De Gaulle was keen on preserving France’s status as a
global power and as a bulwark to British and American influence in this post-colonial era. Thus,
he saw close links with France’s image on the world stage, both as a major power and as a
counterbalancing force between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war. The
United States supported France’s continuing presence in Africa to prevent the continent from
falling under the Soviet’s influence. Similarly, in that period, the United Kingdom had little
interest in West Africa, which left France as the only major power in that region. One of the first
features of France-Senegal dependency is “Françafrique”. The term “Françafrique” derived from
the expression “France-Afrique”, symbolized the inherent colonial ties and dependency relations
that France built with its former colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Felix Houphouet-Boigny,
former president of Cote-d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), defined it as “the secret criminality in the upper
echelons of French politics and economy, where a kind of underground Republic is hidden from
view”. He said that it also means “France à fric” (which implies cash money to France), and that
“Over the course of four decades, hundreds of thousands of euros misappropriated from debt,
aid, oil, cocoa…or drained through French importing monopolies, have financed French
political-business networks (all of them offshoots of the main neo-Gaullist network),
shareholders’ dividends, the secret services’ major operations and mercenary expeditions”
(Verschave, 2006).
To implement his vision of France’s hegemony. “Françafrique” marked France’s sphere of
influence and dominance over Sub-Saharan African states mainly Francophone. Jacques
Foccart, a close adviser and former intelligence member of the French Resistance during World

62

War II and Secretary-General for African and Malagasy Affairs of OCAM 21 appointed by De
Gaulle, played a pivotal role in it. Through Françafrique, Foccart put in place a series of
cooperation accords that covered political, economic, military and cultural sectors with an
ensemble of African countries, which included France’s former colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa
of which Senegal was part, and built also a dense web of personal networks that underpinned the
informal and family-like relationship between France and African leaders (Whiteman, 1997;
Bovcon, 2011); Chafer, 2005).
Françafrique characterized several features of Sub-Saharan African countries that emerged
during the cold war: African cell, Franc zone, cooperation accords, military interventions,
personal networks. Africa cell was those policy decisions made on Africa by President De
Gaulle and his close advisors without engaging in broader discussions with the French
parliament and civil society actors such as non-governmental organizations (Bovcon, 2011, p. 5).
The African cell worked closely with powerful business networks and the French secrets service.
Its founding father was Jacques Foccart who became a specialist on African matters at the Elysee
Palace, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, son of President Mitterrand and a former AFP journalist in
Africa, who between 1986 and 1992 held the position of chief advisor on African policy at the
African cell, in addition to Claude Gueant general secretary and close aide to President Chirac.
The Franc zone was a currency union in Sub-Saharan Africa that was established when the
CFA franc or “franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine” (franc of the African Financial
Community) was created in 1945 as a colonial currency for over a dozen of France’s African
colonies. The zone continues to exist after the colonies had achieved their independence in the
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“OCAM” (Organisation Commune African et Malgache) referring to “African and Malagasy Common Organization” in
English, was an intergovernmental Organization that gathered African States mainly Francophone and which goal was to
maintain an economic, cultural, and social cooperation between its members.
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early 1960s, with only three African countries ever leaving the zone, mostly for reasons of
national prestige. One of the three countries, Mali rejoined the zone in 1984. The CFA franc
was pegged to the French franc (now the euro) and its convertibility was guaranteed by the
French treasury. Despite sharing the same exchange rate, the CFA franc is actually two
currencies, the Central African franc, and the West African CFA franc, which are run by their
respective central banks in Central and West Africa. The foreign exchange reserves of member
countries are pooled and each of the two African central banks keeps 65% of its foreign reserves
with the French treasury. 22 The franc zone was intended to provide African countries with
monetary stability, with member countries such as Ivory Coast experiencing relatively low
inflation at an average of 6% over the past five years compared to 29% in neighboring Ghana, a
non-member country. Moreover, the fixed exchange rate between the CFA Franc and the French
franc has changed only once in 1994 when the CFA franc was considered overvalued. However,
this monetary arrangement has enabled France to control the money supply of the CFA franc and
to influence the decision-making process of the central banks through their boards (Renou, 2002,
pp. 5-27).
Cooperation accords or post-independence relationship was a concept around which French
governments in the early 1960s developed a discourse. This concept was related to the effort of
expanding French influence across the world such as promoting French language and culture,
securing markets for French goods and projecting French power (Chafer, 2005, pp. 7-23). It was
to be achieved outside of the traditional colonial context whereby sovereign states such as France
and the newly independent African countries would work together for mutual benefit. To that
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“The CFA franc and the euro: Give us our notes”. (February 7, 2002). Retrieved from The Economist:
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end, France signed cooperation accords with its former colonies, which provided them with
cultural, technical and military assistance such as sending French teachers and military advisors
to work for the newly formed African government. The accords also allowed France to maintain
troops in Senegal, Chad, Djibouti, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and to establish a framework that would
allow France to intervene military in the region. During 1970-1981, the French military
cooperation budget constituted 11 to 19% of the entire cooperation budget. Under President De
Gaulle, French aid and assistance were made contingent on the signing of these accords. For
example, when Guinea refused to sign the accords, France immediately withdrew its personnel
from Guinea and terminated all assistance to that country. The implementation of these accords
was the responsibility of Jacques Foccart under President De Gaulle and Georges Pompidou. In
1987 alone, France was the largest source of development aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, providing
up to 18% of total aid to the region, followed by the World Bank (13%). Italy (8.5%), United
States (6.8%), Germany (6.8%), and the European Community (6.4%) (McKesson, 1990, pp. 3447). All French aid was provided through the Ministry of Cooperation. France has benefited
from its aid, trade, and investment in Africa particularly in Senegal, which has consistently
generated a positive balance of payment in France’s favor (McKesson, 1990, pp. 34-47).
For military interventions, a significant piece of the post-colonial jigsaw was France’s
substantial military presence. After decolonization, France established formal defense agreement
with many francophone countries in sub-Saharan Africa. These arrangements allowed France to
establish itself as a guarantor of stability and hegemony in the region, playing the gendarme role
of Africa. France adopted an interventionist policy in all its former colonies in Africa, resulting
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in 122military interventions that averaged once a year from 1960 to the mid-1990s, 23 particularly
in Senegal with a coup d’état prevented in 1962. France often intervened to protect French
nationals, to put down rebellions or prevent coups, to restore order or to support a particular
African leader (Vallin, 2015, pp. 79-101). Between 1997 and 2002, thirty-three operations were
launched in Africa by France, though ten of those had mandates or fell under United Nations
command, suggesting that broader humanitarian concerns have become increasingly important to
France, with acceptance of multi involvement, and moves towards using interventionism to
promote security and development rather than prioritizing often morally dubious order and
stability (Charbonneau, 2008, p. 283).
And finally, for personal networks, they were the central feature of Françafrique with stateto-state- relations between French and African leaders that were informal and family-like and
were bolstered by a dense web or personal networks, whose activities were funded from the
cooperation budget. In this logic, Senghor with his “Union Progressiste Senegalaise (UPSSenegalese Progressive Union), which became the Senegalese Socialist Party in 1977, saw these
state-to-state relations as positive contributions to Africa’s development, and Senegal should be
opened to the World and particularly France and its European partners of the European
Economic Community for mutual benefit “Eurafrique”, must be pursued (Yansane, 1980, p. 32).
These networks served as one of the main vehicles for the clientelist relations that France had
maintained with its former African colonies. France has endeavored to preserve the centralized,
socialized, free market-suspicious model of government institutionalized in its former colonies,
with much of its development funding going to central governments instead of sub-state or non-
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“How France maintained its grip on Africa”. (May 21, 2010). Retrieved from BBC:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8639874.stm
66

state actors. In continuity with the double standards exhibited during colonialism, in 1990
Mitterrand announced renewed enthusiasm for encouraging democratic transition via French aid,
but statistics actually demonstrated increases of aid to authoritarian regimes, generally countries
in which France had economic and security concerns (Martin, 1995, p. 15).
Thus, Françafrique as the first feature of dependency was really incorporated in France’s
former colonial colonies in the heyday of the 1960s period and particularly in the cold war era.
This made Senegal and other former Sub-Saharan African colonies of France totally dependent
in all aspects. The colonial ties built in the aftermath of the colonial period allowed France to
still maintain its influence and expand its hegemony over its former colonies.

Senegal’s dependent particularities
One particular feature of France-Senegal dependency is through the maintenance of political
order. Since 1960, it has been attributed to French presence as well as French investment and
aid. This political order maintenance is close and multi-faceted, and political leaders from the
two countries often meet. Senegal is the only Sub-Saharan African country with which France
holds an intergovernmental seminar every year (alternative between Dakar and Paris) due to the
fact Senegal is the first sub-Saharan Africa colonized by French, and Senegal also is home to the
largest French community in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is one of France’s closest partners in Africa
on a human, political and economic level. It is the principal partner of local authorities and
regions in terms of the number of cooperation projects. 24 This can be seen with the list of
bilateral visits. For examples: The Senegalese president’s visit from December 18 to December
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22, 2016, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of the Economy, Finance and Planning’s
visit in Paris to attend the Open Government Partnership Summit in Paris on December 7 and 9,
2016, Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs’ participation in the intergovernmental seminar
held in Dakar on September 22 and 23, 2016 attended by France’s Prime Minister Manuel Valls
(from March 31, 2014, to December 6, 2016, 25 and the Prime Minister of the Republic of
Senegal’s holding of the third Franco-Senegalese intergovernmental seminar at Matignon’s hotel
(Paris) that followed the seminar up with a joint press conference to spell out their priorities for
cooperation: mobility, economic emergence, schooling, and higher education, health, innovation,
and security. 26
In addition to these lists of bilateral visits can be added the resident diplomatic missions such as
France’s embassy in Senegal and Senegal’s embassy in Paris and consulates in Bordeaux, Lyon,
and Marseille, and also a consular agency in Le Havre, 27 symbolizing all the France-Senegal’s
political order maintenance and Diplomatie.
The second particular feature of France-Senegal dependency is through military
maintenance performed by France’s means of security and defense cooperation with Senegal. It
means that Senegal is the leading beneficiary of French structural defense and security
cooperation, which allows France to monitor interventionist policy and programs in Senegal and
its region for national armed forces, and for stability and dominion maintenance within the
Senegalese territory. This can be seen with France’s army corps strong presence in the whole
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Senegalese territory. France often intervenes in Senegal’s affairs to restore order or to support
particular Senegalese leader.
The third peculiar feature of France-Senegal dependency is through the assimilation of
French language carries out not only in the educational system but also as the official language in
Senegal. Inherited since colonialism as France’s civilization mission and assimilation process,
French remains the first language spoken in Senegal that springs well in Senegalese enterprises
and businesses as well as the Senegalese educational system in which it is used. Currently, the
L.M.D (License, Masters, et Doctorat) “Bachelor, Masters, and Ph.D” which is the three-cycles
organization of higher education, common in France and in most Europeans Union as the a way
to standardize the high educational system cycles and to organize the recognition of diplomas
between countries in Europe and in the world 28, is now implemented in the Senegalese
educational system. All these just symbolize the strong assimilation of French language and
educational system within the Senegalese territory that serve as salient examples affirming and
corroborating the notion of France-Senegal dependency.
The fourth particular feature of France-Senegal dependency is through development
assistance. Senegal is one of the 16 priorities of poor countries for France’s official development
assistance. The bilateral partnership framework paper for the period 2013-2017 sets three
priorities sectors: sustainable development, democratic governance, and human development.
Since 2000, the Agence Francaise de Development (A.F.D) “French Development System” has
committed more than 1.5billion Euros in funding in Senegal, combining all financial products
and sectors. Flagship projects include the Train Express Regional (T.E.R) “Regional Express
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Train” in Dakar (Euro 100million), the KMS III project which is expected to secure the supply of
safe drinking water in Dakar (93million Euros, granted in July 2016), and several projects aiming
to diversify the country’s energy mix. In accordance with Senegal’s development strategy, the
11th EDF (European Development Fund) is focused on three sectors for the period 2014-2020:
Strengthening democratic development; sustainable agricultural development and food security;
water and sanitation. Civil society’s support is also covered, in addition to these keys sectors.
The overall envelope of this 11th EDF for Senegal stands at 347million Euros, split between two
phases. The first is for 2018-2020 and will be subject to joint programming with the Member
States of the European Union and the European Investment Bank (E.I.B), even though its
Regional Indicative Program (R.I.P) for the West African Union also supports the strengthening
of regional integration, infrastructure, trade, good governance, and sub-regional peace and
security. Senegal is eligible for the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, aimed at tackling the
root causes of irregular migration and displacement, which was created during the Valetta
Summit in November 2015. This fund has 1.8billiom Euro of European funding, of which a
billion is dedicated to the Sahel and the Lake Chad regions. 29
The fifth peculiar feature of France-Senegal dependency is through cultural, scientific and
technical cooperation systems. The French network in Senegal consists of Senegal’s French
Institute, which includes the sites of Dakar and Saint-Louis; two branches of French alliance in
Ziguinchor (687students) and Kaolack (362 students), and a third in Banjul (Gambia) managed
from Dakar; a network of 11 French schools teaching curriculum, and the one of Banjul managed
from Dakar. These French institutes mainly work for the support of Francophonie and cultural
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promotion, and for academic and scientific sectors. They use in the procedure France Campus
offices and CEF (Centre D’Études en France) “Study Center in France”. On average, 135 higher
education scholarships are awarded each year to local students. Nearly 9,500 Senegalese
students are enrolled in France’s higher education institutions. Dakar is home to a Pasteur
Institute and Regional Offices of France with Institut de Recherche pour le Development (I.R.D)
“Research Institute for Sustainable Development” and Centre International de Recherche
Agronomique pour le Development (C.I.R.A.D) “International Centre of Agronomic Research
for Development”. Since 2016, France has deployed 49 international technical experts to
Senegal. Thirteen of them have been posted in multilateral institutions. They help to implement
projects to tackle terrorism and organized crime, modernized the justice system, support
democratic governance and create start-ups in Senegal. France works in coordination with
international European donors through which most of the French multilateral assistance passes
347million Euros in the 11th European Development Fund for the period 2014-2020, thus making
Senegal among the main African states receiving many partnerships cooperation with France’s
local government (114 ongoing partnerships between France’s local government and Senegal), 30
and also among the main African states receiving French volunteers for any France’s programs.

Senegal’s economy
Like many African countries, Senegal is a low-income African state. Its economy is mainly
driven by agriculture and fisheries, which employ almost 75% of its population and are the
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primary sources of employment in many of Senegal’s rural areas. In addition, there is mining,
manufacturing construction, and tourism. Senegal’s macroeconomic performance has been
strong in recent years. Real GDP more than doubled (an increase of 108%) between 2000 and
2006, driven mainly by the telecommunication and financial services sectors, which together
accounted for 70% of growth. It has boasted a low inflation rate, with an average rate of 1.6%
between 2000 and 2016. However, it reached an all-time high of 5.85% in 2018. The main
reason behind this price inflation was the sharp rise in product prices, in particular food and
energy products. Senegal is a member of the WAEMU (Western African Economic and
Monetary Union), and eight country (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali,
Niger, and Togo) customs and currency union in which all members use the CFA franc (CFAF)
and are working toward greater regional integration with unified external tariffs. 31 Senegal’s
monetary policy is defined by the regional central bank, the BCEAO (Central Bank of Western
African States), with the aim of reducing inflation and preserving a fixed-exchange-rate between
the CFA franc and the euro. Since 2004, the official fixed exchange rate has remained stable
with a fixed exchange rate of 655.96 CFA franc per US dollar. 32
During the last ten years, Senegal’s exports of goods and commercial services have
increased at an annual average rate of 6.4%, and 5.5% respectively. Exports of goods have
increased from US$1.5bn in 2005 to US$ 2.61bn in 2006, while exports of commercial services
have increased from US$ 0.8 in 2004 to US$ 1.3bn in 2006. Despite the growth in exports,
Senegal’s trade balance continues to record a deficit, which reached US$ 3bn in 2015 (22% of
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GDP). Senegal’s main export products in 2015 were gold (US$240m), fresh fish (US$230m), oil
products (US$212m), cement (US$167m), phosphates (US$150m), and groundnut products
(US$123m). Senegal’s main export markets for goods in 2015 were Mali (US$443m),
Switzerland (US$225m), India (US$140m), Cote d’Ivoire (US$ 122m), and China (US$120m);
and 2018 (US$84.45) to France (United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade,
2006-2018). 33 In the last five years, Senegal’s export growth mainly has been driven by
phosphates and groundnut products. Phosphate’s exports have increased from 4.7bn CFAF in
2011 to 34bn CFAF in 2015, while groundnut’s products export have increased from 47bn CFAF
to 77bn CFAF over the same period. 34
In terms of Senegal’s imports, it is mainly originated from its main trade partner France
(US$917m), and operates with the rest of the world like China (US$544$), Nigeria (US$ 453m),
India (US$355m), Spain (US$289m), and the Netherlands (US$230m). 35 This means that
Senegal is dependent on external partners to provide local companies with equipment and
machinery, necessary for industrial processes. Also, the national refining company and the
oldest one in West Africa imports crude oil and petroleum products, as its refining capacity is
lower than the national demand. The main import products were thus machines and apparatus
(US$7.6bn), refined petroleum products (US$5.2bn), crude petroleum (US$4.2bn), transport
equipment (US$3.9bn), rice (US$3.1bn), and wheat (US$1.4bn). 36
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Senegal is actively involved in several international investment-related organizations and is
a member of the African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI), the International Centre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (MIGA). Senegal has also created an investment arbitration center in 1998, which is
administered by the Dakar Chamber of Commerce. In addition, Senegal has bilateral investment
treaties with France, Australia, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, Romania, South Korea, Spain,
Switzerland, Netherland, and the US. It has concluded tax treaties with France, Mali, and the
French-speaking African states of the “Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache” (Joint
Afro-Malagasy Organization). Furthermore, Senegal’s investment Code includes guarantees for
access to foreign exchange and repatriation of capital and earnings, through transactions that are
subject to procedural requirements of financial regulators. These are today no barriers to 100%
ownership of businesses by foreign investors except in Sectors that government and state-owned
enterprises are active such as physical infrastructure including water, electricity distribution, and
port services. According to the World Bank (2017), “FDI inflows to Senegal more than doubled
from US$168m in 2005 to US$345m in 2015”. This is largely due to the country’s privatization
program launched in the 1990s. The government of Senegal partially or totally withdrew its
shares in national companies in the 1990s, most of which provided public services (water supply,
telecommunication, and refinery). The effect of the 2008 international crisis has provoked a
reduction of about 20% of FDI in 2009. 37
In the period of 2000s particularly (2005-2015), the average GDP growth rate was estimated
at 4% while the population grew at a pace of 3%. They did not allow for a significant reduction
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in poverty rates, especially in rural areas. Therefore, Senegal’s President Macky Sall adopted the
“Emerging Senegal Plan” (commonly known in French as PSE “Plan Senegal Emergent”) in
2014 as a new policy framework and development model to accelerate Senegal progress toward
becoming an emerging economy. The PSE is carried out through a five-year Priority Action Plan
(PAP) with strategic pillars, sectorial objectives, and the Strategy's lines of action. The PAP
comes in various development projects and programs that are part of a budgetary framework for
2014–2018. The PAP is building on the optimistic scenario of the PES, which is evaluated at
9,685.7bn of CFA francs. Its financing has been secured up to 5,737.6bn of CFA francs, or
59.2%, making the funding gap to fill for the 2014–2018 period 2,964bn of CFA francs (30.6%),
and the one to be covered by additional revenues and cost-savings reaches 984bn of CFA francs
(10.2%). 38
For the transport sector, Senegal has built 1 520km and rehabilitated 4 015km of roads over
the past four years. It has expanded its highway system with the construction of the Diamnadio
highway and a new 115km highway (The ILA Touba highway). Senegal is also counting the
modernization of transport services through the development of a more modern transport system.
It can be perceived with the TER (Regional Express Train) project which aims at revolutionizing
the Senegalese transport system connecting Dakar(the capital ) and the new airport in Dias via
14stations with a speed of 160km/h, for a load capacity of 115 000 people per day.
In addition, with the new discoveries of gold, oil, gas, petroleum, and zircon in its soil,
Senegal is currently working on projects to explore these precious resources that can generate
immense fortunes and could be a way to enhance its economy to the top.
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Senegal’s dependency on France is perpetuated through its economic relations. There has
been a reservoir of cheap labor and raw material for the former metropole, a captive market for
various high-priced manufactured imports, minimum metropolitan public investment, mostly in
infrastructure projects and financial autonomy, and in addition to export-oriented of Senegal’s
market, making it a significant target for France’s investment. This helps understand that
Senegal accepts France’s contribution and support, and in turn has to undergo most of the cost of
administration and development from its own limited resources. Senegal is France’s 57th largest
trading partner globally and third largest from Africa. France represents the leading foreign
investor in Senegal with more than 78% of FDI stock (2.2billion in 2015), and over 1.7billion
Euros worth of investments with the country. 39 Several French multinational companies such as
BNP Paribas, Eramet, Orange S.A, Necotrans, and Societe Generale operate in Senegal, thus
playing a significant role in Senegal’s economic vitality, accounting for 25% of GDP and tax
revenues. 40
Thus, all things considered, since imperialism and colonialism, when France conquered
Senegal and settled in its four townships of Saint-Louis, Goree, Rufisque, and Dakar, until today,
France has been playing a great role in Senegal. France is involved in all Senegal’s affairs.
Although independent since the 1960s, Senegal is still not autonomous due to France’s
colonial legacy and its deep-seated history that has been so firmly established in Senegal, and has
made it very reliant on France. Because of this reliance on France, the economy of Senegal
follows very closely the colonial extraverted pattern in favor of the former colonial metropole
France. This can be seen in foreign trade where Senegal is dependent on what external partners
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particularly France are prepared to buy and sell. High-priced manufactured imports, minimum
metropolitan public investments, mostly in infrastructure projects and lack of financial autonomy
characterize Senegal’s relations with its former colonial power, France. The latter is its main
trading partner and its leading foreign investor with more than 78% of FDI stock (2.2billion in
2015) and over 1.7 billion Euro worth of investment. Senegal also exports many of its crucial
products to France: Gold (US$ 240m), fresh fish (US$230m), oil products (US$212m), cement
(US$ 167m), phosphates (US$ 150m) and groundnut products (Us$ 123m). These statistics
issued in 2015 are salient examples that show that Senegal is very dependent on global economy
particularly France, which is its largest trading partner. The outcome for Senegal is deregulation
of Senegal’s financial market to allow integration in the global market, thus creating trade deficit
as well as balance of payment’s problems over years forcing it to borrow from IMF to cover
shortfalls in foreign exchange. Another outcome is stagnation seen through the harsh economic
development constraints and the immiseration that many Senegalese people face in their daily
lives. By weakening the Senegalese economy, the colonial dependent situation has created
conditions of generalized economic poverty and lack of opportunity for young people. This
situation causes migrations to Europe and elsewhere.
Take the traditional monocrop of groundnuts (groundnut and peanut) in Senegal, for
example. After independence in the 1960s, Senegal produced 1,1 million tons of groundnuts 41.
Senegal’s groundnuts, particularly peanut, alone accounted for more than 80% of the country's
exports. Groundnuts cultivation employed 87% of the labor force and covered half of the
cultivated land. It provided the greater part of the monetary income of the peasantry of the
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central basin, which produces the bigger share of groundnuts. Groundnuts processing accounted
for 42% of the turnover of Senegalese industry, and a substantial part of the former colony's
fiscal revenues came from taxes on the export of this product (Caswell, 1983, pp. 39-40).
At the peak of 1965, Senegal exported about 300,000 tons of its peanuts, which represented
roughly 20% of the total global peanut exports. 42 However, with the France-Senegal relations of
dependency, it meant that almost all the crop was exported to Senegal’s former colonial power
France, where it provided 60% of the total consumption of vegetable oil (Caswell, 1983, p. 40).
This situation was established during the colonial period when the monocrop of groundnuts
economy which made Senegal a rich country, at least in West Africa, caused the colonial
administration (France) to provide technical and material assistance for the production to satisfy
France’s needs. France’s interventions during this period allowed it to maintain the main policy
of setting paid prices to peasant producers at a certain threshold, as it did during the World Wars
and during the crisis of the Thirties. Measures were taken, for example for the provision of seeds
on credit, and, after the war, the first attempts were made to increase yields through the
modernization of agricultural techniques in the marketing circuits through controlled prices and
by legislation promoting commercialization cooperatives (Caswell, 1983, p. 40). Later, France
lifted the price support it had been offering under the Lomé Convention, 43 and ensured a steady
supply of Senegal’s groundnuts by establishing an increasingly interventionist system in this
sector during the period when the market was in a state of unpredictable changes or tribulations.

42 “The Senegalese Groundnuts story” (February 20, 2015). Retrieved from Gro-Intelligence:
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Overall, the organization of the groundnuts trade tended to undermine the long-term interests
of Senegal and its peasant producers. It was dominated by a handful of French companies
operating mainly through African and Lebanese intermediaries, and which monopolized not only
the purchase and export of groundnuts but also the import and distribution of consumer goods.
Senegal was obliged to mortgage very often its future crops in exchange for loans that allowed
the Senegalese peasant producers to spend the interim period preceding the harvest. This
resulted in a vicious circle of indebtedness, which, combined with fluctuating terms of trade,
long-term adverse effects, and land reclamation did not favor the modernization of agriculture in
Senegal. All this reinforced the stagnation of Senegal's real incomes (Vanhaeverbeke, 1970, p.
217).
As a result, following the independence of Senegal, the percentage of indebted families in
the groundnuts basin was estimated at 60% (CINAM-SERESA, 1963, p. 253). In addition, there
was a new policy agency, OCAS, 44 inaugurated by the Senegalese new elites who studied in
France. Senghor (leader of the UPS party (Union Progressive Senegalese) who served as the
first Senegalese president for almost two decades (from 1960-1980) was a salient example to
perfectly support this idea. Senghor, in the name of African Socialism, was, on the one hand, at
the forefront of the Senegalese nation willing to liberate Senegal and the peasantry from the
straitjacket of the colonial treaty economy while, on the other hand, was attributing to France a
great importance in the Senegalese economy as means of colonial paternalism, particularly in the
traditional agricultural sector. This made Senegal’s agriculture more oriented to the world
economy, and particularly to France, rather than operating in favor of national interests. This
“OCAS”(Office de Commercialisation Agricole du Senegal “Agricultural Marketing Board of Senegal”) is a public Senegalese
industrial and commercial policy established in 1967, whose first mission was to control the Groundnuts’ trade which constitutes
the main agricultural resource and income revenue of the country.
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newly created policy granted the monopoly of purchase of Senegal’s groundnuts production to
agricultural cooperatives and a small number of approved private traders who sold the harvest to
the French processing industries operating in Senegal or French companies that organized the
groundnuts export for treatment and commercialization in France (Caswell, 1983, p. 41).
From the 1975-1976 marketing season, France extended its influence even more with the
complicity of the Senegalese leaders who always embody the colonial paternalism and fraternity
toward the former colonial motherland France, and who are always eager to receive external or
outside assistance from France. They were organizing the export of groundnuts products with a
new parastatal society, SONACOS (Societe Nationale de Commercialisation des Oleagineux du
Senegal or “National Company of Marketing of the Oleaginous of Senegal”) created in 1975.
SONACOS delivered the new harvest to the factories of transformation and organized the
commercialization of the exports. This was facilitated by the creation of the ONCAD (Office
National de Coopération et d’Assistance au Développement or the “National Office for
Cooperation and Assistance in Development”), which was the exploitation mechanism that
ensured the monopoly of the Senegalese marketing of peanuts and represented also the largest
customer carriers during this marketing season by linking it to rural credit, and providing
instruments to control the price and quality of the means of agricultural production used
(Caswell, 1983, p. 44)
Currently, because of France’s influence, the Senegalese government still maintains the
price set at which the peasant producers sold their groundnuts for export and commercialization
in France through the new committee on groundnuts commonly known as CNIA (Comité
National Inter-professionnel de l’Arachide or “National Inter-Professional Committee on
Peanut”). The CNIA reviews the purchase price every year and implements any changes to
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prices at the beginning of the season. It offers the same price to peasant producers regardless of
their location in the country and absorbs any transportation-related costs. Peasant producers sell
their products to the CNIA, which has set the price at the national level. French processors
impose to the Senegalese state a reduction and subsequent withdrawal of subsidies for its
groundnuts and for crushing its groundnuts into oil that is sold to France in a pattern of unequal
exchange, characteristic of primary commodity economies, and in a situation of deteriorating
terms of trade (O’Brien, 1979, pp. 19-20). In 2010, the last year in which the described domestic
processor subsidy was in place, the nationally set price for peanuts is CFA165 ($ 0.34) per kilo.
The Senegalese government offers a subsidy to these French processors of CFA15 ($0.03) per
kilo, which means that the effective processor has cost CFA150 ($0.31) per kilo. 45
These policies show that France’s colonial legacy and relations with Senegal make
Senegal’s groundnuts monoculture heavily dependent on France’s financial and technical
assistance. This can be seen during the two drought seasons that occurred in Senegal from the
period 1970s and 2000s. During this period, Senegal, like other countries in the Sahelian zone,
suffered from a persistent drought while it had few non-agricultural resources to depend on.
Senegal’s peanut basin soil tends to be poor and sandy, and are currently undergoing these
effects with the rapid depletion noticed in these areas particularly in the increasingly
overpopulated areas of the basin which were and are being exploited first (Caswell, 1983, p. 46).
These have led to the even faster exhaustion of Senegalese cultivation soils because of this
irrational exploitation. Therefore, it is no surprise that France provided financial and technical
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assistance for modernization programs aimed at counteracting these trends and encouraging the
use of fertilizers and seeds to ensure the steady supply of Senegalese groundnuts to France.
Thus, Senegal’s dependency on France makes France exercise its influence over Senegal’s
main source of revenues and the largest portion of Senegal’s GDP that employs 70% of the labor
force. Because of the colonial ties Senegal’s cash-cropping that begun during the colonial period
draws today the peasant producers away from subsistence economy and ties them to the supply
mechanism of France’s foreign industries operating as groundnuts’ processors in Senegal. The
liberalization of the export market provides a steady supply of these precious sources of income
to France’s trading companies (O’Brien, 1979, p. 20) that make France richer. Conversely, these
economic relations constrain Senegal’s economic development due to a situation of deteriorating
terms of trade that they have created. The end result has been the inflation of groundnuts export
with a low-income revenue, many financial problems largely compensated by additional aid and
loans that plunge Senegal in an indebtedness and economic stagnation that creates frustrations
for the peasants and families, and the majority of people living below the poverty line.
Therefore, migrations are seen as the only viable solution to escape from this endemic situation
in Senegal.
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CHAPTER FOUR:

STATE POWER AND ELITE APPROPRIATION OF RESOURCES IN POSTCOLONIAL
SENEGAL
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Introduction
The period of the 1960s marked the transition from colonial despotism to independence in
many African states. In the newly independent Africa, this epoch coincided with the rise of
Africans as rulers of the African states. Focused on Senegal, reputed to be one of the most
democratic country compared to many other African countries, this chapter seeks first to describe
Senegal as a democracy. After showing the pattern underlying Senegal as a democratic state, in
the second part, I attempt to support my hypothesis that the more post-colonial holders of state
power resort to authoritarian rule and the privatization of the state, the more likely they will loot
national resources for their private interests. I argue that in Senegal, post-colonial rulers have
used authoritarian means of governance and appropriated the state resources as personal
property. Therefore, they have created a situation of generalized poverty and lack of economic
opportunities for many young people in Senegal. Because of that, the outcome has been massive
migrations to Europe and elsewhere.

Senegal: A Democratic State
I define democracy as a government established for the people and by the people.
Etymologically, the term is derived from the Greek dēmokratiā, which came from dēmos
(“people”) and kratos (“rule”) in the middle of the 5th century BCE to denote the political
systems that existed in some Greek city-states, notably in Athens. It means the rule of a majority
and a government, in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them
directly or indirectly through a system of representation that involves usually a periodical free
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elections holding. 46 Democracy as a process entails the elaboration of a structured and regulated
uncertainty. While it grants winners the power to govern and advance their interests
immediately, democracy frees losers from the dangers of a sudden obliteration, and guarantees
them the capacity to hope for a future victory via regularized, free, and fair multiparty elections.
Therefore, it constitutes the institutional equalization of a structured and regulated uncertainty of
political outcomes among antagonistic and competing actors, and is greatly assisted by the
emergence of civil society, which according to Fatton (1992, p. 103), “Embodies the private
sphere of material, cultural and political activities”.
To be sure, Senegal is a West African state, where democracy overtly appears to prevail.
This has been supported by successive events in the development of the country’s politics, which
has always taken place within the framework of a presidential democratic republic with each
successive political regime in Senegal. In post-independence Africa, Senegal emerged as a
country that moved to democracy without any military coups. In the early 1960s, the country
pulled out of Mali Federation, 47 and saw its first national president, Léopold Sédar Senghor
(leader of the UPS “Senegalese Progressive Union”), elected on September 5, 1960. 48 Senghor
was a lofty intellectual and a highly skilled grass-roots politician who embodied black
consciousness and cultural value and identity of Africa through his philosophical formulation of
Negritude (Note taken from AAS 312, Dr. Sangmpam). Senghor started to shape in this postindependence period the political life of Senegal by embarking on the process of liberalization in
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1974. This process aimed at expanding political pluralism and democracy in Senegal. Its
realization made it possible for the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) of his opponent
Abdoulaye Wade to be legally recognized in that same year. This first step in Senegal’s politics
reflected an aspect of democracy, with the existence of opposition considered as part of a
participatory democracy; such opposition seemed inevitably and safely displayed in public rather
than through the formations of clandestine underground organizations (Wiseman, 1990, p. 168),
and enjoyed the respect and liberty granted to Senegal’s civil society.
A move toward Senegal’s democracy was made in the provision for opposition parties. It
was extended through a new constitutional amendment in April 1976 and allowed new
opponents and their respective parties to adopt one of these three designated ideological
positions such as liberal, socialist, or Marxist-Leninist. In this logic, Senghor’s UPS party
became the Senegalese Socialist Party (commonly known in French as Parti Socialiste du
Senegal), Abdoulaye Wade, leader of the PDS, went for the liberal position, and the PAI (Parti
Africain de l’indépendance or “African Independence Party”) of the leader Majhemout Diop,
became the third party recognized as Marxist-Leninist. The November 1976 municipal elections
went under these arrangements, so did the February 1978 presidential election as well. The latter
was considered as the first presidential election under these three-pronged party system and took
place in a democratic atmosphere that resulted in a landslide victory for the Senegalese Socialist
Party of Senghor. He won 82.20% of the votes, against 17.80% for his opponent, Abdoulaye
Wade. 49 Moreover, during the national assembly election that took place that same day, PS won
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83% of the seats, against 17% for the PDS, while the PAI won none (Wiseman, 1990, pp. 168169).
From this first step of democracy emerged in December 1978 a further concession to a more
open and freely competitive party system in Senegal. The constitution was amended to allow for
the legalization of a fourth party that represented a right-wing ideological stance. MRS
(Mouvement Republicain Senegalais or “Senegalese Republican Movement”) was created in
1977 and led by Boubacar Gueye, the nephew of the late great nationalist leader Lamine Gueye.
In addition to this, came the RND (Rassemblement National Democratic or “National
Democratic Rally”) that was led by the eminent Senegalese academic, Cheikh Anta Diop. It was
a left-wing party and was thus associated with PAI, which symbolized the same ideal spectrum
the RND stood for (Wiseman, 1990, p. 170).
On December 31, 1980, Senghor, even though his health was good for an African leader of
his age to continue to serve his country, surprisingly announced his retirement from politics. His
decision was totally unforced, and he, according to Wiseman (1990, p. 170) commented that, “In
politics, you should know when to go”. Comparatively, the decision he took, distinguished him
from many African leaders of the post-independence period, who even at their old age, were
eager to cling to power. Such a decision placed Senghor as the first of 150 heads of state in the
political stage of Africa to relinquish power on his own accord in the post-independence era.
Since then, a number of others followed his example: Ahidjo in Cameroon, Nyerere in Tanzania,
and Siaka Stevens in Sierra Leone (Wiseman, 1990, p. 170).
All of this describes a series of events under Senghor’s regime in Senegal, where the
political system appeared stable. They embodied a perfect promotion and advancement of
democracy as a process and ideology in the country. It was exercised through the constitutional
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amendments in Senegal, allowing antagonists’ parties at that time to be legalized, and to
participate freely in fair competitive elections against the incumbent Senghor in a democratic
sphere, where freedom and civil society’s choices were respected.
After Senghor’s voluntary retirement, Abdou Diouf, who had been the head of his private
office and then his prime minister after the reestablishment of this post in 1970, replaced
Senghor according to Senegal’s constitutional law under which the prime minister succeeds a
retiring head of state. On January 1, 1981, he was sworn in as Republic of Senegal’s second
president for the remaining five years of Senghor’s tenure. Additionally, he replaced two weeks
later Senghor as general secretary of the ruling party PS (Wiseman, 1990, p. 171), and held the
presidency’s position from 1981 to 2000.
Diouf was known as a reformist that epitomized the ideal of Senegal’s democracy. He
expanded Senegalese citizens’ rights to create parties. He mandated the constitutional
transformation by initiating legislative change to allow for an unlimited number of parties in
1981 (Kelly, 2019, p. 3). In other words, this integral pluripartism opened up the possibility for
opposition parties to run for the presidency against any ruling party or political opponents, as
they desired. By the end of 1981, there were 14 registered political parties; and several other
leaders of that time created their own organizations. It was the case for ex-Prime Minister,
Mamadou Dia, who founded the MSU (Mouvement pour le Socialisme et l’Unité or “Movement
for Socialism and Unity”), for a former anti-colonial activist who created the BDS (Bloc
Démocratique Senegalais “Senegalese Democratic Bloc”), and Oumar Wone who created the
PPS (Parti Populaire Senegalais “Senegalese Popular Party”), asserted Kelly (2019, p. 63). All
of this symbolized Senegal as a democratic country, where there was an ascendency of parties
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that became more institutionalized. This proliferation of parties allowed any party leader to
express desire and wish to run for president in transparent elections.
Through the reforms, Diouf was continuing the political liberalization that Senghor started
earlier by allowing more opposition parties to run against him. Under Diouf’s regime, Senegal
held two presidential elections in 1983 and 1988, where many emerging parties participated. He
respectively won both of these two elections with 83.45% and 73.20% of the votes, 50 in a
country, where the president is to be elected by an absolute majority on a national basis, and in a
democratic climate where people’s voices speak freely for themselves in the polls.
Another indication of Senegal’s democracy under Diouf’s regime was the constitutional
reform he brought in 1991, by approving several constitutional amendments that allowed the
opposition parties to participate in the government in 1991. 51 The following year, in 1992, he
made a significant reform in terms of free and fair elections by establishing the democratic
“electoral code”. It was a consensual elaboration by the government of Diouf and the opposition
leaders. The electoral code put forward a secret ballot and expanded the voting rights to the
diaspora and young people. It required the use of the ballot boxes and indelible ink for the vote,
allowed party representatives to be present at the polls, guaranteed equal media access to all
candidates, and established a national ballot-counting commission, among other reforms (Kanté,
1994, p. 96).
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After the establishment of these new reforms, there were events that affected Senegal
negatively. As we know, the 1990s period was marked by a severe economic depression that
affected both the developed and developing countries. In addition, there was the drought season
the country experienced during that period; and the expansion of globalization and its neoliberal
process came up with the rise of market reform as a global creed that involved a series of policies
in the peripheral part of world. All of these scourges inflicted great pain on Senegal during this
period. The country was in a disastrous economic situation that resulted in the closing of several
important labor sectors and businesses, thus, creating high rates of unemployment. It led to a
total frustration and outbreak in whole Senegal’s fourteen regions.
All these problems affected the country’s politics in that period because the disastrous
economic situation and the high rate of employment mixed to create a crisis of authority.
Although in February 1988, Senegal held presidential and legislative elections and elected Diouf
with 73.20% of the votes 52. In the aftermath of these negative events, Diouf and the PS were
losing legitimacy in the eyes of significant portions of the country. This was particularly so with
the urban and rural youth due to the deepening of the socioeconomic deprivation. Moreover, the
opposition parties were really disorganized and did not fully acquire the necessary means and
support to conquer power and govern (Fatton, 1992, p. 105). Thus, Senegal was facing a disaster
that ended up pervading the whole country economically, socially, and politically.
The events in the post-1988 presidential and legislative elections and the economic crisis
need to be highlighted because it was in such a climate of generalized crisis in Senegal that
Diouf’s regime made a democratic move to set up the “Enlarged Presidential Majority”. The
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latter’s main purpose was to form a new government cooperation by incorporating the main
opposition leaders into the governance itself. Among them, he chose Abdoulaye Wade (leader of
the PDS party) and nominated him to the position of minister d’état without a portfolio.
Furthermore, he incorporated three other members of the PDS, as well as the leader of the
Communist party, Amath Dansako. In addition, Diouf re-established the prime ministership and
gave it to his intimate friend, Habib Thiam, the last to have occupied the position prior to its
dissolution in 1983 (Fatton, 1992, p. 105).
From this standpoint, Diouf’s unification with Wade and the other opposition leaders
reinvigorated Senegal’s “model” democracy. Both of them embarked on an attempt to contain
civil society’s frustrations and outbreaks during such a critical situation, when violence could
have characterized Senegal’s politics, and might have led to serious disruptions and tremendous
consequences that could tarnish the country’s image as a model of democracy. Thus, in
containing the risk of explosive social disturbances, and in promoting stability, the coming
together of party leaders displayed, reaffirmed, and consolidated the claim about Senegal’s
model democracy in Africa.
In 2000, Senegal held presidential elections. During the elections, Diouf and his PS party,
respectively after 19years and 40 years in power, were defeated by Abdoulaye Wade (leader of
the PDS, and main opposition leader in the country since 1974) in the runoff. Diouf received
only 41.51% of the votes against 58.49% for Wade. 53 Although defeated by Wade, Diouf
conceded his defeat and made the courteous move by calling the incoming president Abdoulaye
Wade to congratulate him on his victory while leaving office. Wade in his turn, paid a brief visit

53 Database of election results in Senegal. Retrieved from:
http://africanelections.tripod.com/sn.html#1988_Presidential_Election

91

to Diouf’s mother, who received her son’s replacement with the utmost of graciousness. He also
asked Diouf to represent Senegal at the first European-African Summit in Cairo (Kuenzi, 2011,
pp. 40-41).
The gestures of the two leaders were a major accomplishment in Senegal’s political history
and supported the idea of Senegal as a model democracy. They revealed the vitality and
flexibility of its political system, which peacefully went through a power transfer. This
achievement represented a watershed in the country’s political system. It not only demonstrated
and reaffirmed the perception of Senegal as a democratic country but also placed the country as
one of the most democratic countries in West Africa, and was inscribed forever in the political
history’s book of the continent.
Coming into power through the democratic ballot box that showcased Senegal as a
democracy, Wade’s regime (from 2000 to 2012) represented Senegal’s heyday of democratic
power change. He was widely admired and embodied the PDS historical legacy in his role as
leader of the country’s most prominent post-independence opposition party. His government
initially appeared energetic and communicative, and the civil society seemed appreciative of this
executive power’s transition. President Wade benefited from the two-round voting system 54 in
Senegal. This system allows opponents from different parties to forge a sense of shared purpose
through “unity or coalition” against a candidate during a second-round election. Therefore, those
opposition leaders, who supported Wade and his “Sopi coalition” 55 (Coalition for change) by

54

“The two-round system” (also known as runoff voting or ballotage) is a voting method used to elect a single winner, where the
voter casts a single vote for their chosen candidate.

55
“Sopi Coalition” was a coalition formed before the 2000 presidential election. It was made up of eight parties that voted and
selected Wade as their potential leader to oppose Diouf who was the actual incumbent of Senegal during that period.

92

coalescing with him to form the Front pour l’Alternance 56 (Front for a change in power “FAL”)
during the second round of that 2000 presidential election, seemed also reinvigorated and had
hope for the millennium era (Kuenzi, 2011, p. 41).
Some of the initial steps taken by Wade’s regime and government reinforced in the eyes of
many the perception of Senegal’s model democracy. Although governing is not an easy task in a
country that is known as democratic, Senegalese expected full achievements from the Wade
government. Wade’s government was forthcoming about its promise to hold new elections. By
then Senegal had 174 registered parties, a number that had tripled from 58 parties by the end of
the year 2000 (Kelly, 2019, p. 62). Three elections were held the year after Wade came to
power: (1) the referendum on the new draft of the Constitution in January 2001, (2) the
legislative elections in April 2001, and (3) the municipal and local elections in 2001 (Kuenzi,
2011, p. 41). These elections displayed Senegal’s model of democracy by the way they unfolded
in the country. They were relatively free and fair, where the PDS and its allied parties forming
the “Coalition Sopi” won the elections with nearly 50% of the votes and 74% of the seats. 57
In addition to that, the “strength” of Senegal’s democracy was also demonstrated under
Wade’s regime when the influential Freedom House organization rated Senegal as “free”, based
on its democratic performance during this era (Kuenzi, 2011, p. 41). Indeed, in the early years of
Wade’s regime, elections were relatively free, fair, and peaceful. They reinforced Senegal’s
image as a democratic achievements. But this was not to last.

56

“Front pour l’Alternance” was a coalition that was formed after the first round of the 2000 presidential election. It was made
up of twenty-one parties and included parties of five of the six presidential contenders who were eliminated after the first round
of the 2000 presidential election.
57 Database of election results in Senegal. Retrieved from:
http://africanelections.tripod.com/sn.html#1988_Presidential_Election

93

On February 26, 2012, Senegal held its 10th presidential election and the incumbent
Abdoulaye Wade attempted, against the constitution, to run for a third term. He faced his former
protégé Macky Sall. Trained as geological engineer at the Institute of Earth Sciences (IST) of
the University of Dakar and then at the French Institute of Petroleum (IFP)’s National College of
Petrol and Engines (ENSPM) in Paris, Macky Sall was a member of the Senegalese Democratic
Party (PDS). He served as Prime Minister (from April 2004 to June 2007); and was then
appointed as President of the National Assembly (from June 2007 to November 2008) under
Wade’s regime. Due to its political disagreement and conflict within the PDS that led to his
removal from his appointed post as President of the National assembly, Macky Sall on December
1, 2008, formed his own political party, APR (Alliance pour la Republique or “Alliance for the
Republic”). He toured all fourteen regions of Senegal to lay the foundations for his campaign,
and became the key rival of Abdoulaye Wade during that 2012 presidential race.
The initial results of the February elections were 26.58% for Macky Sall, and 34.81% for
Wade. 58 It compelled both of them to resort to a second round or runoff to get an absolute
majority on a national basis for the victory. During this second round elections which took place
on March 25, 2012, Sall allied with the other disqualified candidates such as Tanor Dieng (leader
of the Socialist Party), Moustapha Niass (leader of the AFP party (Alliance des Forces du
Progrés “Alliances of the Forces of Progress”); Idrissa Seck (leader of the party Rewmi (Wolof
appellation for “country”); Youssou Ndour (Senegalese famous singer) whose candidacy was
rejected by the Constitutional council due the fact he didn’t meet the sufficient valid
requirements and signatures to run for the presidency. He also allied with the M23 (Opposition
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movement generally composed of rappers, who identify themselves under the slogan of “Y’en a
Marre”, Wolof translation for “We are fed up”). All of these opposition leaders and their
respective parties joined forces with Macky Sall and formed with him a coalition named in
Wolof “Benno Bokk Yakkar” (United for the Same Hope). They supported and endorsed Macky
Sall’s candidacy to the presidency during this second round election. Again, Senegal’s
democracy was put to test for transparency in the electoral system, national consensus, and
accountability. In the end, Macky Sall won with 65.80% of the votes, 59 and Abdoulaye Wade
called his opponent Macky Sall at 21:30 GMT to concede the race.
Inaugurated as the Republic of Senegal’s fourth President on April 2 at the King Fahd Palace
hotel in Senegal, Macky Sall put in place his government by appointing Abdoul Mbaye, a
technocrat and banker as his Prime Minister. Some of the initiatives taken by Sall’s regime
reinforced Senegal’s democratic claims made under all the three previous regimes. He took the
initiative to publicly publish his net worth, which was estimated at CFA Francs 1.3 billion,
largely acquired during his tenure as Wade’s Prime Minister. 60 Three month later, precisely on
July 1, 2012, when he won the legislative election with the same coalition “United for the Same
Hope” by obtaining 119 of the 150 seats in the National Assembly, 61 Macky Sall re-established
the Court for the Repression of Illegal Enrichment and announced the creation of OFNAC
(Office National de la Lutte Contre la Fraude et la Corruption or “National Anti-corruption
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Office”), and a National Commission for the restitution of property and recovery of wrongly
acquired possessions. 62 He did so in order to promote Senegal’s image of model democracy
where good governance and transparency coexist on a basis of constitutional values. He also
took the initiative to put forward a democratizing reform by declaring publicly his wish to revise
the constitution in order to reduce the president’s tenure from seven to five years.
Senegal’s democracy under Sall’s regime was also characterized by the creation and
registration of many political parties. According to (Kelly, 2019, p. 88), “The number of
registered parties has risen from over 200 when he became president to over 300 now”. All these
parties serve as vehicles for voicing policy alternatives and freely express themselves as a
counterweight to the president’s policies on the basis of free electoral competition and
accountability.
Sall’s regime illustrated the potential of Senegal’s democracy. As the prerequisite for
democracy involves socioeconomic transformation, he set up in February 2013 the famous “Plan
Senegal Emergent” (PSE “Senegal’s Emergent Plan”). It was a plan designed to transform
Senegal into an emergent economy by 2035, with a cohesive society under the rule of law. 63 It
was a plan designed to raise potential growth and satisfy Senegalese’s aspiration for a better life
through investments in sectors like agriculture, infrastructure, and tourism. Portraying himself as
modernizer eager to promote and consolidate Senegal’s democracy through the solidary and
inclusive appeal for the march towards a “Senegal for all” within the PSE, he invited all the
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opposition leaders and the entire Senegalese community to participate in the boosting of
Senegal’s economic growth and development. More importantly, on March 20, 2016, he
reduced the president’s tenure from Seven to Five years, after the constitutional referendum
elections. These elections took place in a democratic sphere. The opposition and civil society
expressed themselves freely in a fair vote that went for 63% of approval against 37.44% of
turnout. 64
On February 24, 2019, Senegal held presidential election. Among the six potential
candidates and leaders of parties, two of them (Karim Wade, the designated leader of PDS, the
Party of his father Abdoulaye Wade) and Khalifa Sall (leader of the Socialist Party) were
excluded from participating due to their previous condemnations for misuse of public funds. The
remaining four party leaders, Madicke Niang (leader of the Independent Party), Issa Sall (leader
of the Unity and Rally Party), Idrissa Seck (leader of the Rewmi Party), and Ousmane Sonko
(leader of the Patriots of for Work, Ethics and Fraternity Party), ran as candidates against the
incumbent Macky Sall. The 2019 presidential election, was peaceful, fair, accountable, and civil
society-based. More than 6.6 million people registered to vote, including some living abroad.
Macky Sall was re-elected in the first round election with 58.27% of the votes against 1.48% for
Madicke Niang, 4.07% for Issa Sall, 20.50% for Idrissa Seck, and 15.67% for Ousmane Sonko. 65
Macky Sall, who is currently in his second term in office, continues to project the image of
Senegal as a” model” democracy. In this speech of December 31, 2019, President Sall said that,
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“As a democratic country, Senegal has crossed these 2019 elections peacefully, and in total
equanimity”. 66 He reiterated his commitment to continue to maintain Senegal as a model
democracy by serving with accountability to the Senegalese nation. Preparing the future of
Senegal, he argued, “Is to achieve the widest possible convergence around the major national
issues that are at the heart of public policies, especially the sense of the call for a national
dialogue”. 67 Sall has launched a national dialogue, which serves as an opportunity to deal with
the great questions related to the national interests. Currently, it has installed the dialogue
steering committee, which serves as a framework for facilitating exchanges on various topics
related to the country’s agenda. This dialogue, in his words, “Is a consensus to consolidate the
democratic experience, and the economic and social progress that are coming along in this
country”. 68 He has also inaugurated a series of big projects within the PSE, such as the turnpike
that links Dakar and Diamnadio (where the actual airport is located); the one that links Dakar and
Touba, 69 the new national arena for traditional wrestling in the suburb of Dakar; the basketball
arena in Diamniadio; the new agriculture machines for the development of the country’s
monocrops (peanuts and groundnuts); the development of the local rice cultivation and its
consumption in the country; and the development of the fishing sector, in addition to the
expansion of other sectors such as tourism.
All in all, since independence with President Senghor until today with President Macky Sall,
there are enough facts that support the claim that Senegal is one of the better democracies in
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Africa. This is supported by the proliferation of parties in the country. It is also demonstrated by
the country’s stability, the vitality and flexibility of its political system that can transition
peacefully from one regime to another, the transparency of its electoral system or its formal
electoral rules, where the opposition parties and their respective leaders can freely participate and
express their will against a particular incumbent, and with the freedom and respect of civil
society’s choices, the relative accountability of some of its political regimes. Yet Senegal is
hardly a “model” democracy as often claimed. After discussing Senegal as a democratic state, I
now turn to show how the county’s democracy is accompanied by authoritarian behaviors.

Senegal’s democracy and authoritarianism
Placed in the general political framework of post-independence Africa, authoritarian
behavior is the way in which new African elites exercise power by virtue of their control of the
state to oppress, repress, and manipulate to enhance their power. Unlike many African countries,
Senegal has been hailed as a stable democracy model in the continent. However, a close analysis
of the country’s political reality shows that despite its claim to democracy and stability, Senegal
displays features related to authoritarianism.
As mentioned earlier, since its accession to independence in 1960, the republic of Senegal
saw for the first time of its history its first president named Léopold Sédar Senghor. His UPS
party occupied the center of Senegalese politics. When he was elected as Senegal’s head of state
in the early period of the 1960s generally seen as the “Period of Electoral competition” (Sheldon,
1995, p. 21), Senghor started to set up his political authority as “a presidential monarch” by
imposing a one-party regime or one dominant-party system which, accordingly, “Was presented
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as part of the African tradition that aimed at the elimination of oppositional or adversarial
institutions of participation” (Sangmpam, 2007, p. 125). The establishment of a one-party
system represented the organ through which Senghor sought to maintain his monolithic political
position as the supreme officeholder in Senegal by controlling the military corps, the electoral
process, the civil service, and by fending off political challenges by excluding rival contenders.
In 1962, a constitutional crisis arose in Senegal due to the falling out between President
Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia. As Senghor’s colleague, Dia was appointed as
prime minister and was in charge of the government administration and policymaking. He
wanted to implement an agricultural reform that would place the peasants’ groundnuts
production more directly under the control of the government while restraining the rural
dignitaries’ influence over rural commercial trade. Senghor perceived Dia’s reform as
threatening his rural clientelist base from which he derived the strength and the growing
hegemony of his UPS. These were peasants and rural dignitaries (Muslim leaders from the
Muridiyya brotherhood) who were landowners who managed the majority of the groundnuts
production. The disagreement created a conflict between the two leaders. It resulted in a
constitutional crisis that divided the UPS party into two camps during this period: Dia’s radical
camp that wanted the commercial interest of the state by reducing the planning autonomy and
resource of individual ministries against the Senghor’s liberal camp that had personal patronage
networks to defend. The crisis culminated in a standoff when a motion of censure against the
prime minister was introduced in the National Assembly. Senghor and his UPS parliamentary
deputies, who mostly belonged to the Muridiyya brotherhood and their Khalif-General, 70
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provided critical support for Senghor, mobilizing themselves in a show of force for the
presidents (Beck, 2008, p. 54).
From this standpoint, it was not a surprise when Senghor ordered the army to arrest Dia, his
key political rival, after falsely accusing him of a subversion’s conspiracy. Dia was sentenced to
lifelong imprisonment in a remote jail in Kedougou in Eastern Senegal (Bianchini, 2019, p. 187).
Four other promising leaders, Valdiodio Ndiaye, Ibrahima Sarr, Joseph Mbaye and Alioune Tall,
who supported Dia, were arrested as well. In the wake of the crisis, Senghor abolished other
opposition parties in so many ways. Firstly, he dissolved the FNS (Front National Senegalais
“Senegalese National Front”) in October 1964, apparently for harboring supporters of Senghor’s
ex-colleague and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia (O’Brien, 1967, p. 559). Secondly, he banned
the PAI (Parti Africain de L’indépendance “African Independent Party”) whose leaders were
respectively Majhemout Diop and Amadou Ly. Thirdly, he refused the recognition of the RND’s
Party (Parti du Rassemblement National Démocratique “National Democratic Assembly’s
Party”) led by the eminent Senegalese academic, Cheikh Anta Diop (Wiseman, 1990, p. 170).
Fourth, he proclaimed the dissolution of the BMS (Bloc des Masses Senegalaises “Senegalese’s
Masses Coalition”), a relatively conservative party organized also by Cheikh Anta Diop, on the
pretext that a majority of the leaders of that party had joined the UPS (O’Brien, 1967, p. 559).
Finally, he absorbed the PSAS (Parti Senegalais de l’Action Socialiste “Senegalese Party of
Socialist Action”) of Lamine Gueye into UPS and appointed him as President of the National
Assembly as a way to pay him off.
After the absorption of opposition parties, Senghor also established a presidential regime
with executive strengthened powers; he wrote a new constitution in 1963, whose main points
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were the abolition of the Prime Minister’s post and the parliamentary system. 71 Under the new
constitution, the decision-making was highly centralized. Ministers served as high-level
functionaries, deferring to President Senghor on everything except routine matters. The National
assembly, became a rubber stamp for the laws and budgets proposed by President Senghor, who
frequently legislated by decree. Even the judiciary was not immune to Senghor’s influence
(Beck, 2008, p. 55). Senghor was not only the head of state and government but also the
secretary-general of the ruling party, setting a precedent that established the rise of the partystate. All the government and party officials, whether elected or appointed, were ultimately
dependent on Senghor’s patronage, blurring the distinction between legislative, judicial, and
administrative functions (Beck, 2008, p. 55). This meant that the new constitution was designed,
not only to allow him to centralize power through a de facto institutionalized one-party state, but
also to have the single party as the strategic instrument of policy and governability. As a matter
of fact, it allowed Senghor’s UPS ruling party to be declared in 1966 as the sole political party in
Senegal. 72
That, Senghor embarked, by 1976, on the process of liberalization by allowing political
pluralism with the formation of opposition parties as mentioned earlier, was made possible by his
hold on the constitution, his party’s dominance, and his control over the main services and the
military corps. In addition, he controlled the internal clientelist networks and relied externally,
as seen in chapter three, on the former colonial power, France, with which Senghor had a deep
personal attachment. All this, allowed Senghor to exercise power in his favor through different
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means, whether through manipulation or intimidation. One can cite the use of certain unlawful
acts of electoral fraud. The latter as Sangmpam (2007, p. 44) argued, “May involve the
annulment of the results of an election won by the opposition or open bribery aimed at altering
the process and outcome of the elections”. In this optic, the landslide victory of Senghor’s party,
the PS during the first presidential and legislative elections under the three-party system that
were held in February 1978, was not a surprise. It was the outcome of electoral manipulation by
the dominant party.
“While it does appear that there was some element of electoral malpractice, the enormous
superiority of the PS electoral machine was largely responsible for the size of its victory”
(Wiseman, 1990, p. 169). PS’s enormous superiority derived from Senghor hegemonic position
to carry out repression and cooptation for his party’s need and his ability to violate the electoral
process and substance, if necessary, with the help and coordination of some groups of people
such as the rural dignitaries (the Muslim brotherhoods) and local communal leaders who were
indispensable intermediaries due to inadequate formal institutions at the local level (O’Brien,
1975, p. 175). They were designated as “odd ones out” to demonstrate a ruling party well
equipped and prepared. It came to what Fatton (1992, pp. 46-47) characterized as
“Bonapartism”. The latter, is the way in which a personal ruler is able to centralize power by
incorporating certain influential specific groups of people into a cartel that defends his
hegemony, supports and reinforces his material and self-interest, and makes him the only sun of
the political system.
Thus, this means that after independence, authoritarian behavior was manifest in Senegal
under Senghor’s regime. During his time in office, the opposition parties were harassed. Some
prominent opposition leaders were imprisoned, and some other significant opposition parties
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were absorbed and had not consistently participated in elections since their creation. Others
were coopted by Senghor to become part of his own party that held power and controlled power
through a de facto single-party state system. The liberalization process, which he embarked on,
was only possible because his party was extremely dominant and he could use his supremacy to
control and manipulate the strategic instrument of the state apparatus to maintain his hegemonic
position.
After his personal decision to resign from power, Diouf who had been Senghor’s prime
minister since the reestablishment of the post in 1970, replaced Senghor on January 1, 1981.
Diouf was Senghor’s protégé, and Senghor had maneuvered the PS party in a way that would
ensure the political survival of his party and the acceptance of his assigned successor long before
he retired. Diouf became also the general secretary of the ruling party PS. During his time in
office, he similarly duplicated and reproduced the same political logic that Senghor had already
started. As stated earlier, in Senegal, the president is to be elected by an absolute majority on a
national basis. Aware that the opposition coalitions might have posed a great threat to the
legitimacy and stability of the PS party’s strength and dominion, Diouf secretly tailored the
constitution by banning the electoral coalitions under the pretext that such alliances are
“artificial” since they do not last beyond the electoral period (O’Brien, 1983, p. 9). This clearly
would handicap and hamper the progress of the opposition in their run for the presidency.
Blocking this gate for the opposition, Diouf was smartly initiating the “divide and better rule” as
a strategical game in the political sphere of the country by adopting in Senegal’s national
assembly a law restoring the integral pluripartism, as mentioned earlier in the chapter.
From this perspective, it was quite probable that a certain amount of astute political move
laid behind Diouf’s continuation in the political liberalization process that Senghor had started
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earlier. As politics entails tremendous competitions, he was conscious that in implementing his
strategical game by providing more freedom to the opposition parties to participate in an open
competition, it would certainly lead to many internal and external conflicts between them. These
conflicts would, therefore, result in reducing the ability of the opposition to mount an effective
political party that would be able to run against him. These conflicts would also result in much
splitting and the creation of more and weaker opposition parties that, in return, would favor him.
According to Wiseman (1990, p. 172), “It could well be argued that paradoxically, the decision
to give more freedom to the opposition was designed to weaken them rather than strengthen
them”. Thus, in tailoring the constitutional authority, and putting into effect his strategical game
in Senegal’s political sphere by allowing more opposition parties to run against him, Diouf was
aware that he would be able to divide and bring them into fragments in order for him to better
maintain his hegemonic power. This was illustrated by the presidential and legislative elections
that took place on February 27, 1983. Diouf’s resounding victory in both of these elections with
respectively 83.45% and 79.94% of the votes, 73 was so predictable because he had trapped the
opposition in his game by giving them a green light to run against him while he had in advance
seized the state apparatus. In addition to that, he had almost the total support of the rural
dignitaries in the rural areas where most of the voters are located; and where his party (PS) had
always benefited enormously from their continuing support, notably the Muslim brotherhood as
part of Senghor’s clientelist base legacy that Diouf had inherited at that time. “The marabouts of
all the major brotherhoods supported Diouf in the 1983 elections” commented Creevey
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(Wiseman, 1990, p. 175). In this sense, the anti-democratic behaviors uncovered under Senghor
were present under Abdou Diouf’s rule.
Throughout the 1980s, when Senegal faced scourges that impacted the country economically
and socially, Abdoulaye Wade’s PDS and the other opposition parties were growing
discontented due the fact that their call for the renegotiation of the electoral code to ensure fair
and more transparent electoral competitions was ignored. Fraud or possible rigging was
suspected during the precedent elections that took place in1983. Therefore, the next elections
that Senegal held on February 28, 1988, were violently disputed. Prior to Senegal’s Supreme
Court’s official declaration, partial results rumored by Diouf’s government who had the electoral
monopoly were predicting a victory of their PS party. The opposition for its part saw this as a
ploy to prepare them and the Senegalese nation for another fraudulent PS victory. Once Diouf’s
victory was officially confirmed by the Supreme Court with respectively 73.20% and 71.34% of
the votes for the presidential and legislative elections, 74 a wave of violence and vandalism
erupted from all sides in Senegal. Particularly in Senegal’s capital (Dakar), wrathful opposition
leaders and their young followers burnt public buses. This series of violence, triggered by
Diouf’s electoral fraud and electoral monopoly, resulted in multiple injuries. The state
responded decisively by declaring a state of emergency and by arresting leaders of the opposition
parties (Beck, 2008, p. 62).
This was a turning point in Senegal’s politics. After twenty years, it was the most prominent
post-independence opposition leader, Abdoulaye Wade, who orchestrated the rebellion in the
capital city of Senegal. He was enraged due to his persistent inability to assume power through

74

Database of election results in Senegal. Retrieved from
http://africanelections.tripod.com/sn.html#1988_Presidential_Election
106

the electoral process in Senegal, where the two successive political regimes had put forward a
new style of political and modus operandi operating for their control of power. Therefore, he
focused on his wrath of inequity by treating Diouf’s victories as “ridiculous” and triggered
violence in the street with his followers. Such acts led to his arrest when Diouf declared a state
of emergency in Dakar. As news from Reuters, New York Times reported at that time, “President
Abdou Diouf declared a state of emergency in Dakar today as supporters of a defeated rival who
denounced Sunday’s presidential election as fraud battled the police. The police descended on
Dakar University and the headquarters of the rival, Abdoulaye Wade, presidential candidate of
the Democratic Party, breaking up rioting crowds with tear gas and clubs. Young supporters of
Mr. Wade ran through surrounding streets setting fire to cars and buses. The emergency decree,
broadcast over the state radio, banned unauthorized gatherings and increased police arrest
powers. By late afternoon, the crackdown appeared to have brought calm to the streets of the
capital, a city of about a million. The capital was put under curfew from 9 P.M to 6 A.M”. 75
The instability, which Diouf’s regime brought, was intensified during the years that followed
during which Senegal displayed a total lack of compromise. As Sangmpam (2007, p. 204)
argued, “In the absence of compromise, society-rooted conflict is accompanied by a bitter
competition for the control of state power, the sine qua non for access to material and other
resources”. This was well illustrated by the internal conflicts in Senegal’s southern region,
particularly in Casamance. In this area, the MFDC (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la
Casamance “Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance”) which was composed mostly of
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Diola 76 formed a separatist military wing named “Atika”. 77 They were fighting for their
autonomy within Senegal. This was compounded by a border skirmish with Mauritania that led
to rioting and violence with massive human rights violations, and by the collapse of the
Senegambia Federation (Beck, 2008, p. 62). The crisis was intensified during the 1993
presidential and legislative elections that were fraudulently won again by Diouf with 58.40% and
56.52% respectively. 78 The 1998 legislative elections Diouf’s party won again with 50.19% of
the votes. 79 The main opposition leader Wade, who was arrested and suspended a while due to
incitements to riots during the previous 1988 elections, had defeated Diouf in these 1998
elections but once again, the official figures misrepresented the true results by declaring Diouf as
a winner. These elections results again sparked tensions in the country. Riots broke out again in
Dakar that involved Wade and his supporters, including many young people and students. They
made vociferous accusations of electoral fraud and abuse against Diouf again, and cried foul in
the 1998 legislative elections (Kuenzi, 2011, p. 36).
Thus, in Senegal, despite the recognition of the role of the opposition in the constitution,
Diouf’s regime used his control of the electoral laws to practice its “divide and better rule” game,
which brought the opposition into fragments. He ensured again a victory monopoly of his PS
party in elections with illicit practices, electoral monopoly, clientelist networks with the rural
dignitaries, and through his control over the military corps. By doing so, he violated the basic
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tenets of democracy, which requires transparency in the elections, fairness, and evenness in the
playing field, and rejects any practices that will compromise or constrain the opposition from a
possible win in elections, and which requires consistent respect of civil liberties and freedom.
Prior to the 2000 presidential election, Diouf had been in power for Nineteen years and
embodied the hegemony of the PS that had been the sole political regime in power for forty
years. On the other hand, Wade who had been the main opposition leader since Senghor’s regime
was strengthening his PDS party with his new Sopi Coalition (Coalition for a change), which had
increased his level of penetration in the society. Diouf was out of touch with the majority of the
population that faced instability and the deterioration of the living standards. There was growing
dissatisfaction with his regime that oppressed the Senegalese nation, particularly the opposition
leaders and their followers. His government lacked the resources to face the economic problems
and to maintain effectively the clientelist networks, and to fulfill the demands or needs of his
clients (Kuenzi, 2011, p. 39). Because of these problems, PS’s enfeebled grip on power was
becoming more apparent.
The 2000 presidential election that was held in February 2000 led to Diouf’s defeat in the
second round election; he received 41.51% of the votes against 58.49% for Wade. 80 This
electoral result reflected the strong desire for change the Senegalese population wanted because,
despite his expressed anti-corruption stance, Diouf came to symbolize a political system driven
by graft, corruption, inefficiency, and incompetence (Kuenzi, 2011, p. 40). Thus, Wade’s
victory constituted a historic event in Senegal because it marked the end of several years of a
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one-party regime by the PS. As Senegal’s new incumbent president, Wade embodied PDS’s
historical legacy in his role as the prominent party leader and organizer of the political platform
“Sopi” (Wolof translation for “Change”). Because of that, he represented to the eyes of many
Senegalese people a common hope for an alternative solution and set of changes on the national
scale after the practically one-party rule since independence. In this regard, this Millennium era
was though to augur what Wolof society called “Atoume Ndantague” (Prosperous year).
But this was not to be. Depressingly and unexpectedly during the twelve years he was in
power, President Wade relied on authoritarian even as he claimed to be a proponent of
democracy in Senegal. Many Senegalese people, particularly the youth who constitute the hope
of the nation of tomorrow, felt betrayed because they saw in Wade the hope of a true
embodiment of “Sopi”, the development of an orderly, viable and stable nation-state through the
practice of good governance and accountability. They grew discontented and marginalized by
Wade’s regime, which was incapable of unleashing the potential of the Senegalese youth,
increasingly wasted through the inadequacies of Senegal’s educational system. The university
dumped half a million untrained undergrad students on the streets each year. Those who
obtained the bachelor degree found themselves in total uncertainty about the fate of their studies
and future in a system in which it was no longer your efforts, your notes, or grades that
guaranteed you access to a Master’s program. In a system that was no longer predicated on
students’ merit, but on whom in the administration the students/or their families knew.
As the result of this system, thousands of students with a bachelor’s degree were denied
access to Master programs. They found themselves also unable to find work. One can find them
easily in Senegal’s slums gathered around a pot of tea or at the corner of lost areas located
behind Cheikh Anta Diop University next to the beach, where they spend their time to
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commiserate with their cohorts about their situation. As one of them, I frequently spent most of
my time over there as well. As a regular of these gatherings, I can testify about the feeling of
disappointment and despair of these young people who were very worried about the future.
Wade’s regime violated the rights to education for many young Senegalese students. It was a
total let down.
Such neglect of basic needs dismayed some donors. Sweden shut down its main aid
program, while the Netherlands dropped Senegal from its list of priority recipients. Other
development partners even complained that Senegal failed to give adequate attention to the
drafting of a detailed third-generation Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Melly, 2012, p. 8)
Because of Wade’s propensity to privatize the state, the country was in a total impasse under
his regime. A patchy development and economic record aggravated long-standing problems
such as high cost of living, poor social welfare, unemployment, and persistent power shortages in
Dakar and the sub-region. There occurred a fragmentation of demographic social trends, the
spread of corruption, the allocation of state resources in favor of Wade’s ruling party and its
clientelist networks constituted around the Murid brotherhood with whom he was openly
affiliated. All this, gave rise to tensions around the issues of the Sufi religious orders, state
neutrality, and secularism, which were disconcerting to many Senegalese people who were not in
the Murid brotherhood or who supported the secular state (Kuenzi, 2011, pp. 46-47). There was
also the reduction of the budget’s share allocated to health and education, at a time when
teachers’ salaries had been up to seven months in arrears. Even when government initiatives are
announced, shortcomings are widespread. Flooding, for instance, remained a persistent problem
in some suburbs of Dakar, despite the president’s public promotion of new housing projects
(Melly, 2012, pp. 4-8).
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The opposition, on the other side, was enraged due to Wade’s refusal to revise the voters’
registration lists following the February 25, 2007 presidential election that his PDS party and
allies Sopi 2007 Coalition resoundingly won in the first round of voting with 55.90% of the
votes. 81 Because of such a result in this presidential election, all the major opposition parties
made a major pact to boycott the legislative election that was going to be held on June 3, 2007.
“During this election, all seventeen opposition parties boycotted this legislative election”, argued
Galvin and Murison (Kuenzi, 2011, p. 42). Despite their boycott, Wade won the legislative
election with 69.21% of the votes, thus occupying 131 of the official 150seats 82 in the National
Assembly. Once again, his resounding victory clearly showed that he had practiced electoral
manipulation in favor of his PDS party. “Rigorous statistical tests also suggest that manipulation
was likely”, argued Bebber and Sacco (Kelly, 2019, p. 15), and it was as a way to neutralize and
diminish the credibility of the opposition leaders and their parties. This fraudulent number of
seats he brought in the National Assembly allowed Wade to hold the hegemonic power over the
rule of law and decision-making process in the Senegalese Institutions. For that reason, he put
forward reforms that suited his personal and party interests. For example, he took measures to
promote a party formation system that favored the distribution of rewards to party leaders that
joined his ruling party. The rewards included material and financial support and linkages to the
state (Kelly, 2019, p. 72). Wade cut the presidential term from seven years to five, and then
restored it to seven (Melly, 2012, p. 5) in order to meet his authoritarian needs of the
privatization of the state.
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All of this portrayed the institutional instability and Wade’s personal rule in Senegal, where
he used uneven playing field to shape elections to his advantage. Such behavior in office made it
clear that the claim of democracy and fair governance that he militated for when he was in the
opposition had been reversed. His advocacy of fair play, transparency, and good governance
appeared to have been abandoned when it was no longer his ox being gored (Kuenzi, 2011, p.
43).
As a result, a climate of general instability invaded the Senegalese society that became very
exasperated by Wade’s regime. The opposition leaders started marching and rallying on the
streets of Dakar and other major cities demanding Wade to give up power. And if they were
among the thousands of university students or young unemployed who twelve earlier fought for
and with Wade to bring about political change in Senegal, they were most likely among those
who marched and rallied along with the opposition. The crisis was compounded by the failure of
the government to end the 30-year insurgency by the separatist military wing of MFDC. Little
progress had been made. It resulted in factionalism and the intensification of criminal activities
by the MFDC in the South region of Casamance (Melly, 2012, p. 4).
This climate of general instability intensified by June 23, 2011, due to the absence of
national consensus about Wade’s regime attempt to introduce a bill establishing the ticket for the
simultaneous election by universal suffrage of the President and Vice-President of the Republic,
prior to the February 2012 presidential election. This was a plot for him to lower the threshold
required for outright victory in the first round of a presidential election to just 25% of the votes
and to create a position of vice president for his son Karim. The latter had already massive
responsibilities and prominent roles in the government, including state minister for a sprawling
new portfolio encompassing international cooperation, infrastructure, regional development, and
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aviation. Even the energy department was added to his ministerial empire when Dakar was
struggling with power cuts in October 2010 (Melly, 2012, p. 6).
Consequently, a backlash against Wade’s bill erupted in Senegal. The opposition leaders,
students, workers, musicians, and the M23 (Opposition movement generally composed of
rappers, who identify themselves under the slogan of “Y’en a Marre” gathered in Senegal’s main
public places such as Soweto and General-de-Gaulle’s Boulevard to fight against Wade’s bill
and to pressure him into giving up power. “Touhez-pas encore à Notre Constitution” (Do not
touch again Our Constitution), and “Y’en a Marre” were two of the slogans of thousands of
protesters surrounding the entire 14regions of Senegal. As I witnessed, riots erupted everywhere
and thousands of protesters demonstrated their anger by setting tires on fire on every street, by
blocking the Senegalese highway, and by setting public transports on fire. Deputies’ hotel was
set on fire, and even the Residence of Wade’s special adviser of that time, Farba Senghor, was
attacked and all of his cars set on fire. He and his family were urgently extricated from their
residence by the Senegalese army.
Fearing that he could be victim of a possible coup, Wade gave an order to the army to
surround the palace. He also gave orders to the army’s corps to react. The police descended on
the fields armed with tear gas canisters and helmets. Confrontations broke out everywhere in
Dakar and the sub-region between the police and civil society carrying clubs, and stones. The
country plunged into a total disorder, where the police sought to ban rallies and curtailed any
civil society’s protest activities. Because of that, many protesters including several opposition
leaders were arrested. Furthermore, Wade’s government even violated the civil liberties of
journalists. He censored controversial political writing, intermittently shut down private
newspapers and radio stations, and harassed journalists. Overall, He targeted troublemaking
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politicians, public figures, and journalists with a range of legal measures such as the temporary
closure of newspapers and the suing for libel or for threatening the security of the state (Dahou
and Foucher, 2009, p. 28). Members of all of the sectors that might check the abuses of the
president, such as civil society, the press, and opposition parties, have been subject to police and
judicial action (Mbow, 2008, p. 163)
Thus, Senegal’s political reality under Wade’s regime overtly showed that traits related to
authoritarianism were apparent. During the twelve years he spent as Senegal’s head of state, he
violated the rights and basic needs of many young Senegalese people. By virtue of his control of
the Senegalese state, he held the decision-making power in the presidency, manipulated the
country’s institutions by setting up reforms that shaped elections to his advantage, neutralized the
opposition on several occasions, monopolized the state resources, expanded corruption within
the Senegalese society, and violated the freedom of the press. Moreover, during that millennium
era considered as “Atoume Ndantague”, he caused growing discontent and disappointments to
many Senegalese people who were very exasperated by his authoritarian rule. The outcome was
the extreme or relentless violence that was manifest in the whole country. This portrayed not
only the failure of the Wade regime but painted the current picture of general instability in
Senegal where people saw revolutionary violence as a means to their salvation.
On February 26, 2012, in such an atmosphere of a disorder and despair, Senegal held its 10th
presidential election. Surprisingly, the incumbent Abdoulaye Wade who most the Senegalese
people expected to retire from politics was among those running for the presidency. He was
around 85-years old and was attempting to run for a third term. As such Wade’s decision rubbed
salt into the Senegalese peoples’ wounds and had yet again raised growing concerns because a
Wade’s victory meant that he would be in power for 19 years, which seemed like a sufficiently
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long period for any political leader to hold the office of the presidency (Kuenzi, 2011, p. 45). A
Wade victory would prompt unrest in Dakar, especially if the elections were perceived to be
fraudulent again, and more importantly if he placed his son to the presidency as a way to groom
him to carry the torch of political leadership in Senegal. This would confirm the prominence of
Wade’s vision of dynasty or transfer of power from father to son. Therefore, an Anti-Wade-reelection bid protest broke out in Senegal. The Police and thousands of opposition supporters
clashed in the center of the city. Tear gas was fired, two people were shot to death and another
one died after being run over by the police’s water cannon truck. Several other people were also
wounded after they were run over by police vehicles, some people suffered several asthma
attacks because of the tear gas and one man had been visibly beaten (Ajjan, 2012).
In this 2012 presidential election that took place in a harsh and unstable environment, Wade
was facing his former prime minister and protégé Macky Sall (leader of the APR party) who was
a familiar leader to all Senegalese due to his brilliant tour across the whole 14 regions of Senegal
to lay the foundations for his campaign. The election outcome was the victory of Sall on
Sunday, March 25, 2012 with 65.80% of the votes of the runoff election. 83 Sall’s victory derived
from the endorsement he had received from the opposition leaders with whom he allied and
formed the “Benno Bokk Yakkar” (United for the Same Hope) coalition prior to the runoff. It
also derived from the Senegalese youth, workers, and musicians; overall, the electorate who after
crediting him effectively as a true alternative to the incumbent Wade joined forces with him and
supported his candidacy in order for him to ascend to the presidency. Thus, this showed the
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revolutionary potential and determination that civil society has in challenging the most repressive
aspects of an authoritarian regime that, once activated, are impervious to the public will.
Inaugurated on April 2, 2012 as the Republic of Senegal’s fourth president, Macky Sall was
elected to restore order in the country after the violent outbursts and social unrest the country
went through under the outgoing regime of Wade. Many Senegalese people expected him to
bring changes in the country after several promises he made prior to the moments he became
president. However, during the time he has been in office, authoritarianism once again
characterized his regime. As president, Sall set up his political authority by applying his power
retention strategy through the creation of patronage-oriented parties, especially those major party
allies that collaborated with him and joined his ruling coalition. That was the case of his APR
partisans and members of other parliamentary parties, like the AFP (Alliance des Forces du
Progrés “Alliances of the Forces of Progress”) and the PS (Parti Socialiste “Socialist Party”) that
formed the “Benno Bokk Yakkar” coalition, to which he provided the most visible rewards
(Kelly, 2019, p. 89). He institutionalized the distribution of rewards to those that joined him as a
way to provide them with material support and linkages to the state and to ensure future
majorities mobilization during elections. That was the reason why after the July 1, 2012
legislative election, Sall’s Benno Bokk Yakkar coalition held 119 seats in the National
Assembly. 84
In the post-election period, Sall sought to maintain his monolithic political position as the
supreme officeholder in Senegal. Therefore, he started conducting a “witch hunt” against his
opponents and appeared keen to lock them up on corruption charges. He was Wade’s protégé
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and spent eight years on his side. This, allowed him to know more about those opposition
leaders who became his key rivals and to track them down with any evidence possible. As a
matter of fact, several of them were arrested. The most popular among them were Karim Wade
and Khalifa Sall. The former was accused of misuse of public funds during his father’s rule and
was issued a six-year sentence in March 2015, two days after the Senegalese Democratic Party
(PDS) designated him as its candidate for the next presidential election (Ba, 2015). After serving
three years, Sall released him. However, after his release, he left Senegal immediately for Qatar.
Such abrupt departure of Karim raised the suspicion that Sall had likely coerced him into leaving
the country. The other one was Khalifa Sall, Mayor of Dakar. He was sentenced to five years in
prison after being charged with fraud and misuse of public funds prior to the 2019 presidential
election where he was expected to present a strong challenge to Macky Sall. “I feel shame for
my country. This decision is meant to prevent Khalifa Sall from putting his name forward as a
presidential candidate”, said the Senegalese Deputy Cheikh Gaye to Reuters. 85 Such Sall’s
decision to prosecute the popular opposition leaders clearly showed his unequivocal will to
exclude any rival contenders as a way to fend off political challenges and to settle political scores
in his favor.
As a result, popular discontent has been brewing in Senegal under Sall’s regime. As most of
his main political opponents are sentenced, he exhibits the practice and attitude that do not
respond to the prerequisites for democracy. It was illustrated by several political graffiti seen in
every public place around Dakar and other townships in Senegal. As the Economist journal
reported, “To the casual observer, all seems well in Senegal. Visitors to Dakar, the capital, fly
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into a new excellent airport. The economy grew by 6.8% last year and the discovery of natural
gas heralds an even brighter economic future. To boot, the national team has performed well at
the football World Cup. But the political graffiti scrawled across Dakar’s wall tell a different
story. The messages demand freedom for the political opponents of President Macky Sall,
several of whom have been imprisoned. With a presidential election just eight months away,
fears are growing that democracy in Senegal, long an example for West Africa, is being
subverted”. 86 Furthermore, the press expressed anger due to ongoing harassment of journalists
who denounced Sall’s violation of civil liberties and press organs.
Prior to the 2019 presidential election, Senegal had 300 political parties. Sall introduced a
law commonly known as “Loi de Parrainage” (Sponsorship law). Its purpose was to increase
barriers to entry in future races. Among other elements, the law required all presidential
candidates to obtain the signatures of 0.8% of registered voters spread across Seven of Fourteen
geographical regions in order to appear on the ballot. Aware of that, the opposition denounced
the law as it was thinly veiled to bureaucratically handicap them in the 2019 presidential
election. The civil society argued that the law erected undue barriers to the freedom of
expression and association, regulating political party members to the same onerous requirements
to collect elector signatures that independent candidates had to follow to be on the ballot (Kelly,
2019, pp. 59-60). Galvanized by these contentious debated laws, protesters took to the Dakar
streets when the National Assembly, in which Sall’s party occupied the majority with 119 seats
of 150, voted the law. Inside the National Assembly, the opposition grew angry and boycotted
the vote due to the rejection of their request for debate by Sall’s majority parliamentary group.
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Across the city, the police frequently greeted protesters with tear gas and other aggressive
actions. This portrayed Sall’s hegemonic power, his hold on the constitution, through which he
organized political representation and participation, and his hold of military corps through which
he practiced coercion and oppression.
Due to this Sponsorship law, only five candidates were approved to run on February 25,
2019, presidential election. On top of this, Sall’s main political opponents such Karim Wade and
Khalifa Sall, were excluded from participating due to their previous condemnations. For that
reason, it was not a surprise when the Constitutional Council confirmed Sall’s victory in this
election with 58.26%. 87 He had already planned and calculated his political game by applying
his power retention strategy.
Overall, in Senegal where “model” democracy has been hailed, features associated with
authoritarianism were and are obviously present. After decades of its independence, the
country’s political reality in one state where all successive presidential regimes had resorted to
authoritarian rule. By virtue of their control of the Senegalese state, they apply their political
authority by holding the decision-making power in the presidency and manipulate the country’s
institutions by setting up reforms that shaped elections to their advantage. They coerce and
neutralize the opposition on several occasions, expand corruption within the Senegalese society,
and violate the freedom of the press. Moreover, all of them have violated the rights and basic
needs of many Senegalese people, thus, causing popular discontent and disappointment, and
making the country less hospitable. The outcome was the waves of violence that rocked
Senegal, where people saw revolutionary violence as a means to their salvation, thus, plunging
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the country into total instability. All of these successive rulers in Senegal monopolized power
and enhanced themselves as the supreme power holders by building patronage with some
opposition parties and their clientelist bases from which they derived their strength. By doing all
of this, they all have violated the basic tenets of democracy that require transparency in the
elections, fairness, and evenness in the playing field, consistent respect of the civil liberties and
their freedom, and that reject any practices that will compromise or constrain the opposition from
a possible win in elections.
Moreover, by using authoritarian means of governance, Senegalese rulers have dissipated the
state resources. First, they use the selective mechanisms of administrative patronage and
clientelism to establish a framework for the government in rural areas of Senegal, where they
deplete the state resources in order to bargain for influence and advantages from the electorate
majority that mostly resides in these areas. This has been the case since independence with each
political regime in Senegal. Second, they take advantage of their increasing firm monopoly of
peanut production management to absorb the peanuts profits, and then make Senegal’s
traditional agriculture more oriented toward the world economy and particularly toward the
former colonial power, France, rather than toward operating in favor of Senegal. Senghor and
Diouf were salient examples who put in place OCAS policy (Office de Commercialisation
Agricole du Senegal) “Agricultural Marketing Board of Senegal”, ONCAD's organization
(Office National de Cooperation et d’Assistance au Développement), the “National Office for
Cooperation and Assistance in Development”, CNIA (Comité National Inter-professionnel de
l’Arachide) “National Inter-Professional Committee on Peanut) as stated in chapter 3.
The regimes that followed Senghor and Diouf (Wade and Sall) set forward big projects
through which they pretended to modernize and boost Senegal’s economy. Beyond their dubious
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economic impact, these big projects have been proposed through opaque deals with particular
business interests. Therefore, they have sparked off transparency concerns due to the widespread
evidence of unprecedented looting. This was the case of Wade with the building of the African
Renaissance’s Monument towers above Dakar, an astronomical expense of $27 million, 88 when
the country was facing extreme socio-economic problems, culminating in electricity shortages.
During such harsh conditions that the country was going through, many Senegalese people were
exposed to multiple evidences that strongly revealed that Wade’s son (Karim), had accumulated
a fortune of at least $200m that he had hidden away in offshore companies in the British Virgin
Island and Panama. 89 They also saw a dramatic increase in unexplained wealth among those
influential Senegalese closely linked to the government (Melly, 2012, p. 7). This is also the case
with the actual Senegal incumbent president Sall with the building of the turnpike that links the
actual airport of Senegal AIBD (Aéroport International Blaise Diagne) to Thies (the third-largest
city of Senegal located in the East region), commonly named “Aibd-Thies”. Based on the Le
Quotidien Journal (2017), “On the occasion of the 2018 Ministry of infrastructure, land, transport
and opening up, Senegalese members of Parliament noted a gap of 5billion francs CFA on the
cost of the Aibd-Thies turnpike construction’s project. Such a gap compelled many of them to
ask Sall’s government to shed light on the real costs of this project and also the inadequacy of the
financing model and financial clauses”. 90 These questions, which were well noted in the report,
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were not answered either in this document or during the plenary sessions of the Minister of
infrastructure, land transport and opening up that was held at the semicircular auditorium in
Dakar. “Similar questions were asked to Sall about the real costs of Regional express Train
Regarding the railway, where commissioners have noted the discrepancy between the cost of
568billion francs CFA appearing in the official documents and the cumulative amount of the
various contracts which amounts to 801billion francs CFA without taking into account the
conditional works, possible endorsement, of the second section Diamniadio-Dias (both located in
the South-East region of Senegal and is part of Sall’s development plan) and expenses estimated
at more than 42 billion francs CFA” (Le Quotidien, 2017). Furthermore, similar issues have
been raised recently by L’Exclusif (Seneweb, 2020) 91, which talks about the looting of the
treasury coffers by Sall’s regime through the management of their big projects.
Thus, the overall picture is one of a Senegal where, since independence, each political
regime (from Senghor to Macky Sall) has dissipated and plundered the state resources as their
personal property. Therefore, in a country where rulers have used authoritarian means of
governance and appropriated the state resources, it is impossible for the young Senegalese people
to stay because their aspirations are diametrically opposed to the holders of state power’s
behaviors as they have destroyed the socio-economic base of the country. This creates a
situation of generalized poverty and lack of economic opportunities for many young people in
Senegal. This results in the wave of migrations that have been seen in the country.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
POVERTY AND MIGRATIONS

124

Introduction
The effects of imperialism and colonialism’s dependency and postcolonial authoritarian
means of governance that led to the appropriation and dissipation of the state resources by the
Senegalese rulers have wreaked havoc on the country’s socio-economic landscape and affected
negatively many young Senegalese. Most of them do not have great opportunities and good
living conditions for themselves and their families. Overall, they lack basic services and live
daily below the poverty line. Therefore, in such a harsh economic development environment and
misery in Senegal, the youth consider migrations as the only way out. This chapter discusses the
migrations from Senegal and explores issues of poverty and economic deprivation in Senegal as
well as their impact on the migrations based on recent statistical databases, empirical evidence,
and empirical analysis of data that I have collected from the intensive field research I conducted
in Senegal during the 2019 summer externship.

Migrations
Human Migrations can be defined as the movement or displacement of peoples from one
place to another, in particular from one country (emigration) to another (immigration) for
political, social, economic, or personal reasons. They have been the fact of an entire population
or individual, integrating into a wider societal phenomenon (Note taken from PSC 758).
In Senegal, the first waves of migrations started under colonialism. During colonial times,
French colonizers settled in Senegal. Once installed, the European colonial administration
created the four townships of Dakar, Rufisque, Goree and Saint Louis. The creation of these
four European townships served as a way to integrate the Senegalese community, to spread their
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hegemony and to have control over the Senegalese territory for their own sake. To operate its
plan and business, the European colonial administration started collaborating with the Senegalese
local chiefs who had at that time the power over the Senegalese people. The collaboration was
based on bribery. The European colonial administration procured them with diamonds, guns,
coppers, and ivories, and the chiefs served as indispensable channels through which to get access
to the Senegalese people. Once the collaboration was effective, the European colonial
administration started their recruiting process. They took many Senegalese individuals from
their land, embarking them on boats and sent them to Europe. Many of those Senegalese sent to
Europe were transformed into soldiers and defenders of French colonies. They were given the
name of “Tirailleurs” to reflect the policing needs generated by the European colonization phase
and to fight for France during the Two World Wars. This practice of European colonial
administration within the Senegalese territory made the first wave of Senegalese migrations
directed towards Europe during that time to conform to French colonial needs and expectations.
In the post-colonial period, these migrations to Europe continued. In fact, during that
period, there was an international mobility that was partly the result of France facing a
demographic challenge: a declining birth rate, an aging population, and the loss of many French
young soldiers during the two successive world wars. Setting its sight on industrial recovery,
which would require significant labor power, France turned to its former colonies. As part of
post-war reconstruction, migrants from across francophone Africa, particularly Senegal, were
courted to work in French industries and on infrastructure projects. Known as the “Thirty
Glories”, the three decades after the war saw the dirigiste revitalization of France’s economy,
which was made possible in part by the importation of cheap labor from North and West Africa.
France established official recruitment centers in eight foreign countries, one of which was
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Senegal. The economic logic of immigration legislation between 1945 and 1973 enabled France
to remedy its domestic labor shortage by extracting labor from its former colonies (Maher, 2017,
pp. 77-91). This led to massive migrations of Senegalese people to Europe (particularly in
France) for the latter’s labor needs. Thus, the historical context of the problem and its
explanation made the first Senegalese migratory movements directed towards France from the
colonial period to the post-colonial period in the 1970s.
From the 1970s to the 1990s, Senegalese migrants chose different trajectories or destinations
in Europe due to the decreasing opportunities and increasing migrations’ restrictions during the
oil and economic crisis in France. Italy and Spain became two major destinations for these
Senegalese migrants. In an interview held with Papa Demba Fall, a senior researcher at the
Fundamental Institute of Black Africa, he argued that:
“From the period of 1973, there was the oil and economic crisis in France. Because of that, the
French government of that time under Jacque Chirac no longer wanted those Senegalese migrants whom
most of them were laborers and worked in automotive industries in France. They put into place new
legislation accompanied by drastic measures, making the entry conditions to France very difficult.
Therefore, during the next period that followed, Italy became a new destination for Senegalese migrants.
Many of them reluctantly chose to go there temporarily just to wait for the situation in France to improve
so that they can go back. Fortunately, Italy, as an immigration country marked by its diversity, behaved
much more comprehensively, and many Senegalese migrants finally settled permanently in Italy.
However, a few years later, Italy experienced a crisis related to the growing number of migrants they
yearly received and the rise of the extreme right wing in Europe. At this point, many migrants left Italy.
The flows spread to Spain, but years later Spain integrated the “Schengen Space” and applied the drastic
measures undertaken by all other European countries, and made it also a difficult destination to access”.
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“The Barca or Barsaakh” Phenomenon
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In the 2000s, migrations to Europe reached a high peak. It is important therefore to highlight
that these migrations’ trends to Europe are irregular and seem mostly connected to visas and
other immigration restrictions put in place by many European countries over the years. The
following statistic is a salient example to understand the scope of these migrations. According to
the Country Profile report published in 2007, approximately 32,000 migrants reached the Canary
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Islands, compared to only 4,800 the year before. 92 Recently, in the specific case of Senegal, there
have been new types of migrations. A new dramatic phenomenon called “Barca or Barsaakh”
(“Barca” being a reference to Barcelona in Spain, and “Barsaakh” a reference to the Arabic word
for death), meaning “Europe or Death”, has preoccupied the Senegalese. It consists of the deaths
of many young Senegalese people who try to reach Europe by any means necessary, including
using boats on the oceans or crossing the Sahara desert. Whether it is on television news,
newspapers, or local meeting places, all debates revolve around the phenomenon of “Barca or
Barsaakh”. It has completely affected the Senegalese society and has created a trauma in many
Senegalese families who have lost their sons, who represented their only hope. As
(Hebdomadaire, 2006) witnessed:
The Barca or Barsaakh phenomenon has traumatized in families. In several regions of Senegal, as in
the capital, Dakar, parents are worried. They remain without news of their sons left on an adventure in
boats of fortune that are little more than canoes. Anxiety has taken over. In many families’ homes, when
the telephone rang, everybody runs. They hope to hear their son's voice from afar. A voice that could
soothe their worries. Nevertheless, the reality is often cruel. In other families, tears are shed. Many learn
that their children for whom they dreamed of a bright future have perished at sea. They are shot down.
The shock is too brutal.

Based on the research findings, Barca or Barsaakh did not come in a vacuum. It started with
the Senegalese anglers. They are located along Senegal’s small coasts of Thiaroye Sur Mer,
Rufisque, Kayar, Mbour, and Saint-Louis, where artisanal fishing is mostly the main activity,
and where these anglers used to do daily what we call in French “navette en mer”. This is a long
period spent on the sea by commuting between territories with the use of GPS and compass.
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Most of them were former employees of big fishing boats. This means that they are redoubtable
captains in terms of navigation and are very familiar with the sea adventure. Because of the
enormous problems related to climate change and the state’s mismanagement that the fishing
sector encounters, many of them get involved in irregular migrations in the twenty-first century.
This was at a period when the visa fees for Europe were very expensive and the application
processes so discouraging because of the implementation of appointment systems through voice
services in many of the European consulates in Senegal (Le Soleil, 2007). The increasing
immigration restrictions in most of these European countries made it harder for most applicants
to obtain a European visa.
Therefore, during this period, the anglers put into place the project, involving different
people with specific roles. “Some in charge of the logistics; others playing the role of
coordinators and main intermediaries between the promoters and candidates. Also, there are
those called secondary intermediaries, who advertise the project and recruit people”, said
Alioune Ndiaye, a 64 year-old angler. Thus, as experienced anglers turned into promoters, they
carried out the large number of boats that embarked onto ocean-crossings. After their
tremendous successes went viral on the Senegalese national level and immediately created
agitations along those Senegalese small coasts, the small coasts now became the main points of
departure. “La pirogue” (The pirogue) for instance, released in 2012 by Moussa Toure (a
Senegalese well-known producer and cinematograph), is a movie that shows how the business of
these migrations are organized by the local fishermen and their allies, and how they are well
established to target those young Senegalese people whose only option and ambition are to
migrate to Europe no matter the cost or how dangerous the situation is. The movie highlights
that apart from the Wolof community, many of those who adhere to this dangerous adventure
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come from different ethnic groups in Senegal, such as Toucouleur, Peulh, Al Poular, and
Guineans, making the communication between them very difficult because they do not speak the
same language. They are not very familiar with the sea and cannot even swim. Those who can
are the captains and staff members, who usually are “Lebous” or “sea adventurers”, and those
Wolof people who are familiar with the sea because they share many activities with the Lebous.
Before boarding a pirogue, each of them pays 500.000F Cfa ($852). They all gather at a specific
place appointed by the boat’s manager and wait until the right time assigned by the captains and
the staff members to depart.
The main destination of the majority of anglers’ boats that depart from Senegal’s small
coasts is the Canary Islands (Spain). “This is mostly because this island is 1549km (962.504
miles away), and usually by pirogue, one can make it approximately in six days”, said the Mayor
of Ngaparou (an adjacent town located on the west side of Mbour in Senegal), Mamadou Ndiaye
in an interview I held with him. “In a global perspective, Canary Islands are often temporary
destinations or gateways for many young Senegalese people swept by the “Barca or Barsaakh”
phenomenon to enter Spain (which is one of the weak links in the Schengen space and an easy
crossing point for all those who want to come, without having a visa), or to join France and other
European countries like Italy, Portugal, and Belgium”, argued Papa Demba Fall. That is the
reason why when Senegalese migrants started taking these sea-crossing journeys, the migratory
flows at the Canary Islands increased dramatically. To understand the scope of the phenomenon,
“January 2006, around 6,000 migrants were intercepted in the Canary Islands by boats, compared
to 4,715 counted throughout the year 2005”, reported Le Soleil (2006). Overall, half of the
30,000 migrants who arrived in the Canary Islands in 2006 were Senegalese (Gebrewold and
Bloom, 2016). Furthermore, between 2005 and 2008, tens of thousands of Senegalese migrants
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attempted to cross the Atlantic in wooden pirogues heading for the Canary Islands (Maher, 2017,
p. 86).
The sea boat journeys of these Senegalese migrants to the Canary Islands are risky
undertakings and many of them face wide ranges of potentially life-threatening dangers. The
movie “La Pirogue” as mentioned above relates the treacherous journey on the sea with many
difficulties these adventurers encounter. For example, the sea’s pressure with its multiple waves
cause the death of many of them. The depression of many of the passengers who scream with
fear and feel constantly dizzy because they have never been on a boat, and have never
experienced worse situations than those they faced. Carretero, Hernández. M and Carling, J.
(2012) have also examined these dangers. According to them, “En route to the Canary Islands,
migrants face a wide range of potentially life-threatening dangers. Storms and ferocious waves
can make pirogues capsize, even though they are relatively sturdy vessels. There is also the risk
of fire related to onboard cooking with gas, and health hazards that include seasickness,
dehydration, and hypothermia. The overcrowded and unhygienic conditions on board,
sometimes with the presence of dead bodies, can aggravate sickness. The fuel for the engines
can emit toxic fumes that endanger the passengers. Health risks become particularly severe
when equipment failure or weather conditions prolong the journey. In numerous cases, boats
have drifted at sea for several weeks, with passengers eventually dying from thirst and starvation.
There is allegedly a risk of being taken for dead and shoved overboard while sleeping.
Passengers who accidentally fall into the water might not be rescued because the delay would
provoke the loss of precious time and fuel”.
Moreover, they argued that, “Beyond the somatic risks, passengers are exposed to dangerous
psychological stress. The combination of overcrowding and isolation over a long period is a
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strain in itself, sometimes exacerbated by dramatic episodes with the loss of life. Technical
failure, accidents, illness, getting lost at sea, and other adversities are at times attributed to the
mystical powers of “sorcerers”, “demons” who are said to board pirogues with the deliberate aim
of causing suffering and death. This culminates in the risk of involuntary return, which is the
most serious adverse possibility. It occurs in three ways. First when there are technical
problems, bad weather, or other adverse events. Second when the boats are at the risk of being
intercepted by patrols, or when they are intercepted by patrols and escorted back to shore. Third,
when passengers are at risk of being repatriated after arrival on the Canary Islands”.
In 2006, the bodies of 1,167 drowned migrants were taken from the sea, forty-one and
several thousand others were deemed missing in the Mediterranean Sea. 93 Many of those who
make it safely to Canary Islands suffered from dysentery exposure, and dehydration (Maher,
2007, p. 87). The press and international channels witnessed, at that time, the tragic events of
these Senegalese migrants. Faced with this alarming situation, the authorities of the Spanish
Canary Islands launched an SOS appeal. They launched a series of diplomatic and security
measures aimed at relieving the constantly increasing migratory pressure on the Canaries (Le
Soleil, 2006). Among the series of diplomatic measures, I can cite for example the signature of
deportation agreements between the Spanish government of that time under Jose Luis Zapatero
and several other African countries, including Senegal. These measures affected those migrants
who survived the treacherous journeys and who temporarily resided in the Spanish Red Cross
camps. Most of them were exposed to very thorough verification tests analyzed by specialists in
the Spanish region. These verification tests make it possible to reveal with high probabilities
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these migrants’ identities and countries of origin before being deported. For security measures, I
can cite SIVIE (Système Intégré de Surveillance Extérieure “Integrated System of foreign
control), which is an extension of the electronic monitoring system of the Southern Coast of
Spanish country and the Canary Island. It is constituted of radars’ network, camera, and sensor;
and FRONTEX (Frontières Extérieure “External borders”), which is a maritime and air control
system set up by the European Union in collaboration with sub-Saharan African countries.
While the implementation of these effective measures crippled and curbed the sea boat
journeys of Senegalese migrants, the Sahara desert crossing became the new route of these
waves of Senegalese migrants swept by the Barca or Barsaakh movement to enter European
countries. “This Sahara desert crossing has been a historical trajectory chosen by many African
countries since, in the general context, the continent’s migratory flows were predominantly interAfrican and cross-border. Most Sub-Saharan migrants settled in the North Arabian countries
such as Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia to name a few. The main reasons for their
displacement in these countries were the quest for settlements and well-being because of the
tremendous consequences engendered by the 1970s drought seasons. It was during these periods
that the Tuareg pastoral communities coming across Senegal through Mali and Mauritania, the
Tubu people from Chad, and others coming from Niger went to work in the farms and oil
exploitation areas of Algeria and Libya. In the space of thirty years, fifty-three cities had been
built in most of these geographical spaces of Northern Arabian countries. This exponential
development encouraged the massive arrivals of people coming from other parts of Africa,
therefore, creating additional flows in those areas where indigenous people lived. Though there
had been tremendous incidents between them, there were emergences of associations that
supported newcomers. For example, a country like Algeria at that time controlled migrants’

135

movements while integrating them into the development of cities in Algeria where there were
shortages of labor applicants. Many religious and associative support structures were even set up
through these migratory trajectories. Migrants who were around there, found support and
necessary resources in those areas to be able to continue their journey” (Le Soleil, 2006, based
on the research and survey carried out by socio-anthropologist Sylvie Bredeloup of the Research
Institute for Development (RIF) and Olivier Pliez, Geographer at the National Center for
Scientific Research (NCSR) ).
Therefore, in recent years, with the implementation of effective measures of European
borders’ control, the Barca or Barsaakh movement has been redirected to the crossing of the
Sahara desert. Thousands of Senegalese migrants have been making their way into the Sahara to
join Europe. This new circular route is the most dangerous one. “Those who attempt the desert
crossing travel along the Sahara desert through Senegal, Mali, and Mauritania, Niger, and (either
Algeria, Morocco or Libya) to Europe”, said the Mayor of Ngaparou, Mamadou Mbengue in the
interview I held with him. Many Senegalese migrants who undertake these longer and remote
routes are more vulnerable to exploitation, particularly because their transit across Northern
Arabian or Maghreb regions like Agadez (on the North of Niger), Derna and Misrata (in Libya),
El- Khalil (on the border of Mali and Algeria), and Salé, Tangier, Tetouan, and Bouarfa (in
Morocco). Because of their geographical proximity to Europe, these Maghreb regions are
perceived by many migrants as gateways to reach Europe via Malta, or the Spanish enclaves of
Ceuta and Melilla. But most of these regions are controlled by the Tuareg rebels, who work with
the smuggling and trafficking networks connected to departure points across West Africa.
Having no other alternatives, those migrants are obliged to rely on these unknown people. For
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the latter, the desert adventure is all about moneymaking. They profitably take advantage of the
situation.
Along their journeys to the desert, migrants undergo increasing exploitation and unhuman
conditions such as being stripped of their possessions, being kidnapped or held for ransoms, or
being killed. Secret spectacles: “The story of a migrant spy” by Joel Gunter (a journalist at BBC
Africa), is a salient example to understand the vulnerability and exploitation those Sub-Saharan
African migrants face along the terrific desert journey. In The story of a migrant spy published
in May 23, 2019, at BBC Africa Eye Journal, Gunter described the story of a 25-year-old valiant
and plucky Ghanaian young man named Azeteng, who after being inspired by film and
documentaries about being a spy or secret agent, faced the desert’s adventure in order to
understand the way smugglers operate their business and the risks Sub-Saharan African migrants
confront during the horrendous desert journey. For him, to fight for human dignity, something
needed to be done. Talking about the exploitation Azeteng and other African migrants faced,
Gunter (2019) writes:
“It was night when the trucks came to an abrupt stop, jolting Azeteng from a half-sleep. Voices
called out from the dark, ordering the migrants to get out, and they were surrounded by men in military
fatigues carrying AK-47s. We had hit the first Tuareg rebel checkpoint. They fired shots into the air and
ordered the migrants to line up to pay. Those who did not have enough money were told to form separate
lines and had their pockets searched and possessions were taken. Then, they were beaten. Azeteng was
hit hard in the side of the head, knocking his glasses off his face. A Gambian man, who Azeteng had
befriended on the journey, held up his Koran and begged in vain for them to stop”.
“Azeteng put his glasses back out on, and overcoming a swell of fear, he pressed the tiny button
under the arm. The grainy footage captured the migrants shuffling past a militant holding out a large
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plastic bowl, depositing cash. When the bowl was full, another militant tipped it into a larger bowl.
Those who had paid were ordered to sit on the sand and wait. The wind whipped up and the cold started
to bite”.

Two Senegalese migrants, Babacar Ndiaye and Omar Baldé, provided their own testimony:
“Smugglers asked us to pay 400.000f Cfa ($659, 88) in order to be taken. Once this sum was
paid, they took us to Tangier, and from there we were on the way to the desert in indescribable
conditions. We were forty people in a small truck. Some were stacked unceremoniously in the
back of the truck and others were perched on luggage doors. We looked like sheep ready to be
sent to the slaughterhouse” (Le Quotidien, 2000).
Beyond increasing exploitation, vulnerability, and unhuman conditions, are the high death
toll of thousands of Senegalese migrants resulting from thirst, starvation, and illnesses during the
desert journey. “There were a lot of people who died in the desert, Senegalese and other
nationalities who undertook this journey through the desert. They died of thirst and hunger,
combined with the ill-treatment that they suffered during the adventure,” witnessed the deported
young Senegalese Koutcubo Dramé who undertook the desert journey (Le Soleil, 2005).
Moreover, many of them who have survived, are left stranded along their transit across those
Northern Arabian regions like Derna and Misrata (in Libya), and Tangier, Tetouan, Rabat, Salé
and Bouarfa (in Morocco), where they experience uniquely challenging situations and
horrendous conditions that affect their overall well-being. “We are more than 5,000 Senegalese
in this country in such difficult conditions. Many of us live the ordeal in dormitory cities of
Rabat, Salé, Casablanca, Tangier, and Tetouan,” revealed the young Senegalese Babacar Ndiaye
(Le Quotidien, 2000). His words are confirmed by his companion of misfortune Omar Baldé,
who with twenty of his misfortune companions paid the monthly rent of 15,000 Dirhams (99.000
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Cfa Franc or $197) for a small room in which all of them crammed each night for six months in
Morocco. “We do not even have anything left in our pockets,” he added (Le Quotidien, 2000).
Similarly, handcuffed bodies of thousands of Senegalese migrants, some with swollen eyes
and broken teeth, others with broken jaws, disfigured faces, are dragged along the corridors of
European police stations and detention centers where they are locked up for days before being
deported back to Senegal in truly horrendous conditions. They add more desolation and
affliction to their families, where all hopes have been shattered and only pain and grief are left.
Those who manage to make it to Europe are scattered over the European peninsula of Spain,
Italy, where they face discrimination, oppression, marginalization, stereotypes, and xenophobia.
Despite the death and suffering, these young people keep on migrating. Every day, news on
the television and newspapers’ headlines herald thousands of Senegalese who try to reach
Europe. Why does a whole generation of young Senegalese resort to such desperate and
dangerous Migrations to Europe, known as the “Barca or Barsaakh” phenomenon? Chapter 3
and 4 answers this question.

H1: Colonial Relations and Dependency ties between Senegal and France as explanatory
variable of migrations
In chapter 3, I explained that with France-Senegal colonial relations and dependency,
Senegal, even independent since the 1960s, is still not autonomous. This is due to France’s
colonial legacy and its deep-seated history in Senegal that makes Senegal making very reliant on
France. Because of its reliance on France, the economic growth witnessed by Senegal follows
very closely the path of colonial extraverted economy in favor of the former colonial power
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France. Put differently, the trend of Senegal’s economic growth reflects the colonial economic
development model. This can be seen in terms of foreign trade, which makes Senegal dependent
on which external partners are prepared to buy and sell to Senegal. The relation with France
allowed high-priced manufactured imports, minimum metropolitan public investments, mostly in
infrastructure projects and financial deals beneficial to France. France is Senegal’s main trading
partner and its leading foreign investor with more than 78% of FDI stock (2.2billion in 2015),
and over 1.7 billion Euros worth of investment in Senegal. This can also be seen in terms of
exports of Senegal’s crucial products such as: Gold (US$ 240m), fresh fish (US$230m), oil
products (US$212m), cement (US$ 167m), phosphates (US$ 150m) and groundnut products
(Us$ 123m). These statistics issued in 2015 retrieved from the sources aforementioned in
chapter 3, are salient examples that show that Senegal is more dependent on the global economy
(particularly on France, which is its largest trading partner) than on the national economy. The
outcome has been a deregulation of Senegal’s financial market to allow the integration in the
global market. This creates trade deficits as well as balance of payment deficits, forcing Senegal
to borrow from IMF to cover shortfalls in foreign exchange. The outcome has also been
economic stagnation, poor economic development and misery that many Senegalese people face
in their daily lives. By weakening the Senegalese economy, the colonial dependent situation has
created conditions of generalized economic poverty and lack of opportunity for young people.
This situation causes migrations to Europe and elsewhere.
The facts support my first hypothesis. In the interview I conducted with Mamadou Mbengue,
angler at Ngaparou (an adjacent town located on the west side of Mbour in Senegal), he asserted
that:
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“The phenomenon of young Senegalese migrations to Europe referred to “Barca or Barsaakh” could be
linked to the dependent relationship between France and Senegal. Even if the latter got its independence
since 1960, Senegal is still close to France. This is because of the bilateral political and economic
relationship between the two countries. This existing relationship leads to the economic imbalance
between the formerly colonized country and its former colonizer. This imbalance can be seen with the
underdevelopment of Senegal and the inherent poverty people encounter in this country, while France is
enriching itself from Senegal’s monoculture and natural resources, making it a thriving country and an
Eldorado (a dream country) in the eyes of many young Senegalese people. For him, these factors explain
the will of young Senegalese people to risk their life by using boats or by crossing the desert”.

In the interview I held with Pape Fily, a 70-year-old retired professor of history at my high
school college (Ousmane Soce Diop of Rufisque), who lived in “Arafate” (the Southside of
Rufisque in Senegal), he asserted that:
“The colonial dependency between France and Senegal caused the stagnation of the Senegalese
economy because of the massive export of its agricultural and fishing products to France and other parts
of Europe but with low-income revenues for Senegal. This created a stagnation in the Senegalese
economy. In addition to that, Senegal’s trade partner is France. This makes Senegal to operate in the
global economy of France and Europe rather in favor of its national economy, leading to the deregulation
of its financial market to allow Senegal’s integration in the global market. As a result, there is a recurrent
trade deficit as well as balance of payment deficit over the years that force Senegal to borrow from IFM
to cover the shortfalls in foreign exchange. There is thus need for Foreign Aid. This should be taken into
consideration to explain Senegalese migrations to Europe and the “Barca or Barsaakh” phenomenon”.

141

H2: State Power and Elite Appropriation of Resources in Postcolonial Senegal as the
second explanatory variable of migrations
In chapter 4, I provided an explanation related to the role of Senegalese elites in shaping
these migrations. In Senegal hailed for its “model” democracy, features associated with
authoritarianism were and are manifest. After decades of its independence, the country’s
political reality displays a state in which all successive political regimes have resorted to
authoritarian means. By their control of the Senegalese state, they apply their political authority
in the decision-making at the presidency and manipulate the country’s institutions by setting up
reforms that shape elections to their advantage. They coerce and neutralize the opposition,
expand and foster corruption within the Senegalese society, and violate the freedom of the press.
All of them violate the rights and basic needs of many Senegalese people, thus, causing popular
discontent and disappointment, and making the country less hospitable. The outcome has been
the waves of violence that were manifest in Senegal, where people saw revolutionary violence as
a means to their salvation, which plunged the country into instability. All of the successive
rulers in Senegal monopolized power and enhanced themselves as the supreme holders by
building patronage and clientelist networks with some opposition parties through which they
privatize the state resources. By doing all of this, they all have violated the basic tenets of
democracy that require transparency in the elections, fairness, and evenness in the playing field,
consistent respect of the civil liberties and freedoms. They resort to practices that compromise
and constrain the opposition from winning elections. Similarly, I also highlighted the fact that
by using authoritarian means of governance, Senegalese rulers have dissipated the state
resources. (See chapter 4).
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Therefore, in Senegal where features associated with authoritarianism were and are manifest
and where resources are appropriated or dissipated, it is impossible for young Senegalese people
to stay because they cannot fulfill their aspirations. The holders of state power’s looting have
destroyed the socio-economic landscapes of the country.
The field research supports the second hypothesis of the thesis. In an interview, I conducted
with Fatou Kine alias Kitieu, a 49-year-old married woman selling fish around the beach of
Kayar (a small coast of Senegal located in Thies’ region in Senegal), she blames the Senegalese
rulers. She argued that:
“The Senegalese rulers have always been here for their interests only and not for those of the
Senegalese nation. Since our independence, the observation in Senegal is general. Presidents, ministers,
administrators and even local officials, enrich themselves with their families by monopolizing the
country’s main source of wealth and by embezzling the country’s public funds. They have sowed
corruption at the national level. This scourge which lasts and which until now marks our societies is a
fundamental reason, which explains this phenomenon of Barca or Barsaakh of the young people because
they are well aware that they cannot count on such governments. As “badola” (Wolof expression
referring to those coming from a poor family), the only possible solution we find is to support and
encourage our kids to attempt the adventure whether by sea or desert in order to get out of this misery
inflicted to the youth by the Senegalese rulers”.

Moussa Thiam is an elementary professor in Senegal. Based on the discussion I had with
him, he blamed the former political regime led by Abdoulaye Wade as being responsible for all
these problems. He pointed out that:
“The outgoing regime of Wade has destroyed Senegal with their misrule, massive lootings and
embezzlements affecting almost the entire Senegal, and leaving only a vacuum in the Senegalese national
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slush fund. Senegal, classified in 2015 among the least developed countries, will need clarity in terms of
governance, national strategies and effective actions in order to tackle these massive young Senegalese
migrations to Europe”.

Maurice Soudieck DIONE, Doctor in Political Science and Professor-Researcher at Gaston
Berger University of Saint-Louis asserted that:
“The Senegalese state cannot adapt the Senegalese educational system to the real needs of economic
development, which depends on promoting sciences, technology, and innovations. This culminates in the
high number of children and adults being excluded from the official education system, the general decline
in learning and the repetitive and prolonged strikes of teachers and students (both high school and
university). Rather than assigning specific objectives and attempt to meet them, the Senegalese state
seems to manage disorder in education, despite the considerable share of the national budget allocated to
the education sector. The recurrence of the same problems over several decades imputes the
responsibility to the Senegalese state because of a lack of organization and method; weakness in
forecasting, prevention, anticipation, planning, and strategic management capabilities. There is an
authority and credibility crisis, related to the non-respect of the given word and commitments. The
Senegalese state then falls easily into authoritarianism: police violence, requisitions, and the threat of
firing radiation, corruption, and embezzlements. It seeks to constrain rather than convince! Yet repressive
solutions do not guarantee either their effectiveness or their viability over time. They only create
insecurity and isolation. As a result, many young Senegalese people have only one solution. They resort
to “Barca or Barsaakh” phenomenon to resolve the problem”.

The aforementioned Professor Pape Fily also highlighted this authoritarianism tendency of
the Senegalese leaders and the misrule that comes with it as an explanation of the “Barca or
Barsaakh” phenomenon. He said that:
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“The authoritarianism tendency of the Senegalese leaders has manifested itself through the crisis in
the educational system. The complaints of the Senegalese students are generally heard only through
strikes, vandalism, and sometimes by the sequestration of the chief education officer. Violence becomes
the only way to complain. It is almost approved and, worse, it is legitimized. The monthly payroll of
teachers and tutors is a problem, which leads to complaints and strikes. Instead of trying to solve the
problem, the Senegalese government issues a warrant for their arrest in such a brutal way. This worsens
the situation and creates a perennial problem of lack of quality in high education. It compromises
students’ development and future. To these problems, one has to add the difficulties of implementing the
European system of L.M.D (License, Masters, et Doctorat), “Bachelor, Masters, and Ph.D”, in the new
Senegalese educational system. This failure increases the frustrations of the youth. This explains these
waves of migrations towards Europe”.

Even though most of the empirical evidence supports both of the claims made about my two
proposed hypotheses above, it must be mentioned, however, that Poverty in Senegal shares
similarities with that of other poor countries.

Poverty-Driven Migrations
I define poverty as a situation in which one lacks the means to meet the basic needs for a
minimum standard of living. According to Ndiaye, “It is perceived and understood by
structuralists as a social and economic phenomenon congenital with institutional forms and a
specific political and economic environment, and is experienced in a particular way by certain
social categories and tends to designate a certain social condition because it, first of all, refers to
low incomes in a social and economic context” (Aina, Chachage and Yao, 2004, p. 116).
Related to poverty is economic deprivation. It can be defined as the condition of having
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inadequate or unjust access to financial resources that result from several circumstances
including unemployment, unfair eligibility standards for financial benefits and services that make
them inaccessible to those in need (Kirst-Ashman, 2013, p. 61).
The following statistics fully confirm the manifestation and magnitude of poverty as well as
the economic deprivation in Senegal. With an estimated population of around 16 million,
Senegal is a low-income African state where 46.7% are living in poverty. 94 Residents in rural
areas mainly derive their livelihoods from rain-fed agriculture and livestock, and are highly
vulnerable to external shocks, while residents in the outskirts of Dakar live off informal and
largely unproductive services (World Bank Group, 2018, p. 23). 95 In both of these areas where
living conditions are very precarious, disparities in poverty even exist between them. In rural
areas, 66% of residents are considered poor compared to 23% of residents in Dakar (Lano,
2017). About 38% of Senegal’s populations live on $1.90 or less a day. 96 Based on the 2000
Senegal’s socio-economic situation report, the potentially active population aged 15 and over
went from 5,678,497 to 7,299,215 between 2002 and 2010. 97 That is 202,000 potential job
seekers on average per year. Almost 87.80% of the population between 15 and 34 years old
work in the informal sector. The latter is the ordinary resourcefulness, an unstructured sector
that offers no security or any form of social protection. Salaried employees, the only secure ones,
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Statistics retrieved from CIA World Factbook
https://www.indexmundi.com/senegal/population_below_poverty_line.html
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“Systematic Country Diagnostic of Senegal”. (October 4, 2018). Retrieved from World Bank (pp 23-107):
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/336611539873310474/pdf/systematic-country-diagnostic-of-senegal-post-roc-forrvp-clearance-clean-20181004-002-10122018-636754106488285264.pdf
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“Poverty and Equity data portray in Senegal”. (April 2019). Retrieved from The World Bank:
https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Archives2019/Global_POVEQ_SEN.pdf
“2000 Senegal’s socio-economic situation report”. Retrieved from ANSD:
http://www.ansd.sn/ressources/ses/chapitres/3-Emploi_2010.pdf
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hover around 300,000 across the country. The majority of them are in the private sector and
public service (Seck, 2014, p. 69).
Whereas 200,000 young people are spilled in the job market each year, the average annual
creation of new direct jobs by the private sector is 40,000, of which 20,000 are located in
Dakar’s region (Seck, 2014, p. 69). As for the Public Service, it does not offer 20,000 jobs even
during the best years (Seck, 2014, p. 69). In other words, the supply rises around 20% of the
demand, thus, leaving 80% of the working population stranded.
In terms of its fertility rate, Senegal is almost 4.5 children per woman. Young people
comprise 60% of the Senegalese population. This culminates in the illiteracy rate of 40% and a
high unemployment rate of 12.7%, both of which provide dim outlooks for Senegalese youth
(Lano, 2017). The performance of the education sector is deficient. More than 44% of the
Senegalese population are reported to be illiterate. 98 Additionally, the health coverage rate in
Senegal is very low. Only a minority of the Senegalese population gets access to it, thus, making
the health’s condition very deteriorating. According to Ndiaye (Aina, Chachage and Yao, 2004,
pp. 109-117), “Diseases such as malaria, diarrhea, and malnutrition are widespread in the
country and killed almost half of the population whom medicines had become inaccessible to
them”. Yet, access to water and electricity remains another challenge. Thousands of Senegal’s
households daily suffer from water shortages and endless power cuts.
Moreover, in terms of GDP, Senegal rose at an average rate of 4.5% from 1995 to 2005
(Lano, 2017). While other African countries enjoyed economic growth after 2005, Senegal’s
economy, however, rose at an average rate of 3.3% (Lano, 2017). In this perspective, the World
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Data Retrieved from The World Factbook:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html
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Bank reported that Senegal’s GDP growth is too low for a significant poverty reduction. There
has been rapid inflation in the price of manufacturing goods and a decline in economic growth
especially during the last fifteen years, attributed to the global financial crisis and the rise in fuel
prices. This is accompanied by long-standing problems such as high cost of living, poor social
welfare, unemployment, and persistent power shortages in Dakar and the sub-regions.
Additionally, there are other problems related to the traditional sectors such as agriculture and
fisheries, which are the motor of the country’s economy and foreign exchange. The agricultural
sector is regularly threatened by ecological condition such as climate changes, drought, floods
inclement weather, combined with the negative effects of the structural adjustment program, the
burden of the external debts, and the strong dependency ties that link Senegal and its former
colonial power France, negatively affect the country’s terms of trade. Indeed, the dependency on
France and the traditional monocrop of groundnuts sold in a pattern of unequal exchange render
the Senegalese economy weak and unproductive. Fishing also encounters enormous problems
related to climate change and the state’s mismanagement. Both types of economic activities no
longer provide the livelihoods they once did.
These data on poverty and economic deprivation were caused or exacerbated by the
Senegal’s colonial relations and dependency ties with France and the authoritarian-like
appropriation of state resources by its power holders. Both help explain the manifestations and
magnitude of poverty, the economic deprivation in Senegal highlighted by the severe
deterioration of living conditions in both the rural and urban areas, high unemployment rates and
low-income revenues, the country’s patchy development, and the financial markets that are out
of reach for most people. These are the reasons for migrations.
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The country is in a patchy development and its financial markets are out of reach for most
people. As a result, it affects the living standards of Senegalese and creates an endemic, chronic,
and exponential unemployment. The Senegalese youth feels idle, helpless, and depressed.
Millions of them, who have reached the working, marrying, and making-a-living stage, mope
with poverty. They endure daily a contemptuous, violent, and degrading treatment, and live in a
total ordeal. Very frustrated, many of these young Senegalese consider migrations as their only
way out. As their economic aspirations are not being met in Senegal, and aware of the enormous
disparities in terms of development and income between Europe and Senegal, thousands of
young Senegalese are lured away each year to Europe by any possible means in quest for
fortunes to improve their living conditions and that of their family. They are willing to risk their
lives in order to seize employment opportunities and to take jobs that the more privileged locals
do not wish to do in the European countries.
In the second place, poverty translates into the social stagnation or the inability to fulfill a
social role in the Senegalese society and within their own family. As we know, a person is
conditioned by his social environment, which reflects and anchors his reality. In the Senegalese
society, those successful migrants referred to in Wolof as “modou-modou” play an important
role model in the Senegalese households by their increased remittances that not only provide
income to their family but also bolster the Senegalese economy. As those in Senegal witness,
these “modou-modou” are the owners of many buildings and live in luxurious houses with their
families in Senegal. They provide their family with last generation materials and items. They
are the ones who can afford to get married to beautiful women or even to buy the last generation
cars’ model. Many young Senegalese, who mope with poverty, endure daily a contemptuous and
degrading treatment within their family. They are marginalized and are often considered invalid
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persons because they are not able to fulfill their family expectations. They are thus evaluated in
financial terms; who they are in the Senegalese society and within their own family is
determined by their financial status. Therefore, living in a total ordeal in the Senegalese society
and within their own family, many young Senegalese perceive Europe as an “Eldorado” (a dream
country) where opportunities are widely accessible to all people. This prevailing perception of
Europe as paradise is embodied in the image of “modou-modou”. Influenced or fascinated by
the latter, who reflect the image of prosperous Europe where it is good to live and to earn money,
many young Senegalese aspire to migrate to Europe. For them, migrations are synonymous with
success, and they feel convinced that this is the only way to escape from poverty and to finally
liberate themselves from the burden they experience daily in Senegalese society and within their
own family. This makes the desires for migrations in them irresistible, like a collective dream or
even an obsession. They are attached to the idea of getting to Europe and even dangerous
methods of traveling seem better than the perils of remaining in Senegal.
All of this means that the Senegalese youth’s aspirations to migrate to Europe are driven by
poverty in Senegal. This poverty is caused or exacerbated by Senegal’s dependence relations
and its politics of looting.
In an interview held with Mor Mbengue, a 24-year-old student converted into angler, who
lives in Kayar (a small coast of Senegal located in Thies’ region in Senegal) he agreed that:
“Many young Senegalese want to risk their lives in this dangerous adventure because of a lack of
opportunities in Senegal. Jobs are rare to find and many young people work in the informal sectors,
which do not offer long-lasting security and social protection. Such situations compel many of them to
migrate in order to seek a better tomorrow”.
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Nogaye Mbengue is a 51-year-old widow fish seller. She sells fish daily at the beaches in
order to take care of her three children, respectively named Omar (22-year-old), Demba (18year-old), and Dieynaba (15-year-old). For her, life in Senegal is very hard and she is struggling
daily to take care of her three remaining children, crammed into a tiny apartment. Her oldest
son, Madione 29-year-old, passed away two years ago while trying to undertake the treacherous
adventure of crossing the Atlantic Ocean to Spain with some of his friends. Eyes in tears, she
explained to me that she used the money she saved for a long period to provide her oldest son
with the amount of money required for the adventure ticket to Spain. With the loss of her oldest
son, she blames herself for being responsible for the death of her oldest son. She thought that
seeing her oldest son in Europe might have brought change she desired to see within her family.
“La pirogue” released in 2012 by Moussa Touré, as mentioned earlier, highlighted poverty
in Senegal as the main cause of Senegalese migrations to Europe. The hardships of life and the
complexity of the socio-economic conditions in Senegal compel many young Senegalese to
migrate to Europe. They perceive Europe as a paradise where opportunities are widely
accessible to all people.
According to my former high school teacher, Mr. Diop, 52-year-old, who lives in Rufisque
(a town located in the West of Senegal, which used to be one of the four colonial townships
founded by the former French colonizers), “The question of Senegalese migrations to Europe and
the “Barca or Barsaakh” phenomenon is related to difficulties that most Sub-Saharan African
countries encounter, including Senegal where life’s conditions are difficult. Young people do
not have the opportunities to have a job and usually they want to migrate to Europe in order to
find jobs and make their lives and the ones of their families better. Most of them are caretakers
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of their families. Such conditions compel many of them to migrate to Europe to bring changes in
their families”.
Mass Faye is a 45-year-old Senegalese actor living in Rufisque. He spent almost 7years in
the field of theater in Rufisque (Senegal). Based on the discussion I had with him, he said that:
“Migrations have existed for many years. They are becoming more and more extensive in most
African countries where poverty is very high. Such conditions have created favoritism among classes and
different ethnic tribes in most African countries. To deal with this situation, young African people only
see one option: migrating by any means possible towards developed countries or rich countries to make a
better tomorrow. For them, migrations are the only way to tackle the distress and precariousness they are
facing. The migrations are more often illegal because the formalities to sojourn in most European
countries such as France, Spain, and Italy are difficult. The visa is not easy to get. As a result, the only
accessible way for these young people is to risk their lives by crossing the desert and the Atlantic Ocean
by using boats, pirogues or ships. For him, migrations touch many desperate young people in their quest
for a better life and future. Their only way to get out of this horrible situation is to attempt the dangerous
trip to Europe with the call Barca or Barsaakh”.

Mamadou Sy Albert in Nouvelhebdo (June 23-29 no11, 2016) argued that:
“There is an emergent poverty in Senegal. It is growing and is completely invading the Senegalese
society. The fight against poverty or its eradication makes more and more skeptical many analysts of the
Senegalese economy and actors of the civil society. Macky Sall, President of the Republic of Senegal,
and his government make it their major concern and despite the considerable efforts they have made with
their national strategies and action plans to deal with it, poverty is still present. Dakar, the administrative
capital of Senegal, offers the evidence every day. The city is unbearable and residents can no longer have
three full meals per day. Resourcefulness remains the privileged mechanism of the economic survival of
whole sections of the population. Alongside the poor people who have no monthly wage incomes or
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other revenues to meet the traditional human needs, there is an army of informal workers coming from
varied backgrounds with irregular and volatile incomes. They are in a situation of pronounced social
precariousness. Informal workers and all underclass groups are part of this human chain of the urban
poor. They live in conditions of pauperization defying all human dignity. All these explain the
Senegalese migrations to Europe, particularly the “Barca or Barsaakh” phenomenon”.

Ousmane Ndiaye was referred to me by another interviewee, Mr. Diop. He did the sea
adventure from Senegal to Canary island (Spain) three times and his boat was intercepted by the
Spanish coastguard and towed back to Senegal. He is a 29-year old local angler and soccer
player living in Thiaroye sur Mer. Based on the discussion I had with him, he said that:
“I chose to migrate because my parents are very poor and I was not able to help them with the
meager amount of money I collected as an angler and local player. At one point, I was no longer able to
stand the miserable conditions my parents were in, and these weighed on me so much that the only
possible solution I found was to attempt the deadly adventure at sea at my peril during the last 3years. I
thought that making it to Spain might change the living conditions of my parents because I was very
skilled in soccer and my ambitions were to make it to Spain and become a professional soccer player. I
made it three times to Spain on the boat but ended up being towed back to Senegal”.

Abdoul is a local footballer in Thiaroye Sur Mer (a city slum located in Dakar). He plays in
what we call in Wolof “Nawetane”, meaning a small competition between districts of the same
town. Based on the record I took while I was interviewing him, he believes that:
“Young Senegalese’s migrations to Europe are due to the social conditions and status within their
family. In the Senegalese society, those who are given attention in most families are those who have a
good job and a certain level of social status or conditions. However, those who are not in the same
position feel always marginalized within their own family. Such conditions compel many of them to
migrate for being respected within their own family”.
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Babacar Gaye is 32years-old and lives in Leona Valda (Rufisque). He is an angler with an
experience of 15years in terms of sea navigation. He became angler when he was 17years-old
and started navigating and commuting between places. In my conversation with him, he argued
that:
“One of the main causes that forced me to migrate was because of those Senegalese migrants
“modou-modou”, who sent a big amount of money to their family monthly, and who built beautiful and
big houses in such a short space of time. For me, these people reflected the image of a prosperous Europe
where it was good to live and to earn money, while I was struggling so hard in Senegal to find a better
living because I did not earn much money as an angler. This compelled me to join in 2013 the Barca or
Barsaakh phenomenon by playing the role of promoter and with 250 people aboard. We luckily entered
Spain with the help of the Spanish Red Cross who was not able to identify the nationality of the migrants
after detaining them for 30days in their camp. After being released by the Spanish Red Cross, I started
small jobs during the summer like shoe polish, washing cars, harvesting citrons in plantations. I started
making a good living and sending monthly money to my family during the 4years spent in Spain.
Unfortunately, I was arrested and deported back in 2013 because I was in possession of a fake passport”.
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Conclusion
Human migrations, generally defined as a displacement of peoples from one place to another
for many purposes, have long been a source of many scholars’ debates. In this research, I have
attempted to address the specific case of Senegalese migrations to Europe known as the “Barca
or Barsaakh” phenomenon. Historically, Senegalese migrations to Europe started under
colonialism with the massive recruitments by the French colonial administration within the
Senegalese territory. This practice of European colonial administration caused the first wave of
Senegalese migrations towards Europe during the colonial time to conform to French colonial
needs and expectations. Senegalese migrations to Europe continued in the post-colonial period
as part of France’s post-war reconstruction and its need for labor to revitalize its economy. They
were facilitated by the economic logic of immigration legislation between 1945 and 1973, which
enabled France to remedy its domestic labor shortage by extracting labor from its former
colonies thus leading to massive migrations of Senegalese people to Europe during the postcolonial period. In the 2000s, Senegalese migrations to Europe increased tremendously with the
“Barca or Barsaakh” phenomenon, involving a whole generation of Senegalese youth.
Throughout this research, I have provided three broad theoretical frameworks (colonialism
and dependency, post-colonialism, globalization and its neoliberal ideology), to account for the
factors behind this phenomenon. Even if globalization and its neoliberal ideology do help
answer the research question, I did not focus on globalization because the externship time
constraint did not allow me to collect the type of data that it requires. Therefore, in the context
of this study, I have relied on colonialism and dependency and post-colonialism as my
conceptual and theoretical frameworks to explain Senegalese migrations to Europe.
In light of the two theoretical frameworks, I have proposed two hypotheses:
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H1: If a dependency relationship develops between a colonial power and its former colony, then
the former colony’s economy is likely to be weak and unproductive. France’s relationship with
Senegal is a dependent relationship in which Senegal’s monoculture economy and general
development depend on France’s economic, financial and technical assistance. By weakening
the Senegalese economy, the colonial dependent situation has created conditions of generalized
poverty and lack of economic opportunities for young people. This situation causes migrations to
Europe and elsewhere.
H2: The more post-colonial holders of state power resort to authoritarian rule and the
privatization of the state, the more likely they will loot national resources for their private
interests. In Senegal, post-colonial rulers have used authoritarian means of governance and
appropriated the state resources as personal property. This has created a situation of generalized
poverty and lack of economic opportunities for young people. The outcome has been massive
migrations to Europe and elsewhere.
The evidence in chapter 3, 4, and 5 tends to support my two hypotheses. Nevertheless, the
persistence of poverty in Senegal and its similarities in some aspects with other poor countries
suggest that my two causal factors may not completely explain poverty in Senegal. Although my
hypotheses are empirically verified for the most part, poverty in Senegal may be partly caused by
factors (such as drought and globalization-induced structural adjustment programs of IMF) not
accounted for in my hypotheses. Migrations in Senegal are for example exacerbated by the
requirement imposed on Senegal by Neoliberal policies, such as the reduction of the labor force
in the public administration and cut in state subsidies for education health and other services.
As a young Senegalese student, I find it a major interest to contribute through this study to
an understanding of the aches and pains of the young Senegalese people in the hope of seeing
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some change in the Senegalese society. This research throws some light on the incapacity of the
African State, and particularly the Senegalese State, to unleash the potential of its youth. The
inadequacy of the education system is a good example. As a result, to leave the country or to
stay is now a matter of life and death both literally and metaphorically. This thesis will help
inform, and hopefully raise the consciousness of Senegalese leaders to consider and to open the
door to these Senegalese young people who constitute the hope of the nation of tomorrow.
As a student in the African American department, the study’s interests also lies in its Pan
African implications because many of Senegal’s problems are shared by other African countries.
Senegalese, African American and Afro South Americans share the racial component of
migrations. Thus, this study will help to raise the debate of leadership and management in the
Pan-African world. Moreover, the light of the proposed hypotheses and the research’s findings
constitute a starting point and an avenue for future works to further evaluate them.
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEWS
Kayar: A small coast of Senegal located in Thies’ region whose artisanal fishing is the main
activity.
Fatou Kine alias Kitieu, a 49-year-old married woman selling fish around Kayar’s beach.
(July 22, 2019).
Mbengue Mor, a 24-year-old student converted into angler. (July 22, 2019).
Ndiaye Alioune 64 years-old angler, whose son migrated illegally to France by passing
through the Canary Islands (Spain) with a local pirogue. (July 22, 2019).
Thiaroye Sur Mer: A city slum located in Dakar where the main activity is fishing. The small
activities in this area are selling coconuts, mangoes, and vegetables. These are practiced by
many people, men and women from different ethnic groups.
Abdoul, a local footballer who plays in what we call in Wolof “Nawetane”, meaning a small
competition between districts of the same town. (July 23, 2019).
Badara, a retired professor and angler-aged 62-year-old. (July 23, 2019).
Mbengue Nogaye, a 51year-old fish seller. Her oldest son, Madione 29-year-old, passed
away two years ago while trying to undertake the treacherous adventure of crossing the Atlantic
Ocean to Spain with some of his friends. (July 23, 2019).
Ndiaye Ousmane is the one referred to me by Mr. Diop. He did the sea adventure from
Senegal to Canary island (Spain) three times and his boat was intercepted by the Spanish
coastguard and towed back to Senegal. He is a 29-year old local angler and soccer player living
in Thiaroye sur Mer (July 31, 2019).
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Mbour: A city located on the small coast of Senegal. This city is well known because of the
many sightseers who come to places like Saly, Ngaparou, Somone to cite few, in Senegal. Mbour
is also well known due to its important daily fishing activities, making it be known in Wolof as
“Gokhoume Lebous” (city of anglers). (July 24, 2019).
Mbengue Mamadou, angler at Ngaparou (an adjacent town located on the west side of
Mbour). (July 24, 2019)
Rufisque: The city where I was born and raised is a town located on West of Dakar, which used
to be one of those four colonial townships created by the former French colonizers. It is one of
the main reasons why this place is marked by its old French colonial architecture. Rufisque
served as a transition port of African slaves that were transported to Goree Island, where they
were temporarily imprisoned and then sent to Europe. Rufisque is also well known because it is
mainly composed of Lebous community practicing daily fishing activities in this city. That is the
reason why this city is called “Tenguedj” meaning a “Lebou fishing community”.
Faye Mass, a 45-year-old Senegalese actor living in Rufisque. He spent almost 7years in
the field of theater in Rufisque (Senegal). He is the one who plays the role of coordinator in “La
pirogue (The Pirogue)” movie by Moussa Toure. (July 25, 2019).
Mr. Diop, a 52-year-old Professor. He was one of my former high school professors. (July
25, 2019).
Gaye Babacar, a 32years-old man who lives in Leona Valda (Rufisque). He is an angler
with an experience of 15years in terms of sea navigation. He became angler when he was
17years-old and started navigating and commuting between places. (July 31, 2019).
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Pape Fily, a 70-year-old retired professor of history at my high school college (Ousmane
Soce Diop of Rufisque), who lived in “Arafate” (the Southside of Rufisque in Senegal). (August
1, 2019).
Saint-Louis: Commonly surnamed “Ndar” in Wolof, is one of the big cities in Senegal located in
the North-West coast of Senegal. Saint-Louis is well known as one of those four townships
created by the French colonial administration during colonial times. It is marked by its colonial
architecture, “le pont Faidherbe” (Faidherbe’s bridge), and “la place Faidherbe” (Faidherbe’s
place), created around the 18th century where ancient monuments, such as the governor’s Palace
and Saint-Louis Cathedral, can be found. There is also the C.R.D.S “Centre de Recherches et de
Documentation du Senegal” (Research and Documentation Center of Senegal) essentially
dedicated to traditional arts and crafts.
Dione Maurice Soudieck, a doctor in Political Science and Professor-Researcher at Gaston
Berger University of Saint-Louis. (July 26, 2019).
Thiam Moussa, an elementary teacher.
I.F.A.N “Fundamental Institute of Black Africa” (DAKAR): An academic and research
institution that is located at Cheikh Anta Diop University of Dakar. Its aim is to help students
and researchers by facilitating access to necessary resources in their field of research.
Fall Pape Demba, a senior researcher whose research interest is on international mobility
in West Africa and in particular that of Senegalese within the African continent and towards the
countries of the North. In addition to the extensive research on African and Senegalese
migrations, I mentioned above, Papa Demba Fall also focuses on issues of migratory politics, the
impact on group identities and on local development. (July 30, 2019).
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